CHALLENGES POSED BY THE DPRK
FOR THE ALLIANCE AND THE REGION

Korea Economic Institute

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FROM THE SIX-PARTY TALKS TO A NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY REGIME? 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION STRATEGIES AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

by Joseph R. Cerami

Introduction and Background

Ongoing difficulties in the six-party talks for eliminating North Korean nuclear programs continue to dominate the Northeast Asian security agenda. The public debate over the appropriate U.S. policy and negotiating strategies offers stark choices. On the one hand, the Bush administration argues for continuing a multilateral approach for bringing regional pressures to bear, especially encouraging Chinese policy leadership. The opposition, especially as voiced by democratic candidates in the 2004 U.S. presidential election, called for the resumption of bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea. The objectives of both sides in the debate focus on similar objectives, including eliminating North Korean nuclear weapons along with nuclear weapons and long-range missile development programs. Given the current lack of progress, is there a better approach for regional or multilateral negotiations?

Bilateralists may point to the earlier success of the Agreed Framework. Critics of the Agreed Framework can point to the breakdown of the framework in 2000. The Clinton memoir cites the success of the framework as well as his failed attempts to continue diplomacy with North Korea to reduce tensions and pave the way for additional arms controls regarding long-range missiles.

Certainly, given current news, the stall in the six-party talks provides some pause for reflecting on alternatives for continuing along the current path. The purpose of this paper is to examine the possibilities for improving the current approach to North Korea using a theoretically informed multilateralist perspective. Institutional theory provides an alternative path to consider for addressing the current counterproliferation policy challenges in Northeast Asia. In addition to an institutional theoretical perspective, there is a practical example of a counterproliferation success for comparison with the Agreed Framework’s coercive diplomacy approach.

One widely recognized counterproliferation success is from the Clinton-era experience in the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs with Russia and the former Soviet republics. Balanced reviews of Nunn-Lugar programs note that, after a decade, their projects have “gained the kind of political, bureaucratic, and budgetary support that has all but institutionalized them.” For supporters of the Nunn-Lugar approach, the question is how to enhance these programs to gain additional benefits beyond the early projects for consolidating and controlling Soviet nuclear weapons in Russian territory. Graham Allison and others call for extending Nunn-Lugar-type projects to those that dismantle additional nuclear weapons, control fissile materials, and deny terrorists access to nuclear weapons and technology.

1. The secretary of defense in 1999, William Perry, called the North Korean crisis the most serious crisis in the first Clinton administration. His firsthand perspective led to his belief that the real potential for war was prevented because of the Agreed Framework negotiation. Perry, in Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 123–4, writes: “We were about to give the president a choice between a disastrous option—allowing North Korea to get a nuclear arsenal . . . and an unpalatable option, blocking this development, but thereby risking a destructive non-nuclear war.”


3. Henry D. Sokolski and Thomas Rissager, eds., Beyond Nunn-Lugar: Curbing the Next Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threats From Russia (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002).

This paper examines the policy development and implementation of the Clinton-era Nunn-Lugar programs to provide insights drawn from this positive example of success in counterproliferation policy. The institutionalist approach provides a framework for thinking about a regional security regime that goes beyond the current six-party framework in Northeast Asia. Institutionalist theory also provides scholarly insights for discussing the Nunn-Lugar framework to link international relations theory with the practical lessons drawn from a successful counterproliferation policy case. Another insight this case offers is in contrasting competitive strategies⁵ such as addressed in coercive diplomacy theory, with a cooperative strategic approach, as suggested in institutional theory.⁶

One option for current counterproliferation policymaking regarding North Korea, then, is to leverage ongoing issues and concerns, the six-party talks, and the episodic crisis atmosphere while building an institutional approach for a Northeast Asian security regime. Lepgold and Nincic address the theory and history of international institutionalism and the theoretical knowledge, and the practical experiences they recount suggest a road map for proceeding with institutional development.⁷ In brief, they propose a pattern of success based on international relations functionalist theories as well as the recent history of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).⁸ In brief, the option suggested here is the nurturing of a small group of like-minded states and leaders of those states (the six parties), focused around one specific functional area (counterproliferation), to build effective rules, organizations, and enforcement mechanisms for developing an effective Northeast Asian security regime.

**Institutionalism as a Cooperative Strategy**

As discussed in the previous section, in the North Korean case of the Agreed Framework negotiations, the Clinton administration engaged in a traditional, diplomatic approach, stressing principles and techniques similar to those drawn from the scholarly international relations theories of coercive diplomacy. The North Korean Agreed Framework case is representative of top-down policy leadership. President Clinton, Secretary of Defense William Perry, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and other high-level executive branch stakeholders were engaged in developing the administration’s policy and overseeing the bilateral U.S.-North Korean negotiations. Other U.S. officials and allied governments were consulted, including the U.S. Congress and the governments of the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) and Japan. The implementation of the Agreed Framework included the significant involvement of the United Nations (UN) with the involvement of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as the United States, especially its intelligence agencies, through their active monitoring.

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A second case study examining alternative approaches is significant for gaining insights into the conditions for developing effective national security counterproliferation policies. As argued previously, as shown by the history of the past decade, the Agreed Framework case suggests a failed counterproliferation effort. Given the lack of institutional and organizational roots, the Agreed Framework failed to achieve lasting effects in accordance with the U.S. objective of ending the North’s nuclear weapons program. In comparison, then, why is the Nunn-Lugar policy outcome generally agreed to be more successful than the Agreed Framework experience?

A more successful case—one led more directly by the secretary of defense along with Department of Defense (DOD) staff and influenced by other organizational stakeholders, including an engaged Congress and regional players—suggests additional insights into the components of effective counterproliferation policymaking. What insights does the Nunn-Lugar case provide in terms of an instance where executive and bureaucratic leadership contributed to successful and lasting policy innovation? What were the roles of the defense secretary and the DOD bureaucracy as well as the roles of the key senators? These executive and legislative branch leadership efforts were designed to address the critical proliferation threats of “loose nukes” from the former Soviet republics in the aftermath of the Cold War.

To gain theoretical insights to guide this case study, this paper introduces concepts drawn from the literature on international institutions. First, the U.S. outlook on international security institutions in the past century will be described briefly. Next, the major ideas and views in institutional theory will be outlined. Then, the known conditions for success or failure in institution building will be discussed. Last, these ideas and conditions will guide an examination of U.S. policy as developed by the secretary of defense and others involved in the CTR programs to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the former Soviet republics.

