

FINAL REPORT

Topic: Views of Experts on Korean Issues

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This documents, the topic "Views of Experts on Korean Issues" based on the results of surveys, is being submitted to the Korea Economic Institute as a final report on June 30, 2007.

A survey was drafted to present to the American and Korean experts on

Korean issues. The issues addressed by the survey included the North Korea nuclear crisis, wartime operational control, reform and openness in the North Korean's economy, social changes, and defector problems.

The first survey was conducted with ten Korean experts in Seoul a few days before an underground nuclear test that was performed by North Korea in October 2006. The second survey was held with ten American experts from late 2006 through early 2007. Incidentally, some additional questions were added to the survey directed toward the American experts concerning the underground nuclear test of North Korea. Those questions had not been originally included in the previous survey because, at the time of the first survey, the incident had not yet occurred.

All participants are well-known experts in Seoul and Washington who have researched Korean issues for at least a decade, including those who have researched Korean issues for over twenty years. The following findings are the sum of the results of the surveys collected from both experts in Washington and Seoul.

< Abstract >

1. The North Korean Nuclear Issue

Based on the survey, a large percentage of both American and Korean experts think that the Bush administration should have tried harder to solve the nuclear problem within the framework of the Geneva Agreement of October 1994. A third of experts were still doubt about the actual effectiveness of the Agreed Framework itself claiming that the North did not develop the nuclear program for energy. The rest of them advocated that hard-line policy of the Bush administration against North Korea by calling them the 'Axis of Evil,' along with Iran and the Republic of Iraq, deterred solving the nuclear issue through the Agreed Framework. The majority of American experts indicated that they did not see shift in power, in light of the November 2006 election where the Democratic Party had won the election and controlled the Senate and the House of Representatives, affecting the Bush administration's policy toward North Korea.

When addressing the effectiveness of the Six-Party talks, the opinions were divided. Half of the experts appeared hopeful about the future

development of the Six-Party talks, while the rest were less optimistic. A majority of the experts expressed they did not expect North Korea to even sincerely adhere to the September 19 Agreement, even if financial sanctions were to be removed.

The survey results suggest that half of the Korean experts believe that North Korea would probably abandon its nuclear program if the United States fully accepts their demands for political autonomy, a peace treaty with the United States, and cooperation for economic development. However, most American experts were more skeptically saying that North Korea would not abandon its nuclear program completely, regardless of whether or not the United States accepted all these demands.

Further adding to the nuclear controversy, on October 9, 2006, North Korea announced that a successful underground nuclear test had been performed. However as of now, the test location and the size of the test bomb are still yet to be confirmed. Opinions are flying as to where it was conducted and how successful the test had been. Some Korean experts have claimed that the North Korean leaders are bluffing after using conventional bombs or TNTs, whereas a majority of the American experts believe that North Korea's nuclear test was technically a successful one.

Also, more results from the survey show that most American experts think that the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 should stay in

effect, even if North Korea were to return to the talks. Only one American expert thought that the resolution should be reconsidered or suspended if the North remained in the talks.

The survey also addressed several questions to the experts on their views of participation of the countries in the talks. The majority of the experts thought that China should have worked harder towards solving the nuclear crisis when considering China's political and economic influence over North Korea. Most experts believed that China's efforts were insufficient, seeing as China appeared to be the only ally in the position to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear arms development program.

The survey results made it clear that experts also thought that not only China, but also South Korea and Japan could have cooperated more to solve the nuclear issue. South Korea, China, and Japan, were in discord because of the Japanese map violation, 'Sinsa worship', and the controversy over the distorted content in historical textbooks. A great portion of experts claim that Japan and China should have set aside disputes over 'Sinsa worship' and history distortion in order to attain the common goal of solving the nuclear problem.

The opinions of experts are equally divided on the issue of Korea's PSI participation. But the survey showed more American than Korean experts believe that the South Korean government has to participate in the PSI more

aggressively in order to force North Korea to give up its nuclear plan.

However, despite the fact that North Korea's standing in the international community went from bad to worse due to these nuclear issues, North Korea was showing a positive growth rate thanks to the economic support from China and South Korea. Most American experts claimed that any trade acting to support North Korea's economy should have been restrained in order to halt the nuclear program as soon as possible. However, most Korean experts expressed their disapproval of economic sanctions in general against the North.

One of the biggest discoveries of the survey was the overwhelming number of experts asserted that the United States should not do a preemptive strike on North Korea's nuclear sites, even if the international community fails to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear arms program. Additionally, most experts also thought that South Korea and Japan should not try to develop nuclear weapons, even though North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. Only one Korean expert argued that the United States should allow South Korea and Japan to develop nuclear weapons for the balance of power in the Northeast Asia. Interestingly enough, most Korean experts were convinced that North Korea would try to export nuclear and missile technology to Iran or to the terrorist groups in the Middle East in exchange for oil, while a majority of the American experts disregarded the likelihood of these transactions occurring in the future.

2. Wartime operational control issues

The survey indicated that a large number of American experts expressed their uneasiness about the United States maintaining wartime operational control over the South Korean army for a long period of time. Most American experts believed that the United States should return wartime operational control over the Korean army to Korea within three to five years regardless of the public opinion in South Korea. However, a large number of Korean experts stated that it was too soon to return wartime operational control to South Korea because North Korea may still try to unify the peninsula by force. In the meantime, an overwhelming number of both American and Korean experts hoped that North Korea would not declare war on the peninsula, even if the American troops were to be relocated and wartime operational control right returned to Korea.

Most American experts expressed that the underground nuclear test of October 9 and the result of the November 2006 election should have little or no influence on the process of negotiations between Washington and Seoul. However, many experts thought that the roles of the U. S. troops in Korea are bound to change in the near future. More American experts expect these

changes to be realized soon.

Some specialists raised the question as to why the United States unilaterally decided to remove the American troops deployed between Seoul and the de-militarized zone (DMZ) without demanding any yield from North Korea. In response to these questions, most American experts asserted that America's unilateral decision of removing the trip-wire role from Seoul was appropriate. However, most Korean experts thought that the relocation of American troops should have been utilized to negotiate on the issues of the nuclear problems as well as negotiate a possible re-deployment of the North Korean army away from the DMZ.

According to the survey, not one expert was concerned that Korean nationalists who possess political power with the rights of wartime operational control would attempt to unify the peninsula by force. Many American experts appeared to think that returning the rights of wartime operational control to South Korea would not seriously affect the relations between the United States and Korea in the future. However, a large number of Korean experts were convinced that the Korean government would try to rely on China expecting a stronger role than the United States to maintain stability on the peninsula if the United States were to transfer wartime operational control to South Korea. If that occurs, the influence of the United States on South Korea would shrink as China's influence increases. However, a large percentage of American experts

were of the opinion that the relations between the United States and Korea would not change regardless of who has the rights of wartime operational control.

Under the scenario that the Korean peninsula is unified under the influence of China, all but one expert agree that it would negatively affect the United States' national interests within the Northeast Asian region. In the long run, most American experts thought the unified Korea would remain a strong ally of the United States in the Northeast Asia region, regardless of whoever has the rights. However, most Korean experts did not seem to agree that this would be realized unless the wartime control issue was to be solved in a satisfactory manner.

A large number of American experts seemed to be confident that free trade agreements have no bearing on America's public pledge to secure peace on the Korean peninsula. However, half of the Korean experts believed it to be related and that North Korea would take these factors into consideration in formulating their policies against the South in the future.

3. North Korean Economy

The results from the survey showed that a great part of American experts

expect North Korea's economic recovery to continue despite financial sanctions placed by the United States if China and South Korea continue to support North Korea's economy through trade. However, most Korean experts claimed that an economic recovery in North Korea would be limited, regardless of aid from China and South Korea, if the sanctions continue.

After the July 1 measures, small size production systems began appearing from businesses and the individual units, and production and sale were becoming a form of division of labor. Simultaneously, the domestic and imported goods were starting to compete with each other in accordance to market principal, and the state enterprise was quickly changing to a private one. Judging from these phenomena, many Korean experts who participated in the survey were of the opinion that North Korea is going to transform its planned economy to a market economy similar to China's, whereas most American experts seemed dubious.

North Korea has reduced the members of a collective farm production unit to half its size, and is testing family farm unit systems in some regions. The North gave the reduced farm units more rights and responsibilities on cultivating the farmland while strengthening the incentive system in order to increase the production of food. Now, some experts are beginning to say that North Korea may be able to successfully reform its agriculture system, increase the production of food, and relieve food scarcity in the North in the near future. Most

Korean experts somewhat agree, while a majority of American experts do not anticipate any hopeful results from these changes. One American expert remarked that it might be helpful in increasing the production of food, but far short of solving the food problem.

North Korea, after the July 1 reform measures, issued a public bond of fifty billion won, for the first time in its history, in order to mobilize surplus monetary funds effectively. Some specialists argue that the North is changing its financial policy in the process of introducing a capitalistic economy. Based on the survey, a large percentage of both American and Korean experts agree that an issuing a bond once does not mean that North Korea is changing its financial policy to introducing a capitalistic economy.

Since the planned economic system of North Korea is collapsing, the central government is encouraging regional governments to solve the economic problem. North Korea is now emphasizing an increase in autonomous management and responsibility, especially after July 1-reform measures when they prepared the regional budget plan. At the same time, the central government led the local government leaders to compete with each other by giving them appropriate incentives in order to activate local industries that produce daily necessities.

The survey results indicated that a number of American experts viewed this economic decentralization policy would be helpful in overcoming the current

economic crisis of North Korea, while most Korean experts did not agree. When asked about the possibility of these changes developing into a westernized local self-governing system, the majority of both American and Korean experts projected that it would not happen in the near future.

When North Korea was unable to obtain a loan from the international society, the joint venture law in 1984 was created in order to attract the direct investments of foreigners. It turned out to be a failure because the westerners other than pro North Korea businessmen in Japan looked away the law. Now the North has designated Najin-Sunbong, Shineuju, Kaesung, and Mt. Keumgang as special economic districts where foreigners may run their business as in other western countries. The survey indicated that the experts were unsure as to whether or not the policy of the special economic districts would be successful and helpful in the economic recovery of the North in the near future.

In order to help North Korea's economic developments by activating the specialized economic districts, the South Korean government was requesting that the United States recognize the products of Korean enterprises in the Kaesong industrial complex as 'made in Korea' in the Korean-American FTA agreement. Some experts are arguing that this is a political issue rather than an economic one.

Survey results show that six out of ten American experts are leaning

towards having the United States consider the products of Korean enterprises in the Kaesong industrial complex as Korean ones in the Korean-American FTA agreement. Should the United States agree to this condition, a great number of American and Korean experts anticipate that then the economic special districts of North Korea will be activated, and eventually helpful in the economic developments of the North.

