

**JOINT U.S. – KOREA ACADEMIC STUDIES**

**Volume 15, 2005**

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**The Newly Emerging Asian Order and  
the Korean Peninsula**

**Symposium Sponsored by  
The College of William and Mary  
The Korea Economic Institute, and  
The Korea Institute for International Economic Policy  
August 25–27, 2004**

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## **AMERICA'S ROLE IN ASIA— THE EVOLUTION REQUIRED**

*Robert A. Scalapino\**

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## I. Introduction

The end of World War II marked the beginning of a new era in U.S. foreign policy. Previously, the United States had shunned most strategic alliances and refused to participate in key global associations, as the rejection of the League of Nations demonstrated. Wilsonian idealism and the commitment to global democracy failed to win sufficient public or congressional support. A majority of the American people were prepared to let the Old World wrestle with its problems, and there was little appreciation of, or attention to, the New World of Asia. The only U.S. colony in Asia, the Philippines, was an accident, the product of the Spanish-American War that centered on nearby Cuba.

Thus, playing a leading role in the construction of the United Nations (UN), providing massive assistance to Europe in the form of the Marshall Plan, and undertaking the reconstruction of a new Japan and South Korea (the Republic of Korea or ROK) were daunting commitments. Moreover, these engagements initially expanded rather than contracted with the passage of time. Unquestionably, the Cold War was a prime contributing factor. Relations with Western Europe took on major strategic as well as economic dimensions with the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Never had the states bordering the Atlantic been so tightly connected.

Insofar as the United States was concerned, the Cold War centered on a deeply divided Europe. Given the weakness of America's allies—so severely drained by the recent hot war—U.S. leadership in preventing further Soviet advances was indispensable. Moreover, the lines were clearly drawn. To be sure, certain European “neutrals” or “independents” existed, but they were not critical to the balance. Broadly speaking, U.S. allies accepted U.S. leadership. Although there were occasions when U.S. policies or rhetoric caused concern, it was generally manifested in muted form.

## II. U.S. Policy in Asia during the Past Half Century

The situation with respect to Asia was far more complex from the outset of the post-1945 era. What was the appropriate defense perimeter? The United States had fought the Pacific war against Japan largely at sea and on the Japanese-occupied islands in the Pacific Ocean, with the climax being the Okinawa campaign. U.S. military commitments to continental Asia were modest and generally in conjunction with others, notably the Nationalist Chinese.

As World War II ended, however, China was moving toward the climax of a long-existing civil conflict, with the Nationalists in serious trouble. Given its commitments elsewhere, the United States was loath to become deeply involved in that struggle,

and significant divisions existed within the U.S. government in appraising Chiang Kai-shek and his prospects. Thus, when the Communists appeared increasingly likely to overthrow the Nationalist regime, the United States rejected pleas for intervention. Shortly after Communist victory on the Mainland, moreover, Secretary of State Dean Acheson indicated that for the United States the Chinese civil war was over, and the Nationalist forces that had retreated to Taiwan could not expect U.S. assistance.

With China now in the opposition camp, and Southeast Asia—except for the Philippines—outside the U.S. orbit, the strategic picture appeared that of a basic division between continental Asia and island Asia. However, one development had complicated the situation. In the final days of World War II, the Soviet Union had entered the Pacific War. Its forces moved rapidly through Manchuria, decimating Japanese units and marching toward the Korean peninsula.

The Soviet Union could easily have occupied the entire peninsula because U.S. forces were no nearer than Okinawa at the end of the war. However, the Soviets were anxious to work with the United States in postwar Asia at this point. Hence, Russian leaders indicated a willingness to share in the occupation of Korea, with the general assumption that this would be a temporary arrangement prior to the creation of an independent nation. Certain Russians also expressed the hope that they could share in the occupation of Japan. Had that happened, the future would have been even more tumultuous than it became, but Russian occupation was confined to Sakhalin and the Kuriles, regions that it claimed as its own.

Thus, South Korea became the sole place on the Asian continent where a U.S. presence was implanted. The occupation was presented with many complex problems from the outset. The United States, having little knowledge of Korea, began occupational duties with no specific commitments to leaders or general policies other than that of creating a democratic order. Syngman Rhee quickly became the dominant political figure. Rhee had had a lengthy stay in the United States, where he had headed an independence movement that sought to mobilize Koreans living there and elsewhere overseas. His commitment was clearly to democracy, yet his relations with both the U.S. occupation authorities and Washington were troubled from the outset. U.S. authorities found Rhee to exhibit the traits of an autocrat: he was unwilling to work harmoniously with others, Korean or American, and he usually rejected advice unless put under great pressure. He was far from a U.S. favorite, but efforts to promote an alternative proved unsuccessful.

Meanwhile, at the Moscow conference of December 1945, a trusteeship plan had been worked out whereby Korea would be put under international trusteeship for five years, after which elections were to lead to an independent Korean government. This plan was rejected by virtually all Koreans, however, although the Communists were

brought into line under Russian pressure. Thus, the division of Korea and the dual Russian-U.S. occupation continued.

Having supervised the creation of a tightly controlled Stalinist state in the North, the Russians felt comfortable in withdrawing their military forces in 1948, especially since the Russian Far East was nearby, with one of its borders touching North Korea and with major military forces still in the region. The U.S. decision to withdraw its troops involved a more serious strategic decision, and that decision was buttressed later by the declaration of Secretary Acheson in January 1950 that the U.S. defense perimeter was confined to islands off mainland Asia and, hence, did not include Korea. This tragic mistake permitted Kim Il-sung to assume that by force he could unify Korea under his leadership and that the United States would not intervene. He received the support, or at least the acquiescence, of both Russia and China. The costly Korean War followed.