The twentieth-century history of the U.S. posture toward international institutions includes three cycles of engagement followed by withdrawal. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union during the George H. W. Bush (hereafter George Bush) presidency, international institutions came to be viewed more favorably once again. In 1991, George Bush called for a renewed international order under UN guidance after a successful international coalition contributed to the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces in the Gulf War. President Clinton continued this wave of engagement, promoting a policy of assertive multilateralism, especially pronounced in the coalition diplomacy and difficulties with UN and NATO policymakers regarding the employment of peacekeeping armed forces in the Balkans.

The cycle showed signs of again reversing away from international institutions as the second-term Clinton administration concerns grew regarding U.S. strength being overextended, especially after it experienced difficulties in international peacekeeping efforts in Haiti, Somalia, and the Balkans. During the 2000 presidential election, U.S. engagement and intervention abroad through international institutions came under intense criticism from George W. Bush’s campaign. With the second Bush’s election, there was evidence


again of a neoconservative backlash against international institutions. Soon after the election, the United States pulled out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the Russians. Antipathy toward international institutions could be observed even more clearly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. For instance, in a 2002 speech at the UN, George W. Bush clearly signaled his intention for the United States to go it alone if the UN did not act against Saddam Hussein:

We will work with the U.N. Security Council . . . But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced—the just demands of peace and security will be met—or action will be unavoidable.

The watershed moment for this new posture of U.S. unilateralism for preventive defense was highlighted in the U.S. war in Iraq starting in 2002, which the UN secretary general, Kofi Annan, viewed as illegal in terms of international law. On 15 September 2004, in response to a BBC journalist’s pointed questions about the U.S. war in Iraq, Annan replied, “Yes, I have indicated it is not in conformity with the UN charter. From our point of view and from the charter point of view it was illegal.” The second Bush administration had certainly not reduced involvement abroad as promised in the 2000 presidential campaign, and its apparent lack of patience for the diplomacy necessary for gaining UN approval for war (as authorized by Chapter VII of the UN Charter) is cited as a cause for the rush to war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

Given the prominence of the UN and NATO since World War II as well as the differing views of various U.S. administrations on the subject of the efficacy of international institutions and multilateral organizations, insights on international institutions are important as a guide to an understanding of the conditions for promoting effective policymaking. For instance, the literature on international institutions addresses the notion of these shifting worldviews in U.S. foreign and national security policies. Legro explores “why states fundamentally change their long-held ideas toward international affairs” and identifies two stages in such an ideational shift. The “reigning consensus” must collapse and then follows the consolidation of a new dominant and viable idea. If there is a new shift toward reengagement and multilateralism on the horizon, it remains to be learned what conditions tend to precipitate the collapse of one administration’s views as well as what conditions lead to the emergence of a new strategic approach. Despite periodic U.S. anxiety over institutional attachments, the threats of nuclear weapons, technology proliferation, and terrorism require policymakers to address these issues. The recent history of U.S.-North Korean relations suggests that the lack of supporting institutional structures accounts in part for the breakdown in the Agreed Framework. Were there supporting institutional structures that account for the relative success of the Nunn-Lugar programs?

This paper next reviews the major contending scholars’ ideas regarding international institutions in order to inform an understanding of U.S. policy regarding existing and emerging international institutions. The literature on international institutions frames an examination of the origins and purposes of institutions in several ways. In the realist worldview, the pursuit of power forms the basis of any institutions that may arise. Institutions are, in essence, a formalization of

15. Ibid., 263, 265–66.
the distribution of power in the international system.\textsuperscript{17} In the realist—power politics—framework, states define their interests competitively, and institutions are weak in comparison with states.\textsuperscript{18} Neorealism, as formulated by Waltz, emphasizes the importance of the balance of power among an anarchical world of states.\textsuperscript{19} Neorealism regards institutions as part of an international order, that is, the “unintended outcome of balancing pressures or a reflection of learned and formalized rules of equilibrium and balance.”\textsuperscript{20} One strain of neorealism stresses the important role that a hegemonic power plays in institution formation: preponderant power may allow the hegemon to offer incentives to weaker states that cooperate in the building of a particular order.

In contrast with realism, a liberal-internationalist approach proposes that a natural harmony of interests facilitates institution building.\textsuperscript{21} According to the liberal worldview, overlapping values and goals are the originators of international norms, regimes, and organizations. Neoliberalism argues that institutions act “as agreements or contracts between actors that function to reduce uncertainty, lower transaction costs, and solve collective action problems.”\textsuperscript{22} Increased efficiency is at the core of neoliberalism: by eliminating the need to attend multiple bilateral forums for every single issue, the transaction costs of doing international political business are lowered. Keohane first formulated this view, which stresses the importance of information flows, enforcement, and monitoring. A key concern of neoliberalism is that “institutions provide information to states and reduce the incentives for cheating.”\textsuperscript{23}

Following the liberal traditions is a concept known as functionalism, which elevates individual issues as the primary source of institutions. A functionalist argues that the most effective institutions are those that serve practical functions as opposed to “grand political objectives.”\textsuperscript{24} According to functionalist international relations scholars, an institution arises to address a specific concern through a ”spontaneous, bottom-up process.”\textsuperscript{25}

Apart from both the realist and liberal traditions stands the more sociologically based concept called constructivism. According to Ikenberry, institutions are “diffuse and socially constructed worldviews that bound and shape the strategic behavior of individuals


\textsuperscript{18} Lepgold and Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower, 148–49.


\textsuperscript{20} Ikenberry, After Victory, 11.

\textsuperscript{21} Doyle, Ways of War and Peace; Ikenberry, After Victory, 15.

\textsuperscript{22} Robert O. Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World (London: Routledge, 2002).

\textsuperscript{23} Ikenberry, After Victory, 16.