Even with these unstable investment conditions in North Korea, Chinese enterprises have significantly increased their investments into the North after considering advantages such as valuable underground resources and a preoccupation of the market. Judging from these circumstances, some are speculating that China is attempting to subordinate the economy of the North to its own long-term strategy. The opinions of experts on this issue were equally divided. However, more Korean experts expressed concern about China's long-term strategy of subordinating the economy of North Korea to its own than American experts.

Finally, a great number of American and Korean experts perceived that, under the leadership of Kim Jong Il, it would not be easy for North Korea to overcome the current economic crisis and enter into an economic growth track even it did adopt the policy of a reform and openness.

4. Reforms and Openness

According to the results of the survey, most American and Korean experts determined that North Korea's reform and openness policy would not be successful with only domestic system changes. A majority of experts also were of the opinion that it is not likely that North Korea will be able to lead a successful reform and opening of its market by improving relations with the other western countries, but not with the United States. Most experts concurred that the nature of the reforming and opening policy of the North is not likely to be guided by specialists who belong to the economic and diplomatic administration, but controlled by the military officers. As a result, experts suggested a true change would be limited.

North Korea, unlike the others socialist states, has effectively suppressed factional formation within the regime due to the successful power transition from father to son as well as the existing centralization of power led by a handful of members in Kim's family. However, in order to maintain the power system stable under the circumstances of the economic hardship, Kim had no choice but to share power, little by little, with the technocrats who are mostly young, well educated, and have experience living overseas. Therefore, the numbers of technocrats are continuously increasing within the regime.

According to the survey, half of the experts anticipate that this

technocrats group will most likely be able to lead the reform process in North Korea in the near future and eventually stand against army officials and Kim Jong Il. The survey reveals that more Korean experts hopefully expect these changes than their American counterparts.

North Korea has also faced economic difficulties due to its over investment on the defense industry. However, in the survey, many American and Korean experts deduct that North Korea will not reduce its investment in defense for civilian use, even if reform and openness were to be accelerated.

Considering the fact that the North needs more economic support from the South in order to develop its economy, some Korean experts were hopeful that North Korea would give up any offensive military action towards the South and accept to replace the armistice agreement with a peace agreement. However, most American experts were skeptical that this scenario would be realized.

The survey showed that six out of ten Korean experts felt certain that even during the process of reform and openness, the army officials of North Korea would not give up their hostile unification policy. They believed that the more the North builds up trade cooperation with the South, and the more a peaceful reunification is demanded, the more the North Korean regime may create military conflicts such as the west coast violation. On the contrary, six out of ten American experts did not expect the North to create any more military

discords.

In order for a more successful ongoing reform to take place, most experts thought it imperative that North Korea solves the nuclear crisis, which would then stabilize the domestic political system as well as help secure the economic support of China, South Korea, and Japan. According to the survey, American and Korean experts agreed that solving the nuclear crisis and the will of North Korean leadership as the two most important elements for North Korea to accomplish a successful ongoing reform and opening up process. American experts pointed to domestic political stability as the third important element, whereas Korean experts pointed toward the activation of inter Korean economic cooperation as the third essential element.

5. Social Changes

The reform rapidly changed the residents' thoughts on monetary value and social consciousness. Under this new monetary economy, residents were quickly faced with the importance of money because they had to purchase daily goods from the market under the skylarking inflation, rather than receive these goods under the old distribution system. These changes forced people to

acknowledge that ideology was now less pertinent than money. The living situation had been changed drastically because the state no longer bore the responsibility for the daily lives of the residents; rather each individual now bore the responsibility for their livelihood. Therefore, their trust in the state sharply diminished, and the belief in *juche* ideology was also weakened. When asked in the survey, most experts foresaw *juche*, which has been the official ruling idea of North Korea, no longer being able to sustain itself as the main ideology maintaining the regime in the future.

In spite of being confronted with the difficult pressures from inside and outside the country, North Korea has been able to maintain its political power domestically because the national watchdog system controls the resident effectively. Especially, the severe punishment on political offense is the primary reason that the residents do not challenge the political power. However, the deviation from the socialistic norm and a slight shift in ideology has been appearing naturally throughout the long periods of economic difficulty. Market and capitalistic elements, in spite of the containment policy of the North Korean authorities, are being quickly introduced to the residents after the enforcement of the July 1 reform measures. Inevitably, it brought about a change in the form of residents' thoughts and lives. A great number of American and Korean experts presume that these social changes within the system will probably lead to the system change in the long run.

Right before a socialist system collapses, it is a common phenomenon that public morale collapses because of the disappointment in their socialist beliefs. Considering the fact that bribery and thieves are spreading widely in North Korea, it could have been an indication that the North Korean socialist system is showing the early stages of collapsing. However based on the survey, half the experts did not agree that the North Korean socialist system is now at the early stages of collapse, despite the widespread fall in public morale.

Many experts agreed that North Korea is changing internally because of its desire for the policy shift in economic reform, the corruption of members in the Communist Party and bureaucracy, the added importance on material goods, social deviations, and the external information influx. However, a large number of experts predicted that the regime would not collapse suddenly, but would rather opt to change the system slowly and manage the crisis effectively. According to the survey, the Korean experts seemed more convinced that the North Korean regime could be able to maintain this evolving system than the American experts were.

6. North Korean Defectors

The survey proved that an overwhelming number of both American and

Korean experts thought that international organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Amnesty International (AI) should work to obtain the rights of refuge for North Korean defectors. They also noted that the Chinese policy for the North Korean defectors is fundamentally flawed. Most advocated that the Chinese government should rather try from a humanitarian point of view to find a proper method to protect the defectors.

A small but growing number of North Koreans are seeking asylum in the United States after Washington passed the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, which mandated assistance to refugees fleeing the North. The latest arrivals of defectors raised the number of North Koreans from 12 to 31 defectors to have recently sought refuge in the United States. Some activist groups have accused the United States of being slow to help. A large percentage of both American and Korean experts claim that the United States should receive more North Korean defectors based on humanitarian aspects and the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004.

More than ten thousand North Koreans have defected to South Korea since the end of the Korean War in 1953, most of them arriving in recent years with the numbers growing rapidly. If the situation becomes more extreme, some specialists theorized that North Korea could end up as East Germany did in which the residents went over the border and immigrated toward the West,

promoting the collapse of the nation.

Based on the survey 60% of Korean experts agreed that North Korea could probably follow the destiny of East Germany if the situation escalates, while 90% of American experts disregarded any possibility of this occurring.

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Views of Experts on Korean Issues

1. The North Korean Nuclear Issue

In the 1960's, North Korea established a nuclear laboratory in Yongbyon with the support of the Soviet Union. North Korea continued to conduct nuclear research and arrived at a considerable level in the early 80's. Therefore, the United States had the Soviet Union persuade North Korea to join the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in December 1985.

Suspicious that North Korea was continuing to develop nuclear weapons were raised when a commercial satellite of France revealed photographs of the nuclear facility at the Yongbyon area in September 1989. The nuclear facility of Yongbyon has been under close watch from U. S. military satellites, and North Korea was pressured by the international community to discard its nuclear plan.

On January 30, 1993, the North signed a convention on nuclear safety by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and then submitted the initial report to the IAEA. Upon reviewing the report, the IAEA asked the North to allow them to conduct a special investigation concerning the two suspicious areas that had not been mentioned in the report. On March 12, 1993, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the nonproliferation treaty (NPT).

Hereafter, the United States and North Korea have held bilateral meetings for more than a year and half, resulting in the Agreed Framework at Geneva on October 24, 1994 in order to solve the nuclear issue in North Korea.

The main subject of the agreement was that North Korea was to receive a nuclear investigation in exchange for the international community to provide two light-water reactors. Also, the United States agreed to provide the North with 500 thousand tons of heavy fuel oil annually until the completion of their construction of the light-water reactors and if everything went as planned, then to normalize relations between the two nations.

It seemed to be calm for a while on the Korean peninsula after the agreement was signed. However, the *New York Times* raised doubts about the nuclear facility on Kum Chang Ri on August 17th, 1998, and shortly thereafter, the North operated a long-range missile test on August 31, 1998, which again catapulted the peninsula into tension. North Korea later agreed to permit visits to the site under question in March 1999, in return for better relations with the United States. This quieted the crises situation again.

At the same time, the two nations reached an agreement that the North would suspend missile firings under the condition that the United States relaxes the economic sanctions. Due to these agreements, the situation was not deteriorated any further.

In order to solve the root of the problem, President Clinton appointed former Defense Minister William Perry as a special advisor on North Korea to have him prepare a road map for archiving this goal. In October of 1999, this report was opened to the public. The basic framework of the report was that in

the event that North Korea removed the nuclear and the missile programs, the United States, with Korea and Japan, would assist the North to overcome its economic difficulties as well as help the North get out of diplomatic isolation from the international community. The Clinton administration, in accordance with the road map, had continued bilateral conferences with the North. As a result, in October 2000, North Korean Director General Cho Myung Rok visited Washington D.C., while U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited P'yongyang for the first time in November for the improvement of relations.

When the Bush administration took control as a result of the November 2000 presidential election, the thawing mood was substantially discontinued due to Bush's hard-line policy against the North. In the 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush declared war on terror and regimes that made or sponsored weapons of mass destruction. He called North Korea, along with Iran and the Republic of Iraq, the 'Axis of Evil', and declared that he would not allow the North to develop nuclear weapons.

The North Korean Foreign Ministry announced on February 1 that they regarded Bush naming them as one of the 'Axis of Evil' as an actual declaration of war. Hereafter, the situation turned from bad to worse, and in October 2002, when U.S. envoy James Kelly visited North Korea, it was revealed that nuclear bombs were being made with enriched uranium. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) immediately decided to discontinue the

heavy fuel oil supply in November 2002, which aggravated the situation even further.

In May 2003, after having ended the war with Iraq, the United States tried to solve the nuclear crisis with multilateral methods, rather than a bilateral one. Thanks to the arbitration of China, the United States opened the Six-Party talks together with Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, and North Korea at Beijing in August 2003, despite the resistance by North Korea. They held four Six-Party talks and reached an agreement on September 19, 2005. The new agreement was a joint statement similar to the road map laid out in the Agreed Framework of Geneva. However, a financial sanction was placed on North Korea by the United States due to the discovery of North producing counterfeit dollars. The North boycotted further talks, demanding that the United States lift the financial sanction as a precondition for returning to the talks.

In the meantime, the North formally announced its nuclear weapon manufacture and retention capabilities with the Foreign Ministry announcement in February 2005. North Korea announced officially on October 3, 2006, that it was ready to conduct a nuclear underground test. The test was conducted on October 9, 2006 and North Korea subsequently declared nuclear armament. North Korea then announced to come back to the Six-Party talks, after barely a month after its nuclear testing and almost a year and half of walking out on the talks. North Korea agreed to the February 13 deal in which they pledged to take

the initial steps to dismantle its nuclear weapons program, but the talks are still at the mercy of the whims of Kim Jung Il.