\textsuperscript{24} Lepgold and Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower, 144.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 139, 144. Lepgold and Nincic are bullish on the utility of international institutions; they write: “In principle, well designed international institutions provide a way to develop and implement common policies to deal with collective problems, and it is hard to find an international issue that has not become increasingly institutionalized in recent decades.” Furthermore, for breaching the international relations theory-practice gap, they emphasize that “the theoretical and empirical literature on international institutions should carry important practical implications.” They go on to urge continued scholarship: “If scholarly work on international institutions can shed light on these issues [globalization and the backlash] by illuminating the opportunities, constraints, and consequences of multilateral actions, it should help officials shape external pursuits though multilateral means.”
and states,” which serve as “cognitive maps” for state actors.26 Constructivism does not assume that the interests of actors are fixed, but asserts that social structures shape preferences. Institutions define the group identity of a set of states by embodying and propagating shared norms.27

After this brief overview of these major approaches to institutional theory, what do we know about what makes a successful institution? What factors should be taken into account? Ikenberry addresses the initial context for institutions when he writes that “[s]table political orders tend to be those that have low returns to power and high returns to institutions.” Orders that have low returns to power feature “systematic institutional limits” on what participants can do with their individual power. High returns to institutions result in “sticky institutions” which are hard to replace. According to Ikenberry, then, “[t]he more complex, adaptable, and autonomous” an institution is, the more it can lower the returns to power.

Ruggie also addresses the initial conditions for institutional formation and survival, writing that “[a] permissive domestic environment” in the leading world state or states is very important for setting the scene for a successful institution. For example, Ruggie claims that U.S. hegemony was more important than the mere existence of an international hegemon to the flourishing of recent multilateral institutions.28 Thus, a leading state that looks on multilateral institutions in a very unfavorable manner may sow the seeds of destruction, or at least of weakening, for certain institutions that for whatever reasons are perceived as not serving the hegemon’s state interests. In her institutional analysis on the overriding importance of initial conditions for institution building, Zegart strongly emphasizes the critical influence of founding moments in the creation of both successful and unsuccessful security agencies.29

Related to neoliberalism’s emphasis on effective enforcement and monitoring are four key dimensions to take into account when crafting an institution.30 First, the manner in which information is pooled inside the institution is important. Good pooling of information can mitigate cooperation problems. Second, to what extent are rules crafted so as to be easily enforced? Regulations that come with incentives to comply are easier to enforce. Third, the number of members in an institution is important. The smaller the group’s membership, the easier it is to resolve difficulties. Fourth, the precision of rules and monitoring procedures are significant. Are rules mildly, modestly, or heavily elaborate or detailed? In general, more elaborate rules are more difficult to enforce.

In addition to these dimensions, several other issues raised by neoliberal thought may affect the success of institutions, according to Lepgold and Nincic. How many issues does the institution intend to address? The degree of bundling of different issues is important. This question is highly relevant to adherents of the functionalist approach, who view institutions essentially as issue-based forums. In addition, the way that issues are organized internationally figures into the calculus. How an issue is treated, and by whom, is important to how other actors will respond. Last, the choice of partners figures prominently. How like-minded is the membership of an institution? Is it generally true that members must share the necessary values to accomplish a particular end with efficiency?

A summary of several key points will serve to guide the remainder of this paper. Observations include both macropolitical and micropolitical perspectives on the areas guiding an analysis of the Nunn-Lugar case. From the macropolitical level, the notion of a worldview, and especially a hegemon’s worldview, is significant. This builds on Legro’s idea regarding changes resulting from the collapse of a reigning con-

26. Ikenberry, After Victory, 15.

27. Lepgold and Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower, 150–51.


30. Ideas in this paragraph on the four key dimensions are from Lepgold and Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower, 154–59.
sensus and the emergence of a new dominant and viable idea in world politics.

Scholars’ interpretations of worldviews revolve around the four dominant perspectives discussed above: realism, liberalism, functionalism, and constructivism. Each proposes alternatives for policymaking as well as assumptions regarding the relevance of institutions as instruments of statecraft. State leaders’ worldviews, especially for presidents and secretaries of defense, will have important policy implications. For realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer, the state is the focus of attention, and the state’s pursuit of self-interest in an anarchic world is of supreme importance. In Ikenberry’s characterization of neorealism, however, balance of power matters as much as self-interest as a moderator of state power. In a neorealist administration, for instance, institutions may serve the state’s interests to the extent that the arrangements reflect learned and formal rules of equilibrium and balance that reinforce stability and order and, therefore, the position of dominant nation-states or great powers.

Liberalism stresses a harmony of interests among nations in an international community. For liberals, institution building is a natural sign of progress. For neoliberals, there are more specific considerations than notions of community for its own sake. The neoliberals look for agreements and contracts to underpin international relations. Agreements include formal ways to reduce uncertainty, lower transaction costs, and solve problems of collective action. In this regard, the neoliberal, the functionalist, as well as the realist approaches align in terms of a harmony of interests in solving problems through collective action that ultimately serves the state’s purposes or self-interests. Thus, Keohane argues forcefully that international institutions perform state tasks vital for enabling cooperation.31 In fact, Keohane disdains liberal or neoliberal labels for his theorizing and instead considers himself a staunch institutionalist. Constructivism is another approach with more emphasis on creating and developing shared values in world politics. Katzenstein and Ikenberry characterize institutions as a product of diffuse and socially constructed worldviews. Again there is some overlap with realists in the sense of effective institutions providing high returns to power, or, as Katzenstein characterizes it, containing a “stickiness” that makes them hard to replace because they further both state values and interests.

Multilateralist Ruggie and neoinstitutionalist Zegart provide further insights regarding the importance of initial or founding conditions as most significant for determining institutional effectiveness. These initial conditions normally reflect the domestic environment of the leading state, or hegemon. Examples would include the importance of the United States in the founding of the UN after World War II. Other neoliberal thoughts linked to functional approaches include the idea of bundling issues and the number of partners involved. Ruggie and other authors, especially in the functionalist school, argue that including fewer partners, chosen because they share values (as in the EU) and focused issues that serve common interests (as in halting the regional spread of nuclear weapons), is more likely to succeed.

In terms relative to the international security studies literature discussed above and the Agreed Framework experience, Nunn-Lugar represents a narrative of leadership, primarily as leadership from the top and middle. It includes a large number of players involved in the program’s founding and evolution throughout the 1990s. The process of tracing Nunn-Lugar’s development will provide insights into Gottemoeller’s observation that “[s]table cooperation, therefore, is likely to require both attention from on high and bureaucratic commitment at a lower level.”32 One key dimension for examining the conditions for achieving stable cooperation includes the notion of policy relevance.


Policy and Instrumental Relevance

Two aspects of policymaking relevance are presented in the literature on international institutions. These include policy relevance and instrumental relevance. Policy relevance refers to the macropolitical or strategic aspects of policy design in international relations. Instrumental relevance refers to micropolitical or tactical perspectives. The neoliberalist and constructivist theorists note that actors’ preferences shape policy choices.

The literature highlights five areas that suggest the necessary and sufficient conditions for policy relevance, including, first, complementary national interests—that is, that the institution includes accepted values, that goals are compatible for the long term, that there is an investment in any changes in preferences. International institutions can change relations though regimes, defined as “norms and rules that regulate behavior in specific issue areas involving international activities.” As Ruggie suggests, the institution will also be more successful if it assures the hegemon’s support. Hegemon in this context and in this case refers to the United States as the most powerful nation-state in the post–Cold War period, as defined in realist terms regarding national power.

The second aspect of policy relevance addresses the hegemon’s committing resources and supporting rules. These rules include a commitment to essential principles and rules of order, along with partners to share burdens and coordinate policy. The third aspect is the perception of the institution as a carrier of norms, identity, and knowledge. This includes codifying and augmenting legal norms, especially norms that empower what are perceived as legitimate claims. One additional condition is that preferences regarding norms, identity, and knowledge evolve through interaction and presumably not through domination or forcing. Fourth are the expectations regarding the costs and consequences of activities conducted through international institutions. In brief, are there stable expectations for joint coordination that serve agreed state purposes? The fifth variable involves the role of the institution within the policymaking community. The literature suggests that the domain is limited to situations in which the states already agree on the policy objectives or ends. Again, the functionalist school suggests the important influence of special, expert agencies.

Instrumental relevance here refers to the incentive structures, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, calculation of future benefits and costs, and other tools for facilitating effective, productive bargains. These include incentive structures, monitoring and enforcement, calculations of future benefits and costs, and tools for facilitating effective, productive bargains. Incentive structures include positive factors to make cooperation more likely as well as negative factors to prevent defectors. Calculations of future benefits and costs serve to lengthen the “shadow of the future” to increase participants’ rational choices supporting institution building for the long term. Scholars point to eight factors for strengthening effective and productive agreements:

- Rules that stabilize expectations;
- Information to send and receive signals;
- Clear standards;
- Information about compliance;
- Credible penalties;
- Enforcement mechanisms;
- Cooperation through information sharing; and
- Regulating the number of participants.

33. Lepgold and Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower.
34. Ibid., 139.
36. Ideas in this paragraph are drawn from Lepgold and Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower.
Policy and instrumental relevance provide a lengthy list of variables for examining the conditions for successful leadership from the top and middle for effective policy and institution building.

**Relating Institutionalist Theory and Practice in the Nunn-Lugar Case**

This paper proceeds by examining the Nunn-Lugar CTR case as a key program in the Clinton counterproliferation policy initiative.

**Complementary National Interests**

Government policymakers and national security scholars engaged in proliferation policymaking were among the first to seize the opportunity for forming new relationships among the United States, Russia, and the former Soviet republics following the fall of the Berlin Wall. George Bush’s notion of a new world order was significant for the executive branch and especially the promotion of new initiatives by the State Department and the Defense Department.37 During the following Clinton administration, in reflecting on his experiences as secretary of defense, Perry notes the significance of the post–Cold War period for establishing an “effective U.S. partnership with Russia in the security sphere.” Carter and Perry point to the early post–Cold War discussions urging Russia’s policy elite to become “integrationists” to achieve a new, “self-respecting place in the world order.”38

The early, fluid nature of the international environment during the first Clinton administration required adjustments to identify the complementarities of U.S. and Russian national interests. DOD engaged in repeated redesigns of Nunn-Lugar programs in the initial stages to “adapt its existing patterns of cooperation to the realities of Russia at this stage of its continuous revolution.” The pattern included the administration’s interest in shaping the new Russian government’s preferences. Perry writes that the Nunn-Lugar programs were launched when the new Russia was in its early state and needed immediate assistance: the “political backdrop and economic motivation of Russia’s leaders” in the early post–Cold War period were, as we now know, “totally different” from the values and preferences of the Soviet regime.39

In the early Nunn-Lugar period, the nations involved also introduced unique, new situations.40 DOD efforts had to proceed in accordance with a three-party foreign policy approach involving the United States, Russia, and Ukraine.41 The U.S. approach evolved quickly from bilateral to trilateral diplomacy, extending the Nunn-Lugar approach to denuclearize Ukraine and engage the Ukrainians in extensive military-to-military contacts. Working along constructivist lines, the Clinton administration through diplomacy and policymaking attempted to reform Russian and Ukrainian values and preferences regarding traditional and long-standing security threats, as well as to offer opportunities for a more cooperative future for all participants in the new world order, or at least the new regional order.

**Resources and Support for Rules**

The idea of specific, cooperative foreign policies and defense programs continued to expand the complexity of shaping complementary national interests. For example, when negotiating the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START II) Cold War arms control regime, the United States had to engage the still-forming Rus-

39. Ibid., 79.
sian democracy, with its new, active, and fragmented Duma—an environment markedly different from the iron rule of the Soviet Communist Party leadership during Cold War era. The parliamentarians’ concerns about the status of the continuity of the Nixon-era ABM Treaty were further complicated by historical Russian security concerns reawakened by the initiatives for NATO’s eastward expansion. Administration counterproliferation policy efforts with the Russians continued along the path started by Nunn-Lugar to include programs of greater complexity and depth over time.42

In their book, Preventive Defense, Carter and Perry discuss early administration approaches and their experiences as DOD officials in the first Clinton administration. As discussed above, the George Bush administration and then the Clinton administration, in supporting the initiative of Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar, responded quickly to the new threat of nuclear-armed former Soviet republics. DOD programs, under the authorizing Nunn-Lugar legislation, addressed loose-nukes issues to eliminate nuclear weapons and fissile material in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.43 Special projects such as Project Sapphire removed weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium from Kazakhstan and included internal U.S. collaboration among the DOD, Department of Energy, Department of State, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).44 A pattern of similar efforts that incorporated new members into the preferred world order of the United States is also evident during the second Clinton administration, for example, with respect to China.45

During the second Clinton administration, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen continued the trend toward international institution building or multilateralism.46 In Clinton-era DOD policy documents, such as the Annual Reports to the President and Congress, there was a steady drumbeat for the United States to take a leading role in supporting international institutions.47 The 2000 report highlights the significance of the U.S. role in “shaping” the international environment through multilateral alliances, transparency, trust, and confidence building as well as through limiting dangerous military technologies.48 The section on dangers and threats focuses on reducing or eliminating nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons. The report supports existing arms control agreements, including the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework; CTR programs with Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan; the Chemical Weapons Convention; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The report also highlights the significance of identifying and controlling nuclear fissile materials that can be used for NBC weapons and delivery systems.