The international community has not solved the North Korean nuclear issue, although it has been over fifteen years since the first nuclear crisis of the North occurred. The debate as to what did not work began to materialize among experts. This is why the survey starts off by questioning the effectiveness of the Clinton and Bush Administrations North Korean policies.

Based on the survey, a majority of both American and Korean experts agreed that the Bush administration should have tried more to solve the nuclear problem within the framework of the Geneva Agreement in October 1994. As mentioned before, the Bush's hard-line policy against North Korea along with the 'Axis of Evil' statement was not viewed to have helped the nuclear situation.

However, 30% of experts doubted about the effectiveness of the Agreed Framework, which was originally designed to help build two light-water reactors in return for North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapon development program, because the North has developed the nuclear program for weapons, and not for energy.

Q. 1) The Agreed Framework of October 1994 was the proper method to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapon development program.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	6	1	1	1		1

Korean	7		2	1		
Total	13	1	3	2		1

Q. 2) The Bush administration's hard-line policy was the better method to solve the problem.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	1	1	2	6		
Korean	2		1	7		
Total	3	1	3	13		

In November 2006, the Democratic Party had won the election and had majority control over both the Senate and the House of Representatives. However, 70% of American experts predicted that these changes would not influence the Bush administration's North Korean Policy.

Q. 3) The results of the election of 2006 will influence the Bush administration's policy toward North Korea.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		3	5	2		
Korean						
Total		3	5	2		

The Six-Party talks fell into a deadlock because North Korea demanded the financial sanction to be removed as a precondition to return to the talks after the September 19 communiqué, while the United States adhered to the principle that the nuclear issue was different from the economic sanction that was placed in response to the counterfeit notes. Under these circumstances, many people doubted whether or not the Six-Party talks were still an effective tool for solving the nuclear issue. At the same time, they were not certain whether North Korea would sincerely adhere to the September 19 communiqué, even if the United States removed the financial sanction on them.

The survey revealed that experts were divided in their opinions on the

effectiveness of the Six-Party talks. Half of the experts expressed hopefulness on the future development of the talks. Among them, only four out of twenty experts agreed that the North Korean nuclear issue would be solved within the Six-Party talks. Six out of twenty experts said 'somewhat agree.' The remaining 45% disagreed. One expert did not answer.

Q. 4) The Six-Party talks are still an effective tool for solving the North Korean nuclear problem.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	2	3	3	1		1
Korean	2	3	3	2		
Total	4	6	6	3		1

The survey also revealed that no one felt absolutely certain that North Korea would adhere sincerely to the September 19 communiqué if the United States lifted the financial sanction on her. Five out of twenty experts are predicting that it is likely that North Korea will adhere it. But a majority of the

experts believe that it is not even likely that the North would adhere to the communiqué, even if the financial sanction were to be removed. One American expert argued that the North Korean nuclear issue had no bearing on the financial sanction, which has been caused by counterfeit notes of the U. S. currency in North Korea.

Q. 5) North Korea will sincerely adhere to the September 19 communiqué if the United States removes the financial sanction on them.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		2	2	3	2	1
Korean		3	5	2		
Total		5	7	5	2	1

It is widely known that North Korea secured enough plutonium to make six to seven nuclear bombs. The size of one of these nuclear bombs would be equivalent to the size of the bomb the United States used in the Hiroshima bombing in 1945. Some plutonium had been extracted previously before the Geneva Agreement, and the rest were secured by completing the reprocessing

of the 8,000 spent fuel rods in 2003. In light of the recent events of North Korea conducting a nuclear underground test and the declaration of nuclear armament, many experts are debating the real intentions of the North. Will North Korea abandon its nuclear plan completely if the United States fully accepts all their demands for political autonomy, a peace treaty with the United States, and a cooperation of economic development at the Six-Party talks? Many Chinese experts say "yes." But how many American and Korean experts agree with their opinions?

The survey shows that 5 out of 10 Korean experts said "yes." But the five experts still did not agree. Meanwhile, not one American expert chose a definite "yes," but four out of ten said that it is likely that the North would abandon the nuclear plan if the United States accepts their demands. Two American experts disagreed and three chose "don't know." One expert commented that those demands probably would not be sufficient enough for the North to give up its plans.

Q. 6) North Korea will abandon its nuclear weapons plan completely if the United States fully accepts its demands for political autonomy, a peace treaty with the United States, and a cooperation of economic development.

	Yes	Likely	Unlikely	No	Don't know	No answer
American		4	1	1	3	1
Korean	5		4	1		

Total	5	4	5	2	3	1
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North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006. However, the location and the size of the testing-bomb have yet to be confirmed. Different research institutes have presumably determined different places where the regime could have conducted a test. The Korean Geological and Resources Research Institute speculated that the test was conducted at the borderland between Hwadae and Kilchu, Hamgyong-Bukdo, while the Korean National Intelligence Agency mentioned Sang-pyung Ri, 15 kilometers away from the city of Kimchaek as the location of test. In the meantime, the United States has proposed Punggye Ri, Ham-gyong Bukdo as the sites in question.

The debates are also going on about the size of the test and its effectiveness. The initial nuclear test is generally designed to have an impact explosion of 10~20kt degree of power. However, North Korea yielded only about 0.8kt. In order to conduct a small-scale nuclear test, a highly sophisticated nuclear weapon manufacturing technique is necessary, which the North is unlikely to possess. This is why some experts are doubtful of the validity of the North Korean underground nuclear test. Some are arguing that North Korean leaders are simply bluffing after detonating to the same degree power with conventional type bombs or TNTs. However, North Korea officially claimed immediately after the test that it was quite successful and there was no outflow of radioactivity at all.

The survey reveals that 70% of American experts agreed or somewhat agreed that the North Korea's nuclear test was a technically successful one. Only two out of ten said that it seemed to be somewhat a failure.

Q. 7) North Korea's underground nuclear test of October 9 was technically successful.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	2	5	2		1	
Korean						
Total	2	5	2		1	

On October 3, 2006, North Korea announced that they were ready to conduct a nuclear underground test, and on October 6, the United Nations Security Council repeatedly urged the North to cancel its plans and observe U.N. Security Council Resolution 1695. On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted the nuclear test and subsequently declared nuclear armament disregarding all warnings. Then, the Council immediately called a meeting with the Board of Directors and unanimously adopted Resolution 1718, which cemented the North Korea's nuclear test as a serious threat to the international community and

urged the United Nations' members to inflict economic and diplomatic sanctions against the North in order to cease its nuclear arms program.

The U.N. Security Council criticized the underground nuclear test of North Korea in the resolution. It urged North Korea to discontinue all activities related to its nuclear and ballistic missile program, return to a membership of the NPT and the IAEA, and to heed regulations. It also demanded that the dismantling process should be complete, verifiable, and irreversible. Also, the resolution asked its member countries to freeze financial assets and stop economic aids, which may support the manufacturing of weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missile programs in North Korea.

North Korean Ambassador Park Kil Yeon's speech at the Security Council of the United Nations made it clear that North Korea refused to be in accordance with Resolution 1718. He asserted that if the pressure from the United States against the North continued, North Korea would regard it as a declaration of war and prepare for a proper physical confrontational measure. Then on October 17, 2006, the Foreign Ministry spokesman announced in an official statement that North Korea regarded the Security Council Resolution as a declaration of war.

However, North Korea has agreed to resume the Six-Party talks, after almost a year and half of walking out on the talks and barely a month after its

nuclear testing. Under the circumstances, debates are going on among some experts in Seoul that the UN Resolution should be nullified or suspended as long as the North remains in the talks.

The survey revealed that 80% of American experts agreed or somewhat agreed that the resolution should continue to stay effect, even if North Korea returned to the talks. Only one expert thought that the resolution should be reconsidered or suspended, if the North remained in the talks.

Q. 8) The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 should continue to stay in effect even if North Korea returns to the talks.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	4	4		1	1	
Korean						
Total	4	4		1	1	

China is the only ally to North Korea that would be able to persuade the North in abandoning its nuclear arms development program. Considering Chinese political and economic influence over North Korea, many experts

believe that China should have worked more towards solving the nuclear crisis. They believe China's efforts to persuade the North to abandon its nuclear arms program were insufficient.

Why is China reluctant to press the North to stop its dangerous game? If China cuts the oil supply to the North for a couple of months, the North may not have any other choice but to give up its nuclear arms program. This creates questions such as, "What are the real intentions of China?" or "Is China worried that a collapse in the North Korean regime will produce a great number of defectors and create unnecessary border disputes with the unified Korea in the long run?"

Based on the survey, 65% of experts claimed that China should have played a more aggressive role in persuading North Korea to give up its nuclear program. But 7 out of 20 experts disagreed. One expert thought that China actually had little or no leverage with North Korea at all.

Q. 9) China is the only friendly nation which is in the position to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, China should have put more effort towards solving the nuclear problem.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	4	2	3	1		

Korean	5	2	3			
Total	9	4	6	1		

Due to the support from China and South Korea, North Korea yielded a positive growth rate even though their international standing went from bad to worse due to nuclear issues in the 2000's. Some experts are arguing that this kind of trade should be refrained by China and South Korea in order to stop the nuclear arms program of the North as soon as possible. Meanwhile, some experts are arguing that it is a better strategy if the international community plays both sides of the operation, as the United States and Japan place economic pressure on North Korea, China and South Korea can encourage the North to return to the international community through economic support.

The survey revealed that 60% of American experts agreed or somewhat agreed that China and South Korea should participate in the economic sanction led by the United States against North Korea, if the North continuously refuses to stop its nuclear arms program. However, 70% of Korean experts expressed their dissatisfaction of economic sanctions against the North.

90% of American experts did not think that a dual strategy of the United States and Japan imposing economic pressure on North Korea while China and

South Korea encouraged the North to return to the international community through economic support would be effective. Korean experts were divided with half of them supporting the current North Korean policy of China and South Korea, while the other half disagreed.

Q. 10) China and South Korea must also impose economic sanctions against North Korea as the United States is currently doing if North Korea does not give up its nuclear arms program.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	3	3	3		1	
Korean	1	2	5	2		
Total	4	5	8	2	1	

Q. 11) It is a better strategy if the international community plays both sides of the operation, as the United States and Japan place economic pressure on North Korea on one side, as China and South Korea encourage the North to return to the international community through economic support.