The Defense Department also refers to the administration’s nuclear posture statements and re-

42. For example, during the second Clinton administration, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen pointed to the continuation of arms control programs, such as the 1998 Clinton-Yeltsin Moscow summit, and the development of a joint U.S.-Russian Moscow center for information sharing on ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. The center included the announcement of early launch detection, early warning systems, and technical programs on observation satellites. These extensive program developments reflect the increasing benefits of cooperative and complementary security preferences. See William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2000), 8–76, www.defenselink.mil/exsec/adr2000/adr2000.pdf.


44. Ibid., 67.

45. Secretary of Defense Cohen noted similar intentions for bringing China into the international community by seeking Chinese adherence to international standards on weapons proliferation and on international trade and human rights initiatives and by increasing China’s transparency as well as instituting confidence-building measures such as military-to-military exchanges; see Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 11.

46. Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters.

47. Examples below from the 2000 Annual Report to the President and the Congress are illustrative of the administration’s consistent policies from 1996 though 2000.

ports. The 2000 annual report emphasizes the importance of U.S. nuclear weapons to deter aggression through a wide range of responses, along with the ability to hedge against future threats. Secretary Cohen also reinforced the U.S. commitment to the strategic arms control regime and the administration’s intent to conduct further arms control talks with Russia by beginning a round of START III negotiations. For example, the START III initiative was announced after the Clinton-Yeltsin summit in 1997 in Helsinki.49

Secretary Cohen continued to address U.S. support for a multilateral, regional order in Europe. He stressed U.S. defense objectives in Europe and the significance of cooperative relations with Russia, Ukraine, Central and Eastern Europe, and NATO. The 2000 annual report pointed out that the United States, Russia, and Europe “should also work together” with all the “new independent states” to counter the proliferation of WMD and missile delivery systems.50

Cohen singled out Asian regional relations as well. He cited the importance of traditional defense relationships with Japan, Australia, and the ROK as well as engagement with China. Again the significance of the Agreed Framework is trumpeted. The secretary placed special emphasis on the U.S.-Japan security relationship, which he called the “linchpin” of U.S. security in Asia.51 Cohen’s final DOD annual report focused on maintaining “traditional” relationships but did not emphasize plans or programs for reforming or transforming European and Asian security alliances.52

Norms, Identity, and Knowledge

The importance of the need for building the norms, identities, and knowledge for developing institutionally relevant policy is not highlighted in DOD documents. There are no references in the 2000 annual report to a broader role for the DOD or the United States in institution building for promoting legal norms, legitimate claims, and preferences for positive interactions and change. The report does mention early Nunn-Lugar barriers in terms of overcoming 50 years of Cold War mistrust with the Russians. In the Carter and Perry account, some mention is also made of Clinton and Gore interventions to develop trust with the new governments of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.53 But the official DOD documents are largely silent on building institutional norms, identity, and knowledge.

Costs and Consequences

The key costs and consequences of international institutions are also not mentioned in detail in DOD annual reports. Carter and Perry do note some of the consequences of Nunn-Lugar in terms of budgetary and performance results. For instance, they highlight $2.4 billion in funding as of mid-1998. They go on to point to the success of 40 engineering projects in Russia to build safeguards for existing stockpiles, dismantle weapons and missiles, and convert defense industry to civilian purposes. Carter and Perry also write of the success of destroying 4,800 nuclear weapons, removing nuclear weapons from all non-Russian former Soviet republics, and eliminating proliferation threats in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Perry and Carter stress that they “never expected this astounding degree of success” and credit Nunn-Lugar initiatives for no early post–Cold War loose-nukes problems.54 In addition, Carter and Perry attribute part of these great successes to the extraordinary cooperation inside the Washington policymaking community. Nevertheless, the Nunn-Lugar programmatic successes are not tied to the larger issues regarding build-

49. Ibid., 5–6.

50. Ibid., 9–10.

51. Ibid., 10–11.

52. This lack of emphasis is curious compared with the drumbeat within the DOD to transform the U.S. armed forces throughout the post-Cold War era, from the Clinton administration to the present George W. Bush administration.

53. Carter and Perry, Preventive Defense, 76.

54. Ibid., 76–77.
ing a community of shared norms, values, and identities in terms of international institutions, arms control and security regimes, or multilateral organizations.

Institutions and Policymaking

The fifth dimension of policy relevance relates international institutions and the role of the policymaking community. The national security policymaking community can be an open-ended network. The community in this case includes specific U.S. government legislators, departments, and agencies as well as universities and research institutes as players or stakeholders in counterproliferation policymaking. This policymaking community is not limited solely to the U.S. Defense Department and special agencies involved in Nunn-Lugar implementation. As discussed next, one example of effective policy implementation within the wider policymaking community was the DOD’s top secret Operation Sapphire, conducted in 1994.

Sapphire was the first special operation implemented as part of Nunn-Lugar. Carter and Perry strongly emphasize the success of Operation Sapphire in the first Clinton term. The operation resulted in the removal from Kazakhstan of 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, or the equivalent of enough fissile material for 60 Hiroshima-Nagasaki nuclear bombs. The U.S. government policy community—Washington interagency players—included the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, along with the CIA and U.S. Air Force. Carter and Perry report the successful internal and external coordination with the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan—all made possible under the umbrella of the 1992 Nunn-Lugar legislation and implementing programs.

Carter and Perry trace the genesis of the Nunn-Lugar approach to the senators’ concerns during the 1980s Cold War years about nuclear accidents. Senators Nunn and Lugar were at the forefront of U.S. congressional activities regarding establishing nuclear risk reduction centers. Their initiatives included agencies and organizations outside of government. Early efforts by Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar and their staffs involved work with think tanks and universities. Carter’s late 1980s Harvard proliferation studies on the Soviet nuclear arsenal led to a series of meetings hosted by Harvard’s Belfer Center along with Perry’s affiliation with Stanford University. Workshops included experts from New York’s Carnegie Corporation and Washington’s Brookings Institution. This loosely coupled nonproliferation community set the stage for raising concerns about nuclear and fissile material safeguards following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The astonishingly rapid progress of Nunn-Lugar legislation, which passed within nine days of its first draft, included Senate passage on 28 November 1991 by an 86-6 vote. The House of Representatives version of the bill, supported by Chairman Les Aspin of the House Armed Services Committee who was later President Clinton’s first secretary of defense, passed on a voice vote.