	Agree	Somewhat	Somewhat	Disagree	Don't know	No answer

		Agree	Disagree			
American		1	3	6		
Korean	4	1	3	2		
Total	4	2	6	8		

South Korea is reluctant to participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) considering its current relations with North Korea, including the South-North dialogue. As mentioned before, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1718 and urged the UN members to adhere to the resolution in order to stop North Korea's nuclear arms program immediately after seeing North Korea conduct the underground nuclear test. The issues of the PSI as well as the South-North relations as a whole are under hot debate among conservatives, liberals, and radicals in South Korea.

According to the survey, the opinions of experts are equally divided on the issue of South Korea's PSI participation. But more American experts claim that the South Korean government has to participate in the PSI more aggressively in order for North Korea to give up its nuclear arms program. 60% of American experts agree or somewhat agree that South Korea should participate in the PSI actively, while 60% of Korean experts disagree after taking in account the course of South and North Korea's future relations.

Q. 12) South Korea should participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) towards North Korea aggressively in order to solve the nuclear problem.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	4	2	1	2	1	
Korean	2	2	4	2		
Total	6	4	5	4	1	

South Korea, China, and Japan, are in discord because of a Japanese map violation, 'Sinsa worship', and the controversy over the distorted content in historical textbooks. South Korea and China are also under controversy over the distortion of ancient Korean history in China, which was created by 'The Northeast Process Policy' of China. South Korea, China, and Japan had even discontinued summit talks with each other for a period of time. Therefore, even the most affected countries did not cooperate as much as they possibly could have with each other to solve the nuclear crisis.

The countries most affected by North Korea's nuclear ambitions should have come together and cooperated to solve the nuclear problem to keep the peace in Northeast Asia. A third party country, such as the United States, could

have the taken the role of a mediator if these countries had been able to concentrate on solving the nuclear crisis at hand. Some experts are urging South Korea and China to realize that 'Sinsa worship' and history distortion are internal problems within the concerned countries and should not relate these conflicts to diplomatic and security issues.

The survey represents that 65% of experts (80% Korean experts and half of American experts) are agreeing or somewhat agreeing that Japan and China should stop focusing on issues such as 'Sinsa worship' and history distortion in order to solve the nuclear problem as well as keep the peace in the Northeast Asia, while five out of twenty experts disagreed. Meanwhile, two American experts did not answer the question. One of them commented that these issues are unrelated to the nuclear issue.

At the same time, no one completely agreed that South Korea and China should recognize that 'Sinsa worship' and history distortion as internal problems within the concerned countries and should not relate these conflicts to diplomatic and security issues. 60% of experts (eight Korean experts and four American experts) disagreed or somewhat disagreed with opinion that these undesirable disputes made by Japan and China should be tolerated for attaining the common goal of solving the nuclear crisis.

Q. 13) Japan and China must stop creating issues such as 'Sinsa worship' and history distortion in order to solve the nuclear problem as well as keep the peace in the Northeast Asia.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	1	4	2	1		2
Korean	5	3	1	1		
Total	6	7	3	2		2

Q. 14) South Korea and China should recognize that 'Sinsa worship' and history distortion as internal problems within the concerned countries and should not relate these to diplomatic and security issues.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		4	1	3	1	1
Korean		2	4	4		
Total		6	5	7	1	1

If the international society cannot stop North Korea's development of nuclear bombs in the long run, what should be the next step? Should the United States do a preemptive strike on the nuclear sites in question, regardless of a

possible outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula? Should the United States allow South Korea and Japan to develop nuclear bombs as well? How will Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea react to the situation in the long run?

The survey shows that overwhelming number of experts expressed that the United States should not do a preemptive strike on North Korea's nuclear site even though the international community fails to persuade North Korea to abandon the nuclear weapons arms program. A majority of experts also claim that South Korea and Japan should not try to develop a nuclear weapon, even though North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. But one Korean expert claim that the United States should allow South Korea and Japan to develop nuclear weapons in order to keep the balance of power in Northeast Asia.

Q. 15) If the international community fails to persuade North Korea to abandon the nuclear arms program with all possible peaceful methods, the United States must do a preemptive strike on the nuclear sites in question.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American			1	9		
Korean			3	7		
Total			4	16		

Q. 16) If North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, the United States should allow South Korea and Japan to develop nuclear weapons in order to keep the balance of power in Northeast Asia.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American			2	8		
Korean	1		6	3		
Total	1		8	11		

It is well known that North Korea has exchanged missile technology for that of nuclear bomb with the Republic of Pakistan in 1997. Now, many experts are concerned that the North may try to export its nuclear and missile techniques to Iran or terrorist groups in the Middle East in exchange for oil, even though North Korea denies any possibility of that.

Based on the survey, a majority number of Korean experts predict that North Korea will try to export nuclear and missile technology to Iran or the terrorist groups in the Middle East in exchange for oil. But most American experts deny the possibility of these transactions.

Q. 17) North Korea will try to export nuclear and missile technology to Iran or the terrorist groups in the Middle East in exchange for oil.

	Agree	Somewhat	Somewhat	Disagree	Don't know	No answer

		Agree	Disagree			
American		1	3	2	3	1
Korean	1	7	2			
Total	1	8	5	2	3	1

2. Wartime operational control issues

Some military experts advocate that North Korea's strategy to occupy Seoul and the capital region by a surprise attack, combining their special warfare powers and mechanized units before the United States has a chance to intervene, has not been changed. Unlike their wartime strategy during the Korean War, North Korea will probably not continue to advance the troops towards the southern regions if they manage to secure Seoul and the capital area. The North will probably try to bargain with the United States through a truce agreement to end the attacks on South Korea under the condition of keeping Seoul.

To fulfill their goals, the North has strengthened their offensive weapons within their armored divisions and intensively deployed them nearer to Seoul. They have also arranged a vast quantity of fighter-bombers, missiles, tanks, and long-range cannons containing about 70% of their military power within 50 kilometers of the DMZ. Also, the North formally revealed their nuclear weapon manufacture and retention capability. The South Korean White Paper of Defense recently revealed that the total military strength of South Korea is about 80 percent of that of the North, excluding nuclear weapons from the calculation. Some experts, however, argue that the North cannot compete with the South, despite the numerical advantages, because the regime's military

equipment is old.

Many conservatives in Korea advocate that the United States should continue to maintain wartime operational control over the South Korean army in order to deter the invasion of the North over the South, because it does not seem that North Korea will give up the goal to unify the peninsula by force. Meanwhile, due to the current economic developments, the liberals and radicals in Korea now claim that South Korea possesses a strong enough military power to deter the North's aggression. Therefore, they advocate that the United States should relinquish wartime operational control over the Korean army back to South Korea as soon as possible.

Most American experts that took the survey thought the United States should not maintain wartime operational control over the South Korean army for a longer period of time to deter possible aggression by North Korea against the South. 7 out of 10 American responded that the United States should return wartime operational control over the Korean army to South Korea within three to five years because South Korea is strong enough to deter the North's aggression on its own.

Meanwhile, 70% of Korean experts stated that it is premature to return wartime operational control to South Korea yet because North Korea has not yet giving up on its goal to unify the peninsula by force. 3 out of 10 Korean experts, however, advocated that there should be no problem even if the United

States were to return the wartime operational control rights to South Korea within three to five years because Korea is maintaining a strong enough military capability due to the current economic developments.

Q. 18) The United States should continuously maintain wartime operational control over the South Korean army for a longer period of time in order to deter an invasion by the North to the South, because North Korea will not give up on its goal to unify the peninsula by force.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		1	3	6		
Korean	5	2	2	1		
Total	5	3	5	7		

Q. 19) South Korea possesses a strong enough military force to deter the North's aggression on its own. Therefore, the United States should return wartime operational control over the Korean army to Korea within three to five years.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	4	3	1	2		
Korean	1	2	4	3		
Total	5	5	5	5		

Currently, the Bush administration announced that it would transfer wartime operational control to South Korea by 2009. In Seoul, some liberals and radicals welcomed the United States' decision. However, conservatives and citizens who are concerned about national security do not desire such a sudden return of wartime operational control. Former Korean military leaders are strongly against the transfer being this soon.

The survey revealed that many agree that the transfer should proceed more cautiously than the United States scheduled. 70% of experts disagree or somewhat disagree about the early transfer of wartime operational control to Korea. Nine out of ten Korean experts express negative opinions concerning a sudden return. But four out of ten American experts advocate that the United States should transfer wartime operational control to Korea by 2009 as it has been announced, regardless of the public opinion in South Korea. One American expert did not answer the question but expressed his opinion that he agrees it has nothing to do with South Korean public opinion.

Q. 20) The United States should transfer wartime operational control to Korea by 2009 as it has been scheduled, regardless of the many Korean citizens who are concerned about national security and do not desire such a sudden return of wartime operational control.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	1	3	2	3		1
Korean	1		5	4		
Total	2	3	7	7		1

Through the course of events, such as the underground nuclear test of October 9 and the result of election of November 2006, some experts argued in their columns that these changes might have influence on the future negotiation process pertaining to wartime operational control.

The survey indicates, however, that most American experts predict that these two events will have little or no influence on the process of negotiation between Washington and Seoul.

Q. 21) The underground nuclear test of October 9 will influence the process of returning the wartime operational control to Korea.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		3	2	5		
Korean						

Total		3	2	5		
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Q. 22) The result of election of November 2006 will influence the negotiation process of the wartime operational control.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		1	3	6		
Korean						
Total		1	3	6		

Some conservatives have cautiously suggested the alternative of South Korea raising its share of maintenance expenses of the U.S. troops in Korea equal to that of Japan's, rather than to dissolve the Korean-American combined command.

The survey attests that half of the American experts believe that this idea is worth being discussed, but 70% of Korean experts express otherwise. One American expert even stated that these two issues are not related at all.

Q. 23) Korea should raise its share of maintenance expenses of the U. S. troops in Korea equal to that of Japan's rather than dissolve the Korean-American combined command.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	4	1	1	1	2	1
Korean		3	4	3		
Total	4	4	5	4	2	1

The citizens of Seoul are concerned about what will happen on the Korean peninsula if the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea is relocated to P'yongt'aek and wartime operational control over the Korean army is transferred to South Korea. Will the roles of the Korean-American Alliance and the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea change in the near future? Is there any possibility that North Korea may try to use that opportunity for a surprise attack or any sort of provocation against the South?

Based on the survey, 65% of experts foresee the Alliance as well as the roles of the U.S. troops in Korea changing in the near future. More American experts believe that these changes will be realized sooner than expected. But

half of the Korean experts are hopeful that this would not be the case. In the meantime, an overwhelming number of both American and Korean experts make sure that North Korea will not break out a war in the peninsula even though the American troops are relocated and a wartime operational control right is returned to Korea.