These preliminary efforts in building proliferation knowledge and legislation were extended through the 1993 shift of Carter and Perry from academia to government service. Carter notes that to spearhead Nunn-Lugar implementation in order to assist Russia in safeguarding nuclear stockpiles required “a whole new organization.” He points also to starting by “crafting a set of objectives” and identifying officials in partner countries to coordinate efforts.

Initiating a new national security program required forming a coordinating interagency group as well as overcoming barriers to implementation. Carter and Perry go on to emphasize the significant barriers that challenged Nunn-Lugar implementation. The notoriously cumbersome Pentagon acquisition system had to extend to spending dollars on overseas engineering
projects, which in turn required something “history had never before permitted,” that is, running U.S. programs with and within the Soviet Union.59

The early Nunn-Lugar period also met resistance in the U.S. Congress. Congressional barriers involved reversing a mind-set from defense versus the Soviet threat to spending for Russian military housing and defense industry conversion to civilian, commercial pursuits. Give the rapid pace of Nunn-Lugar legislation, implementation money had to be reprogrammed from the 1993 defense budget, which required much bureaucratic work in adjusting appropriations.60 In addition, the old arms control bureaucracy, centered in DOD and the State Department, had to shift from Cold War arms control perspectives and patterns to new approaches.

Barriers also existed within the new and relatively unstable Russia. For instance, Carter and Perry note the problems of coordination with the former Soviet nuclear research and development agency, Minatom, especially in regard to new tasks of dismantling nuclear weapons and the long-term safeguards and storage of fissile materials.61

The writing in later DOD documents reveals a moderation, or decline, in the defense secretary’s initiatives for extending the DOD role and building on early Nunn-Lugar successes. For instance, by the time of the 2000 annual report, Secretary Cohen focused on a narrower range of issues with respect to counterproliferation policy. He cited the importance of the armed forces’ capacity to respond to asymmetric threats and was mainly concerned with fighting on an NBC battlefield, with a vague sentence on increasing unspecified dollar amounts for “institutions of counterproliferation.”62

Counterproliferation as counter-NBC operations for battlefield forces is a significant operational capability, but at the strategic level it falls short of the Nunn-Lugar objectives of eliminating and safeguarding nuclear weapons and stockpiles. The focus of the 2000 document and defense policy is mainly directed toward continuing the modernization of existing Cold War legacy weapons systems, or platforms, such as tanks, helicopters, aircraft carriers, submarines, and jet aircraft, while conducting research and development for cutting-edge technologies.63 The annual report proposes the needs for weapons system development using Gulf War scenarios. The report also presents information on ongoing modernizations such as the Revolution in Military Affairs for acquiring new technologies and the Revolution in Business Affairs for adopting the presumed better business practices of the corporate sector. Critics charge that these are actually minor and insignificant changes and a normal part of the Pentagon’s internal “fight for defense dollars.”64 The evidence from official documents reveals a downward trend, or at least a leveling off, in DOD’s emphasis on counterproliferation policy and programs.

Findings and Conclusions

The documentary evidence suggests an early peak in Clinton-era counterproliferation policymaking. The essential role of key department leaders, such as Secretary of Defense Perry and Assistant Secretary of Defense Carter, in influencing the Washington policymaking process is most significant. Added weight in terms of political initiative and legislation as well as budgetary support was provided by experienced, senior legislators. In terms of policy relevance, several points stand out in addition to the overall assessment of effective leadership from several levels,
including the defense secretary, Congress, think tanks, and implementing bureaucracies, along with similar leadership levels within the foreign governments involved.

National interests in the Nunn-Lugar case were complementary and were expressed clearly by the governmental leaders involved in policymaking. The values of controlling and eliminating nuclear weapons were seen as compatible with long-term goals that, in the Russian case, included radically transforming its defense posture and international diplomacy. There were significant investments of time and money to change preferences for an institutional approach to altering relations by means of a regime change in arms control and in the fundamental roles of nuclear weapons in a new, post–Cold War order. The remaining superpower, or in institutional terms the United States as hegemon, assured its support for this new order. Additional resources were committed to reinforce the essential principles of the new order to eliminate nuclear weapons from non-Russian former Soviet republics. Importantly, the former republics were engaged in the process of sharing the burdens of coordinating the policy and its implementation.

The largely bilateral relationship between the United States and the newly emerging Russia solidified the norms, identity, and knowledge for institutionalizing the Nunn-Lugar counterproliferation policies. Ironically, the long Cold War history of nuclear mirror-imaging and arms control contributed to common frames of reference regarding the process and substance for conducting interstate negotiations on nuclear weapons issues. Common preferences were revealed through interactions that included the former Soviet republics. Evolving norms regarding the elimination of nuclear weapons and some fissile materials empowered diplomats and defense officials to complete counterproliferation policymaking in accordance with shared and legitimate claims of policy relevance. In the Nunn-Lugar case, the emergence of shared norms, identity, and knowledge in the window of opportunity following the end of the Cold War empowered policymakers from the United States, Russia, and the former Soviet republics to conduct revolutionary counterproliferation policies.

The costs and consequences of action through the CTR programs also stabilized expectations for joint coordination. Funding through the congressional budget process, reinforced through DOD’s highly regulated planning, programming, and budgeting system, provided a degree of stability and transparency for implementing programs as well as established mechanisms for engaged congressional oversight. In essence, the programmatic processes of the U.S. Congress and bureaucracy for implementing Nunn-Lugar programs served the agreed administration purposes in visible ways.

The Nunn-Lugar case also provides evidence of the significance of the network aspects of the counterproliferation policymaking community. The functional role of a wide variety of specialized agencies in the early Nunn-Lugar period, all focused in a common direction on clear goals, served as a forcing function for the policymaking community. The overarching and clear program goals regarding eliminating nuclear weapons in former Soviet republics at a unique time in history served as a strong foundation for counterproliferation policy efforts.

One area where Nunn-Lugar reveals a shortcoming in institution building is as an early successful innovation, or pilot test, on which to build and expand geographically beyond Russia and the former Soviet republics to other areas of proliferation concern, such as South Asia (India and Pakistan), Northeast Asia (North Korea), and the Middle East (Iraq and Iran). In other words, the early Nunn-Lugar successes were not replicated in other areas of proliferation concern. Additional insights into the difficulties of institution building are revealed in examining the nature and scope of what theorists call the instrumental relevance of institutions. The high costs of developing effective and efficient institutions to serve as an instrument of state policy can be seen in the complexities in the four dimensions for assessing instrumental relevance: incentive structures, monitoring and enforcement processes, calculations of future benefits, and facilitating bargaining.