Q. 24) If the United States transfers the wartime operational control to Korea, the roles of the Korean-American Alliance and the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea will probably change in the near future.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	2	6	1	1		
Korean	1	4	3	2		
Total	3	10	4	3		

Q. 25) In case that the U. S. Armed Forces in Korea is relocated to P'yongt'aek and that wartime operational control over the Korean army is transferred to South Korea, North Korea will try to make use of that opportunity to do a surprise attack or any sort of provocation against the South.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American			1	9		
Korean		2	6	2		
Total		2	7	11		

Some specialists raised the question as to why the United States unilaterally removed the American troops between Seoul and the demilitarized zone (DMZ) without getting any yield from the North, such as the re-deployment of North Korean troops away from the DMZ or any give on the nuclear issue.

The survey results represented most American experts views that the America's unilateral decision of removing the trip-wire role from South Korea was appropriate. Meanwhile, the majority of Korean experts claims that the decision of the relocation of American troops would have been a good opportunity to renegotiate nuclear issues as well as a re-deployment of the North Korean army away from the DMZ in order to ease tension in the area.

Q. 26) It is appropriate that the United States unilaterally remove the American troops between Seoul and the demilitarized zone (DMZ) without getting any yield from the North.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	4	3	2	1		
Korean		1	4	5		
Total	4	4	6	6		

Q. 27) The removal of American troops should be linked with issues of the nuclear problems as well as a re-deployment of the North Korean army away from the DMZ in order to ease tension in this area.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	1	1	2	4		2
Korean	5	4	1			
Total	6	5	3	4		2

Some specialists cite three specific roles that the American troops in South Korea have - deterring North Korean aggression against the South, maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia, and keeping a watchful eye

on whether or not South Korea makes an attempt to unify the peninsula by force. Some of them postulate that if South Korea possesses the right to wartime operational control over its army, a nationalist in control of political power may try to invade North Korea for unification purposes, after heavily arming its army with its economic power.

According to the survey, none of the American or Korean experts agreed with that postulation.

Q. 28) If South Korea should possess the rights of wartime operational control over its army, a nationalist in control will try to invade North Korea for unification purposes after heavily arming its army with its economic power.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American			5	5		
Korean			4	6		
Total			9	11		

The decision of the United States to return wartime operational control to South Korea, followed by the gradual withdrawal of ground troops, may cause the Korean government to rely on China to play a stronger role in maintaining stability on the peninsula. Should that occurs, the influence of the United States

in South Korea may be weakened, while the influence of China is strengthened.

The survey presented opposing views between Korean and American experts on this point. 70% of Korean experts agree that the Korean government will try to rely on China to play a stronger role than the United States in maintaining peace, if the United States transfers wartime operational control to South Korea. However, 60% of American experts expect nothing to change in the relations between the United States and Korea regardless of who has the rights of a wartime operational control.

Q. 29) If the United States transfers wartime operational control to South Korea even though North Korea possess nuclear weapons, the Korean government may rely on China to play a stronger role than the United States in keeping stability on the peninsula. If that is the case in the future, the influence of the United States in South Korea will be diminished while China's influence is magnified.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	1	2	4	2	1	
Korean	6	1	1	2		
Total	7	3	5	4	1	

How important is South Korea to the United States strategic position concerning Northeast Asia? If the Korean peninsula were unified under the influence of China in the future, would it affect national interests of the United States in Northeast Asia?

The survey displayed that 90% of American and Korean experts predict that it would negatively affect the United States' national interests within the Northeast Asian region in the long run if the Korean peninsula were unified under the influence of China. One American expert stated that it would not happen in the near future.

Q. 30) In the case that the Korean peninsula were unified under the influence of China, it would not be a serious loss to the United States' national interests within the Northeast Asian region in the long run.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		1	6	3		
Korean		1	4	5		
Total		2	10	8		

Some experts suggest that the rights of wartime operational control would not affect the relations between the United States and Korea in the future. In the long run, they assume that the Korean peninsula will be unified under

American influence and the unified Korea will remain a strong ally of the United States in the Northeast Asia region regardless of whoever has the rights.

The survey shows that 60% of American experts somewhat agree with the above opinion, but 70% of Korean experts determined that these scenarios will not be realized if the issue in question is not solved in a satisfactory manner.

Q. 31) The Korean peninsula will be unified under U. S. influence in the future and the unified Korea will remain strong allies of the United States in the Northeast Asia region regardless of who has wartime operational control.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		6	4			
Korean	1	2	6	1		
Total	1	8	10	1		

Despite issues with the transfer of wartime operational control, some Korean conservatives argue that if the U. S. – Korea FTA comes into effect, North Korea may recognize that as an act proclaiming that the United States' public pledge concerning Korean security remains firm.

In response to this on the survey, most American experts were of the position that the FTA will little or no effect on America's public pledge to security

on Korea, but half of Korean experts anticipate North Korea to take these factors into consideration when formulating their policies against the South in the future. One American expert assessed that the FTA is not connected to the security issue from a U. S. standpoint.

Q. 32) In spite of issues with the wartime operational control transfer, when the U. S. –South Korea FTA comes into effect, North Korea will recognize this act as America's public pledge to security on the Korean peninsula remaining firm.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		1	2	2	3	2
Korean	4	1	2	3		
Total	4	2	4	5	3	2

3. North Korean Economy

Until the mid 70's, the North Korean economy marked a 10% growth rate, and then it declined to yearly average of only about 2~4% growth in the latter half of the 70's. After 1990, due to the collapse of the Eastern European socialist countries that were North Korea's main trade counterparts, the growth rate turned negative. In addition, a natural calamity in 1995 created food scarcity and aggravated the situation, and the North almost faced bankruptcy.

Since 2000, North Korea yielded a positive growth rate even though relations with the international community were dwindling because of nuclear issues. The support from China and South Korea, the changes that came from the July 1 Economic Management Improvement Measures, and the activation of the Mt. Kumgang and Kaesong special economic districts fueled the growth. The trade size had also continuously increased since 2002. It reached up to US \$3.5 billion in 2004, including the trade between the North and the South amounting to 700 million dollars, which was the highest record since 1991.

If China and South Korea continue to support North Korea through favorable trade, would the economic recovery in North Korea continue despite the effects of the U. S. financial sanction?

The survey indicated 60% of American experts predicting that North Korea's economic recovery would continue despite the financial sanction by the

U.S. because China and South Korea are supporting the North through trade. However, 90% of Korean experts anticipated that an economic recovery in North Korea would be severely limited regardless of aid from China and South Korea if the sanction continues.

Q. 33) In case China and South Korea continue to support North Korea through trade, economic recovery in North Korea will continue, despite the U. S. financial sanction.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	1	5	2	1		1
Korean		1	5	4		
Total	1	6	7	5		1

In the meantime, North Korea has actualized prices and wages as well as the exchange rate through the July 1 Economic Management Improvement Measures that was enforced in 2002. As a result, the semi-national rice price rose to 25 times, wages 18 times, and the exchange rate regulated 70 times its original price.

The income index system was also introduced, which increased the

managerial rights and provided material incentive, while abolishing the equal distribution system. The goal was to shift attention from distribution to productivity, reducing the national finance charge. The skylarking inflation that was caused by short supply, however, threatened the reform management measures.

After the July 1 measures, small size production systems were appearing from businesses and the individual units, and production and sale were becoming a form of division of labor. Simultaneously, the domestic and imported goods were starting to compete with each other in accordance with market principals, and the state enterprise was quickly changing to a private one. Judging from these phenomenons, some experts anticipate that North Korea will be able to introduce a market economy based on capitalistic principles.

Based on the survey, half of experts speculate that North Korea will transform its planned economy to a market one similar to China's. 70% of Korean experts are of the same mind on the possibility of these changes, while 60% of American experts doubt about it.

Q. 34) After the July 1 reform measures, the small size production system is appearing and production and sales are becoming a form of division of labor. At the same time, the domestic and imported goods are competing with each other in the free market, and the state enterprise is quickly changing to a private one. Judging from these phenomenons, it is possible that North Korea will be able to

introduce a market economy based on capitalistic principal.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		3	5	1		1
Korean		7	3			
Total		10	8	1		1

North Korea reduced the members of a collective farm production unit to half its size, and is testing family farm unit systems in some regions. The North not only gave the reduced farm units more rights and responsibilities on cultivating the farmland, but also began strengthening the incentive system in order to increase the production of food. Now some experts are beginning to say that North Korea may be able to successfully reform agriculture system, increase the production of food, and help to solve the food difficulties in the North in the near future.

60% of Korean experts somewhat agree with these hopeful scenarios, while 70% of American experts do not anticipate any drastic results from these changes. One American expert says that it may be helpful in increasing food production, but will still be far short of solving the problem.

Q. 35) After the July 1 reform measures, North Korea has reduced the sizes of collective farm production units to about half its size, and is testing family farm unit systems in some regions. North Korea gave more rights and responsibilities to the units to cultivate the farmland and increased the incentive in order to increase production. This kind of agriculture reform will be able to help solve the food difficulties in the North in the near future.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		2	6	1		1
Korean		6	4			
Total		8	10	1		1

North Korea, after the July 1 reform measures, issued a public bond of fifty billion won for the first time in its history in order to mobilize surplus monetary funds effectively. Some specialists argue that the North is changing its financial policy in the process of introducing a capitalistic economy.

The conclusion from the survey was that the majority of all experts were wary because issuing a bond once does not mean that North Korea will suddenly change its financial policy to introducing a capitalistic economy.

Q. 36) North Korea, after the July 1 reform measures, issued a public bond of fifty billion won for the first time in its history in order to mobilize surplus monetary funds effectively. This demonstrates that the North is changing its financial policy in the process of introducing a capitalistic economy.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		3	4	3		
Korean		2	7	1		
Total		5	11	4		

Since the planned economic system of North Korea has almost collapsed, the central government encourages regional governments to solve the economic problem by themselves. It emphasizes an increase in autonomous management and responsibility, especially after the July 1 Economic Management Improvement Measures, when they prepared the regional budget plan. At the same time, the central government led the local government leaders to compete with each other to activate local industries, which produce daily necessities by giving them appropriate incentives.

The existing debate is whether this economic decentralization policy is helpful in overcoming the current economic crisis and/or it can be developed into the westernized local self-governing system in the long run.

70% of American experts acknowledged that this economic decentralization policy would be helpful in overcoming the current economic crisis of North Korea, while 90% of Korean experts somewhat disagreed.

As to possibilities of these changes being developed into the westernized local self-governing system, a majority of both American and Korean experts express their opinions that it will not happen in the near future.

Q. 37) Since the planned economic system of North Korea has almost collapsed, the central government encourages regional governments to solve the economic problem by themselves. It emphasizes an increase in autonomous management and responsibility, especially after July 1 reform measures when they prepared the regional budget plan. This economic decentralization policy will be helpful in overcoming the current economic crisis.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		7	2		1	
Korean		1	9			
Total		8	11		1	

Q. 38) The decentralization policy, which North Korea is enforcing in the process of overcoming its economic difficulties, can be developed into the westernized local self-governing system in the long run.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		2	3	3	2	
Korean			9	1		
Total		2	12	4	2	

When North Korea was unable to obtain a loan from the international society, the joint venture law in 1984 was created in order to lure foreign direct investment. However, it turned out to be failure because the westerners other than businessmen who were belonged to the Pro Pyongyang Federation of Korean Residents in Japan looked away the law. The North designated Najin-Sunbong, Shineuju, Kaesung, and Mt. Keumgang as the special economic districts in which foreigners are able to run business as in other western countries.

One can see from the survey that experts are not certain as to whether or not the policy of the special economic districts will be actually be successful and

helpful in the economic recovery of the North in the near future.

Q. 39) The policy of the special economic districts is able to be successful and helpful in the economic recovery in the North.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		4	3	1	1	1
Korean		5	5			
Total		9	8	1	1	1

In order to help North Korea's economic development by activating the specialized economic districts, the South Korean government is requesting the United States to classify the products of Korean enterprises in the Kaesong industrial complex as South Korean products in the Korean-American FTA agreement. Some experts are arguing that this matter is a political issue, rather than an economic one.

Six out of ten American experts agree or somewhat agree with the idea that the United States should recognize the products of Korean enterprises in the Kaesong industrial complex as Korean ones in the Korean-American FTA

agreement, while four experts disagree with this idea.

If in fact the United States determines those products to be from South Korea, 75% of all experts anticipate that the economic special districts of North Korea would actually be activated and eventually helpful in the economic development of the North.

Q. 40) The South Korean government claims that the United States should recognize the products of Korean enterprises in the Kaesong industrial complex as Korean one in the Korean-American FTA agreement. Do you agree on this?

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	1	5		4		
Korean						
Total	1	5		4		

Q. 41) In case the United States agrees on it, the economic special districts of the North will be activated, and eventually helpful in the economic development of the North.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	2	4	2		2	

Korean	5	2	3			
Total	7	6	5		2	

In the long run, will North Korea be able to overcome the current economic crisis under the leadership of Kim Jung II, and enter into an economic growth track similar to that of China and Vietnam?

The survey indicates that the majority of experts anticipates that it will be not easy for North Korea to overcome the current economic crisis under the leadership of Kim Jung II, even though it adopt a policy of reform and openness.

Q. 42) In the long run, North Korea will be able to overcome the current economic crisis under the leadership of Kim Jung II, and enter into an economic growth track similar to Vietnam's (after Vietnam's economic reform in the mid 1990s)?

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		2	5	2	1	
Korean		3	5	2		
Total		5	10	4	1	

Even with the unstable investment environment in North Korea because of nuclear arms issues, the Chinese enterprisers have significantly increased

their investments into North Korea after considering advantages such as valuable underground resources and the preoccupation of the market. Judging from these circumstances, some experts consider it as China's attempt to subordinate the economy of the North to their own long-term strategy.

The opinions of experts on this issue are equally divided. More Korean than American experts expressed concern about China's long-term strategy of subordinating the economy of the North to its own. However, nine out of twenty experts anticipate that China will not try to subordinate the North Korea's economy to their own in the near future.

Q. 43) Even with the unstable investment environments in North Korea, the Chinese enterprisers significantly increased their investments into North Korea after considering advantages such as valuable underground resources and the preoccupation of the market. Judging from these circumstances, China is attempting to subordinate the economy of the North to their own long-term strategy.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		4	5			1
Korean	2	4	4			
Total	2	8	9			1

4. Reforms and Openness

China successfully led its economic growth through reform and openness while leaving her socialist system intact, a system that could serve as a possible model for North Korea in its reform process. In addition, China became the only neighbor supporting North Korea after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is inevitable that North Korea would show high interest in the changing model of China at some point. As a result, North Korea's domestic reform process, the Economic Reform Measures of July 1, 2002, shows similarities to that of the initial stages of China in terms of the system. Unlike China, however, North Korea's reform process is immobilized because of the economic pressure placed by the United States caused by the nuclear crisis and the counterfeit dollars issues. The domestic inflation after the July 1 reform and the socially dissatisfied factions are also preventing further progress.

To offset this, North Korea is increasing trade and cooperation with South Korea, strengthening the traditional amicable relationships with China and Russia, and maintaining relations with the members of EU and ASEAN in order to create a more favorable external environment for a successful domestic economic reform. However, North Korea is not changing the core of its policies of the Kim Jong Il regime, such as nuclear issues.

Based on the survey, most American and Korean experts predict that

North Korea's reform and openness policy will not be successful with only its domestic system changes, such as the July 1 Reform Measures, without improving international relations. A majority of experts also predict that North Korea is unlikely to lead the reform and opening of its market successfully by only improving relations with the EU, ASEAN, China, and Russia, and not the United States.

Q. 44) The reform and openness policy of North Korea will be able to be successful with only domestic system changes such as the July 1 Economic Reform Management Measures without improving international relations.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American			3	6	1	
Korean			7	3		
Total			10	9	1	

Q. 45) North Korea is likely to lead the reform and opening of its market successfully by only improving relations with the EU, ASEAN, China, and Russia, and not the United States.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		1	3	5	1	

Korean			8	2		
Total		1	11	7	1	

There are two groups of experts. One group claims that the policy of reforming and opening up the North is guided not by people who belong to the diplomatic or economic related administration, but by a special team under the military. Therefore, a true change will be limited. The others advocate that the army officials do not have a specialty group on a reform and openness; it is currently led by a group of specialists who belong to the economic and diplomatic administration and that the army officials are participating only in the area, which relates to security. The more the economic reform policies progress, the less of the role of the army officials will play. Considering these situations, North Korea is probably able to pursue the same level of reform as that of in China.

How did the experts that took the survey lean on this issue? A majority of experts of both nations believe that the reforming and opening policy of the North is not likely to be guided by specialists who belong to the economic and diplomatic administration, but by the military officers. As a result, a true change will be limited.

Q. 46) Policy makers of the reforming and opening up of the North are guided by a special team in the military. A true change will be limited because of the influence of the army officials on the process of reform and openness.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		6	1		3	
Korean	2	5	3			
Total	2	11	4		3	

Q. 47) The army officials are participating only in the process of the decision that relates to security. The true reform is currently led by a group of specialists who belong to the economic and diplomatic administration. The more the economic reform policies proceed, the lesser the role army officials will play. North Korea will be able to pursue the same level of reform as that of China's.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		2	5		3	
Korean		1	9			
Total		3	14		3	

North Korea, unlike the others socialist states, has effectively suppressed factional formation within the regime thanks to the successful power transition from father to son as well as the centralization of power led by a handful of

members of Kim's family. However, in order to maintain the power system stably under the circumstance of the economic hardship, Kim had no choice but to share the power little by little with the technocrats who are mostly young, well educated, and have experience living overseas. Also, the numbers of technocrats are continuously increasing within the regime. Now, some experts are cautiously forecasting that these new group of reform-minded people will lead the reform and openness of the North in the near future and eventually conflict with army officials and Kim Jong Il.

Based on the survey, half the American and Korean experts hope that this technocrat group will lead the reform process in North Korea soon and eventually stand up against army officials and Kim Jong Il. More Korean experts expect these changes positively. Some 60% of Korean experts anticipate that these changes will likely be realized in the near future, while only 40% of American experts somewhat agree with it.

Q. 48) In order to maintain the power system stably under the circumstances of the economic hardship, Kim has no choice but to share the power little by little with the technocrats who are mostly young, well educated, and have experienced life overseas. The numbers of technocrats are also continuously increasing within the regime. These new group will lead the reform and openness of the North in the near future and eventually conflict with army officials and Kim Jong Il.

	Agree	Somewhat	Somewhat	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
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		Agree	Disagree			
American		4	6			
Korean		6	3	1		
Total		10	9	1		

North Korea has also faced economic difficulties due to its over investment in the defense industry. When reform and openness is accelerated, some specialists advocate, the North will reduce its investment in defense and appropriate that towards civilian use. At that time, North Korea will probably adopt a rational military policy based on its economic capacity.

However, the survey indicates 60% to 65% of American and Korean experts presume that North Korea will not reduce its investment in defense for civilian use even though reform and openness is accelerated. Nor will they consider its economic capacity and probably adopt a more rational military policy in the midst of reform and openness.

Q. 49) North Korea, like other socialist states, has faced economic difficulties due to its over investment on the defense industry. When reform and openness is accelerated, the North will reduce its investment in defense and appropriate that towards civilian use.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		4	4	1	1	

Korean		3	6	1		
Total		7	10	2	1	

Q. 50) In the midst of reform and openness, North Korea will consider its economic capacity and probably adopt a more rational military policy.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		4	4	1	1	
Korean		2	7	1		
Total		6	11	2	1	

North Korea has a strong political objective to take South Korea by force and to consolidate Kim's regime in unification. When the progress of reform and openness is accelerated, some experts assume people will recognize that this political objective is unrealistic and will discard it. At the same time, during the reforming and opening process, considering the fact that the North needs more economic support from the South in order to develop its economy, North Korea may probably have to give up any offensive military planning towards the South and accept to transfer the armistice agreement with a peace agreement.

Now, the survey reveals that some 55% experts forecast that North Korea will eventually give up an offensive military policy against the South and agree to sign the peace agreement. There were more Korean experts among

this group that concurred. 70% of Korean experts expect the North to eventually give up its hostile military policy against the South when given economic support, while only 40% of American experts somewhat agree with that.

Q. 51) North Korea will eventually give up an offensive military policy against the South and agree to sign the peace agreement after considering the fact that it needs economic support from South Korea to develop the economy.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		4	4	1	1	
Korean		7	3			
Total		11	7	1	1	

Some experts argue, however, that even during the process of reform and openness, the army officials of North Korea will not give up their hostile unification policy. The more the North builds up trade cooperation with the South, and the more peaceful reunification is demanded, the more the North Korean regime may create military conflicts, such as the west coast violation.

Six out of ten Korean experts think North Korea will create more acts of violation even in the midst of the reform and openness process, while six out of

ten American experts do not think that the North will create military discords.

Q. 52) Even in the midst of reform and openness policies, the army officials of North Korea will not give up their hostile unification policy. The more the South and the North build up economic cooperation and more people demand a peaceful reunification, the more the North Korean regime will create military discords such as the west coast violation.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		2	6		2	
Korean		6	3	1		
Total		8	9	1	2	

In order to for North Korea to succeed in the ongoing reform and openness, most experts assert that it is imperative that North Korea solves the nuclear issue. This will stabilize the domestic political system, as well as help secure economic support from China, South Korea, and Japan.