**Incentive Structures**

U.S. incentives for CTR programs were fairly obvious. The timing of the Nunn-Lugar initiatives was related directly to a unique opportunity at the end of the Cold War to eliminate dangerous proliferation threats. The weaknesses of Soviet safeguards and
stockpile security were already known in the defense expert community as a result of the 1980s Harvard Belfer Center studies. Although a number of international relations scholars debated the increased stability of multiple nuclear powers, including Ukraine and others, as a hedge against future Russian aggression, conventional wisdom in the policy community coalesced around the idea of providing incentives to eliminate nuclear weapons threats in an uncertain post–Cold War environment. The U.S. and Russian debates over Nunn-Lugar included calculations of the benefits and costs of a new, innovative approach.

Carter and Perry write of the high transaction costs of early Nunn-Lugar negotiations. The United States was mainly interested in dismantling Soviet missiles as a way of serving U.S. national security interests. Russia and the former Soviet republics were interested in social assistance to convert military forces, scientists, and their vast military-industrial complex to civilian, commercial uses. Incentives were also important for charting a future direction for Nunn-Lugar to include fissile materials as well as existing missiles and bombs. In this sense, institution building includes improving the incentives for likely cooperation as well as for preventing later defectors who would still possess materials useful for so-called dirty bombs as well as nuclear merchandise for the terrorist black market. Thus, institution building initiated through Nunn-Lugar provides incentives for continuing to engage Russia and the former Soviet republics in an ongoing process for ideas such as forming international fissile material repositories with the use of funds from an international consortium to manage the global stockpile for peaceful purposes and producing non-weapons-grade nuclear reactor fuel.

Incentive structures in the Nunn-Lugar case actually involved a wider range of options than was visible through the lens of traditional arms control negotiations. In the case of Ukraine, a wide-angle perspective reveals three separate sets of incentives. The first level included trilateral diplomacy conducted by the United States, Russia, and Ukraine. These negotiations focused on economic incentives for defense conversions, market reforms, and economic development. At a second level, incentives were necessary to meet Ukraine’s security concerns. U.S., European, and Russian relations were all involved in the resulting defense programs for military-to-military training for Ukrainian and other Eastern European forces, NATO Partnership for Peace programs, and ensuing programs for NATO expansion. The third piece included the Nunn-Lugar denuclearization program.

**Monitoring and Enforcement Processes**

Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms for institution building include aspects of intrastate and interstate relations as well as international relations. For instance, in the Nunn-Lugar case, early support was lacking from Russia’s Minatom. On the U.S. side, existing Cold War agencies were reorganizing as well as forming new organizations—for example, the reorganization and new missions assigned in the transition from the U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Organizational reforms included the newly chartered On-

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67. Ibid., 80.

68. Ibid., 83.


Site Inspection Agency, which was founded to support early post–Cold War counterproliferation initiatives.\(^{71}\)

In comparison, the later, failed North Korean Agreed Framework relied on the IAEA for monitoring and enforcement. Later, in 2000, the last annual report issued by Secretary of Defense Cohen pointed out the significance of the Agreed Framework freezing North Korean nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon under IAEA inspections.\(^{72}\) The resulting collapse of the North Korean international monitoring and enforcement again provides a contrast with the effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of the Nunn-Lugar programs with included host agencies such as Minatom and the DTRA engaged directly. In comparing these two cases, the evidence to date suggests the critical importance of host country involvement in actively supporting monitoring and enforcement arrangements.\(^{73}\)

**Calculation of Future Benefits**

The phrase “lengthening the shadow of the future” portrays the important perception of institutional arrangements as enhancing the prospects of future benefits and costs.\(^{74}\) In other words, the potential for future payoffs lends support for institution building. Writing in 1999, Carter and Perry emphasize the successes of Nunn-Lugar in the early post–Cold War period.\(^{75}\) In addition, they project forward to highlight continuing counterproliferation work. In particular, they note that Russia still possesses enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium to produce between 25,000 and 80,000 nuclear weapons. Therefore, they propose reinventing Nunn-Lugar with expanding program budgets with greater latitude for nuclear audits and inspections and a new arms control regime. The call is for an expansion of Nunn-Lugar for safeguarding fissile materials. The initiative in expanding CTR program proliferation regimes is echoed in recent work by the Carnegie Foundation and again by Allison of Harvard’s Belfer Center.\(^{76}\)

**Facilitating Bargaining**

The final dimension for assessing the instrumental relevance of international institutions concerns facilitating bargaining. Facilitation includes establishing rules, procedures, principles, and precedents as well as creating high costs for no agreement. The extensive nature of the eight components cited for successful negotiations reveals the importance of institutions and regimes, along with supporting organizations, for effective policymaking and implementation. The eight components drawn from the literature on bargaining and negotiations comprise (1) rules, (2) information, (3) standards, (4) information about compliance, (5) credible penalties, (6) enforceable rules, (7) cooperation through information sharing, and (8) limiting the number of participants.

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In the Nunn-Lugar case, making the CTR effective policy instruments required extensive negotiations for rules to stabilize expectations. Carter and Perry point out that managing expectations included more players than the engaged international negotiators. For example, on the U.S. side there were expectations from the Congress that traditional, Cold War security concerns would be overcome. The new Russian Duma also had to be kept on board. Similarly, in the Agreed Framework negotiations, Ambassador Robert Gallucci highlighted the critical nature of his negotiating team’s liaison with influential senators and members of Congress. 77

The signaling of information is also cited as important by the Nunn-Lugar negotiators. Carter and Perry point out that it took an official Pentagon internal study, the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, to clearly announce “a new phase of arms control” that was fundamentally different from the Cold War balance of terror. 78 The Nuclear Posture Review was meant as a clear signal to players domestically and internationally that the Cold War was over and that nuclear weapons would play a smaller role in U.S. defense planning. This new approach included calls for dramatic cuts in the U.S. strategic arsenal that would drive down the total number of strategic weapons for consideration in ongoing iterations of strategic arms reduction talks.

Two other factors in the Nunn-Lugar bargaining stand out. Traditional Cold War concerns about security and secrecy had to be overcome. Information about compliance arrangements was crucial for building trust and confidence for continuing the program. In this respect, Carter and Perry emphasize the significance of mutual information between the United States and Russia regarding the technical implementation of the dealerting and detargeting of strategic missiles. 79 The complexity and high degree of transparency necessary insured that each side had to step up to new challenges for continuing to shape a new post–Cold War relationship.