Survey results manifest that American and Korean experts agree that solving the nuclear problem and North Korean leadership as the two most important elements for North Korea to accomplish a successful ongoing reform and opening up process. American experts point out domestic political stability

as a third important element, while Korean experts chose the activation of north and south economic cooperation as a third essential element.

Q. 53) Please indicate the three most essential elements for North Korea to accomplish a successful ongoing reform and opening up process.

- 1) Solving the nuclear problem & security guarantee from the US ()
- 2) Activation of north and south economic cooperation ()
- 3) Domestic political stability ()
- 4) The will of the North Korean leader for reform & openness ()
- 5) The economic support of China ()
- 6) Economic support and normalization of relations with Japan ()

	American	Korean	T/L
Solving the nuclear problem & security guarantee from the US	10	10	20
The will of the North Korean leader for reform & openness	10	8	18
Domestic political stability	8	1	9
Activation of north and south economic cooperation	1	7	8
Economic support and normalization of relations with Japan	1	4	5
The economic support of China			

5. Social Changes

The Kim Jong Il administration concentrated on facing the economic difficulties that had been hindering the efficiency of policy executions, and carried out the aforementioned July 1 Economic Management Improvement Measures in 2002 as one of its plans in overcoming the economic hardships. Even with the some positive effects that the July 1 measures had, in some ways, it put many more economic hardships on the many residents who did not have enough cash to maintain their daily lives after the enforcement of the policy. It also brought about the macro-economic insecurity as well as the inflation caused by the short supply of commodities.

As a side effect of these measures, change began to take place. The measurement rapidly changed the residents' thoughts on money and social consciousness. Under this new monetary economy, residents were quickly faced with the importance and new meaning that money held because they had to purchase daily goods from the market under the skylarking inflation. It was no longer under the old distribution system.

These changes forced people to acknowledge that an ideology suddenly became less pertinent in their daily lives than money. The living situation had been changed drastically because the state no longer bore the responsibility for the daily lives of the residents, and each one now bore the responsibility for

their livelihood. As a result, their trust in the state diminished sharply, and the belief in the *juche* ideology also weakened.

When asked in the survey, a majority of experts foresee that *juche*, which has been an official ruling idea of North Korea, slipping as the main ideology maintaining the regime. Only four experts somewhat thought that *juche* might prevail as the main ideology in North Korea.

Q. 54) The *juche*, which has been a official ruling idea of North Korea, will hereafter be a main ideology maintaining the regime.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		3	6	1		
Korean		1	6	3		
Total		4	12	4		

Another side effect, the increased flow of information about external affairs due to the increase of people who crossed the border for trade and to purchase food, perplexed the leaders of the North the most. The more common markets are open, the more information on external current events circulates

with the transactions of goods.

In order to minimize the shift in the residents' thought and reinstall more trust in the state's authority, North Korea began to strengthen the ideology indoctrination. In 2004, they established laws that targeted punishing new crimes such as cultural infringement, prostitution, hostile broadcast listening, and the corruption of North Korean culture by bringing in and spreading other cultures. Furthermore, North Korea punished residents who played or listened to western music and/or dance as well as watched the so-called "corrupt videos." The government authority also prohibited the use of cellular phones in order to ban the influx and outflow of information.

North Korea is continuously trying to control and manage its residents. However, they often have no choice but to accept some changes and allow residents to do some activities because it was unavoidable in propelling market elements for improving the North Korean economy. As a matter of fact, the punishments for "cultural deviations" in the daily lives of residents and defectors have already been relaxed substantially. In addition, it is important to note that it applies only to the person who violated the law, rather than to the whole family. However, North Korea is still very strict in disciplining a criticism about Kim Jong II, they are now simply trying to manage the side effects of the other violations by advocating the persistence of "our socialism."

Many experts state that in spite of confronting the difficult pressures from

inside and outside of the country, North Korea has been able to maintain its political power domestically because the national watchdog system controls the resident effectively. Especially, the severe punishments on a political offense are the primary reason that the residents do not challenge the political power. However, the deviations from the socialistic norm and a slight shift in ideology have been appearing during the long periods of economic difficulty as a natural phenomenon. Market and capitalistic elements, in spite of the containment policy of the North Korean authorities, are being quickly introduced to the residents after the enforcement of the July 1 reform measures. It inevitably brought about a change in form of thought and life of the residents. Now some experts prospect that these social changes within the system may lead to a change of the system in the long run.

The survey does show that sixty percent of experts presume that these social changes within the system will be probably leading to the system change in North Korea in the long run.

Q. 55) Market and capitalist elements, in spite of the containment policy of the authorities, are being quickly introduced in the North Korean society and is changing the thought and lives of the residents significantly after the implementation of the July 1 economic reform measures. These social changes

within the system will be probably creating a change in the system in the long run.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	1	5	2	1	1	
Korean	1	5	4			
Total	2	10	6	1	1	

Right before a socialist system collapses, it is a common phenomenon that public morale plummets because of the disappointment in their socialist beliefs. Considering the fact that bribery and thieves are widely spreading in North Korea, it may be an indication that the North Korean socialist system is also showing the early stages of collapsing.

Although based on the survey, half of experts do not think that the North Korean socialist system is now in the early stages of collapse, despite widespread drop in public morale. However, 40% of American experts pointed out that the current situation in the North is similar to that of Eastern Europe in 1990s. Still, 70% of Korean experts discard the possibility of a collapsing socialist system in North Korea because the residents are watched and controlled effectively.

Q. 56) Right before a socialist system collapses, it is a common phenomenon that public morale collapses because of the disappointment in their socialist beliefs. Considering the fact that bribery and thieves are widely spreading in North Korea, it is an indication that the North Korean socialist system is also showing the early stages of collapsing.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	1	3	3		3	
Korean		3	7			
Total	1	6	10		3	

Many experts assume that North Korea is going through internal changes because of its desire for the policy shift in economic reform, the corruption of members in the Communist Party and bureaucracy, the added importance on material goods, social deviations, and the external information influx. These many social changes will be probably be the source to the collapse of the

political system in the long run. How soon will it be realized?

According to the survey, 55% of experts predict that North Korea will not be collapsed suddenly, but it will change the system slowly managing and responding to the crisis effectively. Korean experts are more certain that the North will manage to maintain its current system than their American experts counterparts. Four out of ten Americans state that they are not sure about what will happen there in the near future.

Q. 57) North Korea will slowly change rather than collapse suddenly because they are managing the crisis effectively.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		3	2	1	4	
Korean		8	2			
Total		11	4	1	4	

6. North Korean Defectors

North Korean defectors began appearing from the beginning of the 90's along with the economic hardship caused by the collapse of socialist countries. When the situation became worse due to the food shortage in the mid 90s, the number of defectors reached up to four hundred thousand. In 2000, the number had decreased substantially because of the food aide provided by the international community to help overcome the North Korean food shortage, and also China and North Korea's keeping tighter control of their borders. Currently, it is known that approximately thirty to fifty thousand defectors are illegally residing in China.

These defectors, however, are suffering from an infringement of human rights, a situation that is being monitored by the international community. From 2003, the U. N. Commission on human rights has resolved three orders for North Korean defectors, and the United States has also passed the North Korea Human Rights Law regarding defectors in 2004. Many Korean experts state that international organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Amnesty International (AI) should work to obtain rights of refuge for North Korean defectors.

An overwhelming response from the survey shows that both American and Korean experts concur that the international bodies such as UNHCR and AI

should work for the North Korean defectors who are escaping hunger and political repression to acquire a right of refuge.

Q. 58) the international bodies such as UNHCR and AI should work to acquire rights of refuge for the North Korean defectors.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	5	4			1	
Korean	7	2	1			
Total	13	6	1		1	

The Chinese government arrests defectors and returns them to North Korea. Many South Koreans criticize the Chinese policy of arresting the defectors and returning them to North Korea by force, knowing it could only mean extremely severe punishments for the captured defector when they arrive home. Instead, they claim that China should build refuge camps in the border area and let the defectors stay until they can be relocated to where they would like to settle.

According to the survey, 75% of experts disapprove of the Chinese policy

concerning North Korean defectors. The majority is of the view that the Chinese government should try to find a more satisfactory method of protecting the defectors from a humanitarian standpoint.

Q. 59) China arrests the defectors and returns them to North Korea, resulting in severe punishments upon returning home. Instead, the Chinese government should build refugee camps in the border and let the defectors stay until they can be relocated to where they wish to go.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	4	3	1	1	1	
Korean	5	3	2			
Total	9	6	3	1	1	

A small but growing number of North Koreans are seeking asylum in the United States after Washington passed the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, which mandates assistance to refugees fleeing the North. The latest arrivals of 12 defectors raise the number of North Koreans to 31 defectors to have recently sought refuge in the United States. Some activist groups have accused the United States of being slow to help North Koreans under the 2004 North Korea Human Right Act.

According to the survey, 75% of both American and Korean experts

express their views that the United States should receive more North Korean defectors based on the humanitarian aspects.

Q. 60) Based on the humanitarian aspects, the United States should receive more North Korean defectors.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American	4	3	2	1		
Korean	5	3	2			
Total	9	6	4	1		

More than ten thousand North Koreans have defected to South Korea since the Korean War ended in 1953. Most of them arrived in recent years, and the numbers are now growing rapidly. If this continues, some specialists argue that North Korea will end up as East Germany where the residents went over the border, immigrated toward the West, and promoted the collapse of the nation.

90% of American experts deny any possibility of this kind of scenario.

However, 60% of Korean experts anticipate that North Korea will probably follow up the destiny of East Germany if the situations become prevalent.

Q. 61) If the situation become worse, North Korea will probably end up as East Germany did in which the residents went over the border, immigrated toward the West, and promoted the collapse of the nation.

	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Don't know	No answer
American		1	8	1		
Korean	1	5	4			
Total	1	6	12	1		

<The Survey Questions>

Hello, my name is Tae Hwan Ok, and I am a visiting fellow from the Korea Institute of National Unification (KINU). The following survey is intended to aid in the understanding of the views of American experts on Korea on issues such as the North Korean nuclear crisis, wartime operational control in South Korea, openness and reform in the North Korean Economy, social changes within North Korea, and the rights of refuge for North Korean defectors.

The survey consists of about sixty questions. Please mark one out of the five answers for each question and e-mail (tho@keia.org) it back by the end of January 2007. The results will be distributed to all participants by the end of August. Thank you in advance for your kind cooperation.

This project is sponsored by the Korea Economic Institute. **Some questions cannot be answered by choosing yes or no. In that case, yes means "agree," likely means "somewhat agree," unlikely means "somewhat disagree," and no means "disagree."**

<The North Korean Nuclear Crisis >

1) The Agreed Framework of October 1994 was the proper method to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapon development program. The Bush Administration should have tried to solve the problem within the framework of the Agreed Framework.