In a similar manner, the activities required for the success of Operation Sapphire also contributed to lowering the barriers to gaining information about compliance as well as increasing cooperation by increasing information flows. The cooperative advantages of information sharing led to a cascading effect for additional Nunn-Lugar program initiatives. Sapphire was followed by the Russian dismantling of SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles. These security initiatives were then complemented by medical diagnostic programs for cancer tests in and around former Soviet nuclear facilities; by research grants for Russian, Kazakh, and Ukrainian scientists; and by defense industry conversions to commercial pursuits.

The question remains: Does the evidence presented in this paper suggest that Nunn-Lugar initiatives have the potential to serve as a comparable case study for thinking about developing a Northeast Asian security regime? This paper focused on the study of the Clinton administration’s Nunn-Lugar counterproliferation policy initiatives for reducing the threats of loose nukes in Russia and the former Soviet republics. The Russian case, as guided by institutional theory, examined U.S. and, in particular, the U.S. Defense Department’s leadership efforts in countering the proliferation of nuclear WMD from 1992 to 2000. This paper’s findings suggest the significance and influence of institution- and organization-building approaches for effective counterproliferation policymaking. Of course, adapting the Nunn-Lugar approach for Northeast Asia requires additional study and analysis. Certainly, developing a framework for synthesizing competitive strategies versus a stubborn North Korean regime and cooperative strategies for promoting a common counterproliferation policy for enhancing U.S., Chinese, Japanese, ROK, and Russian collective security remains a challenge. More study is needed of the organizational and agency mechanisms necessary and sufficient for developing an institutional approach suitable for Northeast Asian security.


78. Carter and Perry, Preventive Defense, 85.

79. Ibid., 88.
Postscript—
Paths for Further Research: Government and Organizational Performance

Recent research on government performance as developed in the field of public administration deserves additional attention by international relations and security studies scholars. The ties among executive leadership, policy effectiveness, and government performance are the subject of continuing public management research. For instance, Patricia W. Ingraham and her colleagues offer a performance framework and finds “big lessons” such as “management matters” and “effective leadership is vital.”

Ingraham and colleagues highlight performance management at the federal, state, and local levels; and the book’s insights offer a similar focus on policy leadership as it studies senior executives in public organizations working as policy makers, implementers, integrators, and results managers—or what Ingraham et al. term “grounded leadership,” that is, the senior or strategic leaders’ roles in charting the direction and degree of influence for implementing effective public policy within and across government organizations. Executive responsibilities include leaders’ roles in coordinating management efforts to support a vision for achieving government missions, goals, and performance objectives. Ingraham’s public management research highlights the relevance of strategic leadership and management for coordinating complex administrative systems across agencies and within government, which their extensive findings suggest “is clear” in their study of U.S. government organizations.

Let me conclude by offering a suggestion for future research needs and an approach for studying counterproliferation policymaking. In short, further research is needed to analyze executive and agency performance in pursuit of administration counterproliferation policy objectives in both the contexts of U.S. agencies and international organizations. The leadership roles of public executives such as the secretaries of defense as integrators for government policy development and implementation should be examined in terms of utilizing DOD’s management capacity for integrating various U.S. and international agencies in achieving the administration’s policy results for countering WMD proliferation in North Korea, Russia, Iran, and elsewhere. Again, the integrating roles of public executives extend across U.S. government agencies as well as international organizations.

For example, the time is right for a detailed case study of Clinton-era counterproliferation policy with respect to Iraq. An Iraq WMD case requires examining the relationship of U.S. efforts along with the roles and functions of the UN and its organization for nuclear matters, the IAEA. Establishing a robust Iraq case study narrative should proceed along three lines. First, in establishing the official U.S. policy as it evolved during the 1990s, the analysis should trace policy development from government documents, including the Clinton national security and national military strategies, various issues of Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, and internal administration WMD strategy and policy reviews.

A second line of inquiry should follow the narratives from the perspective of UN proliferation policymaking. UN Security Council resolutions from the end of the Gulf War in 1991 through 2002 and the start of the war in Iraq provide open-source documents that shed light on the alignment or misalignment of U.S. and UN policy. In addition, published biographies by UN chief inspectors Richard Butler and Hans Blix add insight into the roles of inspection executives in implementing UN policy and Security Council resolutions.

A third line of inquiry includes reports by several U.S. government agencies, such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO, formerly General Accounting Office), and nongovernmental organizations, such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative, that provide over-

81. Ibid., 152.
82. Ibid., 20–21.
sight of WMD policy issues. In addition to internal executive branch and DOD studies of U.S. policy in Iraq, there have been numerous external evaluations of U.S. proliferation policy. These oversight functions provide a check on executive branch self-assessment and include congressional committee hearings and studies, GAO reports, and university and think tank policy reviews. For example, the Carnegie Foundation of New York, the Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs sponsor programs to gain perspectives on WMD threats and counterproliferation policy from leading scholars. All offer important insights for evaluating government policymaking and organizational performance.83

In addition, the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York has sparked a number of government reports, commissions, and personal accounts on issues related to national security and terrorism in general that provide additional unclassified information on Clinton-era WMD proliferation efforts. Of particular value are two extensive research reviews by high-level government commissions. One is the 2004 Kean-Hamilton report of the 9/11 Commission.84 A second authoritative 2004 report, focusing on Iraq and WMD, was begun by a former U.S. government official and UN weapons inspector, David Kay, and completed by another IAEA weapons inspector, Charles Duelfer.85 Duelfer’s three-volume report provides a detailed review of the relationship of U.S. counterproliferation policy with the implementation by the IAEA’s two weapons inspections teams during the 1990s and leading up to the war in Iraq.

The triangulation of these three research streams will provide a more robust understanding of the leadership patterns and the role of the U.S. agency lead, the secretary of defense, in terms of forming and implementing WMD policy in both the policy formation and organizational implementation stages. In short, the DOD leadership and agency role should be considered from a public management framework, including the executive’s role in influence and emphasis, in integrating and aligning, and in managing results.86 The contribution of this research will extend the understanding of scholars and policymakers within and across U.S. agencies as well as across national and international organizations in the important case study of U.S. counterproliferation efforts directed against Saddam Hussein and Iraq.

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86. Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue, Government Performance, 16.