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

2) The United States could not have persuaded North Korea to give up the nuclear weapon program with the Agreed Framework. Consequently, the Bush administration's hard-line policy was the best method to solve the problem.

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

3) Do you think that the results of the election of 2006 will influence the Bush administration's policy toward North Korea?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

4) Do you think that the Six-Party talks are still an effective tool for solving the North Korean nuclear problem?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

5) Do you think that North Korea will sincerely adhere to the September 19 communiqué if the United States removes the financial sanction on North Korea?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

6) Do you think that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 should continue to be in effect even though North Korea returns to the talks?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

7) Do you think that North Korea will abandon its nuclear weapons plan completely if the United States fully accepts its demands for political autonomy, a peace treaty with the United States, and a cooperation of economic development?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

8) Do you think that North Korea's underground nuclear test on October 9 was successful technically?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

9) As China is the only friendly nation that is in the position to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, China should have put more effort towards solving the nuclear problem.

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

10) If North Korea does not give up its nuclear program, do you think that China and South Korea must also impose economic sanctions as the United States is currently?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

11) It is a better strategy that the international community plays both sides of the operation, as the United States and Japan place economic pressure on North Korea on one side, as China and South Korea encourages the North to return to the international community through economic support.

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

12) Do you think that South Korea should participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) towards North Korea more aggressively in order to solve the nuclear problem?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

13) Japan and China must stop creating issues such as 'Sinsa worship' and history distortion in order to solve the nuclear problem as well as keep the peace in the Northeast Asia.

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

14) South Korea and China should recognize that 'Sinsa worship' and history distortion as internal

problems within the concerned countries and should not relate these to diplomatic and security issues.

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

15) If the international community fails to persuade North Korea to abandon the nuclear weapons program with all possible peaceful methods, the United States must do a preemptive strike on the nuclear sites in question.

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

16) If North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, should the United States allow South Korea and Japan to develop nuclear weapons in order to keep the balance of power in Northeast Asia?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

17) Do you think that the North will try to export nuclear and missile technology to Iran or the terrorist groups in the Middle East in exchange for oil?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

< Wartime operational control issues >

18) Many conservatives in Korea advocate that the United States should continuously maintain wartime operational control over the South Korean army for a longer period of time in order to deter an invasion by the North to the South, because North Korea will not give up on its goal to unify the peninsula by force. Do you agree with their opinions?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

19) The liberals and radicals in Korea claim that South Korea possesses a strong enough military force to deter the North's aggression on its own. Therefore, they advocate that the United States should return wartime operational control over the Korean army to Korea within three to five years. Do you agree with their opinions?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

20) Do you think that the United States should transfer wartime operational control to Korea by 2009 as it has been announced, regardless of the many Korean citizens who are concerned about national security, and do not desire such a sudden returning of wartime operational control?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

21) Do you think that the underground nuclear test of October 9 will influence the process of returning the wartime operational control to Korea?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

22) Do you think that the result of election of November 2006 will influence the negotiation process of the wartime operational control?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

23) Do you think that Korea should raise its share of maintenance expenses of the U. S. troops in Korea equal to that of Japan's rather than to dissolve the Korean-American combined command?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

24) In case that the U. S. Armed Forces in Korea is relocated to P'yongt'aek and that wartime

operational control over the Korean army is transferred to South Korea, do you think that North Korea will try to make use of that opportunity for a surprise attack or any sort of provocation against the South?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

25) If the United States transfers the wartime operational control to Korea, do you think, the roles of the Korean-American Alliance and the U. S. Armed Forces in Korea will probably change in the near future?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

26) Do you think that it is the appropriate that the United States unilaterally remove the American troops between Seoul and the demilitarized zone (DMZ) without getting any yield from the North?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

27) Or, do you think that the removal of American troops should be linked with issues of the nuclear problems as well as a re-deployment of the North Korean army away from the DMZ in order to ease tension in this area?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

28) If South Korea should possess the rights of wartime operational control over its army, do you think a nationalist in control will try to invade North Korea for unification purposes after heavily arming its army with its economic power?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

29) If the United States transfers wartime operational control to South Korea even though North

Korea possess nuclear weapons, the Korean government may rely on China to play a stronger role than the United States in keeping stability on the peninsula. If that is the case in the future, the influence of the United States in South Korea will be diminished while China's influence is magnified.

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

30) In the case that the Korean peninsula is unified under the influence of China, it will not be a serious loss to the United States' national interests within the Northeast Asian region in the long run.

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

31) The Korean peninsula will be unified under U.S. influence in the future and the unified Korea will remain strong allies of the United States in the Northeast Asia region regardless of who has wartime operational control.

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

32) In spite of issues with the wartime operational control transfer, when the U.S.-South Korea FTA comes in effect, will North Korea recognize this act as America's public pledge to security on the Korean peninsula remaining firm?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

< North Korean Economy >

33) If China and South Korea continue to support North Korea through trade, economic recovery in North Korea will continue, in spite of the U. S. financial sanction.

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

34) After the July 1, 2002 reform measures, the small size production system is appearing and production and sales are becoming a form of division of labor. At the same time, the domestic and imported goods are competing with each other in the free market, and the state enterprise is quickly changing to a private one. Judging from these phenomenons, it is possible that North Korea will be able to introduce a market economy based on a capitalistic principal.

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

35) After the July 1 reform measures, North Korea has reduced the sizes of collective farm production units to about half its size, and is testing family farm unit systems in some regions. North Korea gave more rights and responsibilities to the units to cultivate the farmland and increased the incentive in order to increase production. Do you think that this kind of agriculture reform will be able to help solve the food difficulties in the North in the near future?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

36) North Korea, after the July 1 reform measures, issued a public bond of fifty billion won for the first time in its history in order to mobilize surplus monetary funds effectively. Do you think this demonstrates that the North is changing its financial policy in the process of introducing a capitalistic economy?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

37) Since the planned economic system of North Korea has almost collapsed, the central government encourages regional governments to solve the economic problem by themselves. It emphasizes an increase in autonomous management and responsibility, especially after July 1-

reform measures when they prepared the regional budget plan. Do you think that this economic decentralization policy will be helpful in overcoming the current economic crisis?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

38) Do you think that the decentralization policy, which North Korea is enforcing in the process of overcoming her economic difficulties, can be developed into the westernized local self-governing system in the long run?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

39) Do you think that the policy of the special economic districts is able to be successful and helpful in the economic recovery in the North?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

40) The South Korean government claims that the United States should recognize the products of Korean enterprises in the Kaesong industrial complex as Korean one in the Korean-American FTA agreement. Do you agree on this?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

41) In case the United States agrees on it, do you think the economic special districts of the North will be activated, and eventually helpful in the economic development of the North?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

42) In the long run, do you think that North Korea will be able to overcome the current economic crisis under the leadership of Kim Jung Il, and enter into an economic growth track similar to Vietnam's (after Vietnam's economic reform in the mid 1990s)?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

43) Even with the unstable investment environments in North Korea, the Chinese enterprisers significantly increased their investments into North Korea after considering advantages such as valuable underground resources and the preoccupation of the market. Judging from these circumstances, do you think China is attempting to subordinate the economy of the North to their own long-term strategy?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

< Reform and openness >

44) Do you think that the reform and openness policy of North Korea will be able to be successful with only domestic system changes such as the July 1 Economic Reform Management Measures without improving international relations?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

45) Do you think that North Korea is likely to lead the reform and opening of its market successfully by only improving relations with the EU, ASEAN, China, and Russia, and not the United States?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

46) Policy makers of the reforming and opening up of the North are guided by a special team in the military. A true change will be limited because of the influence of the army officials on the process of reform and openness.

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

47) The army officials are participating only in the process of the decision, which relates to security. The true reform is currently led by a group of specialists who belong to the economic and diplomatic administration. The more the economic reform policies proceed, the lesser the role army officials will play. North Korea will be able to pursue the same level of reform as that of China's.

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

48) In order to maintain the power system stably under the circumstances of the economic hardship, Kim has no choice but to share the power little by little with the technocrats who are mostly young, well educated, and have experienced life overseas. The numbers of technocrats are also continuously increasing within the regime. These new group of reform-minded people will lead the reform and openness of the North in the near future and eventually conflict with army officials and Kim Jong Il.

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

49) North Korea, like other socialist states, has faced economic difficulties due to its over investment on the defense industry. When reform and openness is accelerated, do you think the North will reduce its investment in defense and appropriate that towards civilian use?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

50) In the midst of reform and openness, do you think that North Korea will consider its economic capacity and probably adopt a more rational military policy?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

51) North Korea will eventually give up an offensive military policy against the South and agree to sign the peace agreement after considering the fact that it needs economic support from South

Korea to develop the economy.

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

52) Even in the midst of reform and openness policies, the army officials of North Korea will not give up their hostile unification policy. The more the South and the North build up economic cooperation and more people demand a peaceful reunification, the more the North Korean regime will create military discords such as the west coast violation.

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

53) Please indicate the three most essential elements for North Korea to accomplish a successful ongoing reform and opening up process.

1) Solving the nuclear problem & security guarantee from the US ()

2) Activation of north and south economic cooperation ()

3) Domestic political stability ()

4) The will of the North Korean leader for reform & openness ()

5) The economic support of China ()

6) Economic support and normalization of relations with Japan and ()

< Social Changes >

54) Do you think that the *juche*, which has been a official ruling idea of North Korea, will hereafter be a main ideology maintaining the regime?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

55) Market and capitalist elements, in spite of the containment policy of the authorities, are being

quickly introduced in the North Korean society and is changing the thought and lives of the residents significantly after the implementation of the July 1 economic reform measures. Do you think that these social changes within the system will be probably creating a change in the system in the long run?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

56) Right before a socialist system collapses, it is a common phenomenon that public morale collapses because of the disappointment in their socialist beliefs. Considering the fact that bribery and thieves are widely spreading in North Korea, it is an indication that the North Korean socialist system is also showing the early stages of collapsing.

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

57) North Korea will slowly change rather than collapse suddenly because they are managing the crisis effectively.

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

<North Korean defectors>

58) Do you think that the international bodies such as UNHCR and AI should work to acquire rights of refuge for the North Korean defectors?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

59) China arrests the defectors and returns them to North Korea, resulting in severe punishments upon returning home. Instead, do you think the Chinese government should build refugee camps in the border and let the defectors stay until they can be relocated to where they wish to go?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

60) Based on the humanitarian aspects, should the United States receive more North Korean defectors?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

61) If the situation become worse, do you think that North Korea will probably end up as East Germany did in which her residents went over the border, immigrated toward the West, and promoted the collapse of the nation?

1) yes () 2) likely () 3) unlikely () 4) no () 5) don't know ()

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