As is well known, the U.S.-ROK crossing of the 38th parallel and the resounding defeat of North Korean forces led to the intervention of China, not out of great sympathy for Kim Il-sung, but because Mao Zedong did not want the United States and, possibly, Chiang Kai-shek on China's border. Thus was the issue of Taiwan reopened, with the United States now committed to preventing the island from falling under Communist control.

The compromise that ended the Korean War brought the United States back to the Republic of Korea, this time as a guaranteed protector of ROK sovereignty. The United States had returned to the Asian continent. Further, in the aftermath of the Korean War, security relations with select Southeast Asian states, including Thailand, were established. Although not alliances, these relations included training and base use. However, the firm commitments were those to such offshore entities as the Philippines, which together with Japan formed the defense perimeter.

Once again, the United States was to be challenged by Communist advances, centering upon Indochina. As the 1950s unfolded, worries about Communist activities throughout Southeast Asia intensified. Guerrilla movements, often aided by the People's Republic of China (PRC), were active in many parts of the region. The Paris agreement regarding Vietnam, moreover, with its pledge to create a unified Vietnam via free elections in both the North and the South, was totally lacking in realism.

Should the United States commit itself to blocking Communist expansion in Southeast Asia, by force if necessary? This issue was increasingly on the policy agenda as the 1950s came to a close. However, given other priorities and a recognition that public support for another conflict was doubtful, U.S. leaders were cautious. Thus, through such actions as the secret exploration of the situation in Laos via dispatch of a small

unit, the United States adopted a policy of creeping rather than striding in establishing its strategic commitments in the region.

Even after the war in Vietnam became a reality, with U.S. commitments not easily reversible, policies were marked by certain restrictions, including limitations on U.S. attacks on the North and in the Laotian and Cambodian zones being used by the North Vietnamese. Naturally, the United States was apprehensive about Chinese involvement on a greater scale should the North be decimated. In addition, Vietnamization, namely, the training of indigenous South Vietnamese forces to play the key military role, was seriously delayed.

Given the policies pursued by the United States, the North Vietnamese, sensing that impatience was a U.S. trait and that the U.S. public would not support engagement if no end were in sight, correctly determined that the appropriate strategy for them should be that of outlasting the Americans.

It can be argued that the U.S. commitment in Vietnam permitted the other Southeast Asian states—Laos and Cambodia excepted—to create conditions more favorable for containing the Communist movement in their societies. Shortly after the Vietnam War, moreover, various factors, long in motion, led to serious fissures within the international Communist movement, a major development affecting regional and global security. Yet the U.S. acceptance of defeat in Vietnam—peace without honor—had a negative effect on our Asian allies, raising doubts about our credibility.

This was especially true with respect to South Korea. President Park Chung-hee, learning of the U.S. decision to withdraw from Vietnam and noting the declaration of President Nixon at Guam in mid-1969 that the United States “would look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for its defense,” told this author that he had to be given time to get ready for the shift in U.S. policy. The Yushin Constitution of 1972 and a more intensive authoritarian course followed.

The Carter administration also cast doubt on the U.S. commitment to the ROK. President Carter himself advocated the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Korea, and, although his proposal was discarded, certain troop withdrawals did occur. With the Reagan presidency, confidence in the United States rose and relations improved. This continued through the Clinton years. Differences between the United States and the ROK remained, however, and were soon to become more visible. With the election of Kim Dae-jung as South Korea’s president, ROK policies toward the North shifted in 1998 toward negotiation under the so-called Sunshine Policy. Kim’s policies were viewed skeptically by the Bush administration at its outset, and new strains developed. Kim’s visit to Washington came at the beginning of the Bush presidency when no

policy toward North Korea had been formulated, but President Bush personally voiced strongly negative sentiments when he placed the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) in "the axis of evil" and expressed distrust of Kim Jong-il.

From that point, however, U.S. policy toward the North was to evolve gradually toward a more nuanced and flexible position. First, the Bush administration expressed a willingness to participate in multilateral negotiations while it asserted that the United States had no intention of attacking the North. Second, the Bush administration, at the third six-party dialogue, set forth a proposal that provided a three-month period for the North to prepare for the dismantlement of its nuclear facilities, with immediate economic aid in the form of heavy fuel oil sent by states other than the United States and a "provisional" guarantee from the United States not to attack the DPRK or seek the overthrow of the current government. Talks would also begin regarding the lifting of economic sanctions and providing longer-term economic aid.

This proposal was not accepted by the North and the impasse continues, but agreement to go forward with the six-party talks exists, and the United States has finally initiated a more concrete proposal for handling the nuclear issue as well as setting aside certain terms such as CVID (complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement). Unquestionably, pressure from China and South Korea constituted a factor in producing the U.S. proposal. At the same time, deep differences over policy continue to exist within the Bush administration, but moderates are now dominant, at least temporarily. Meanwhile, in mid-August 2004, the DPRK withdrew from working-level talks with the United States on its nuclear program, casting doubt on any immediate advances. Even if the North is tempted to procrastinate, awaiting the outcome of the November 2004 election in the United States, a negotiatory course has been charted.

In accepting a multilateral approach to the North Korea issue and in responding to criticism of its past rigidity by both Seoul and Beijing, Washington has demonstrated a more flexible policy. Whether this will continue will depend partly on North Korea, but it illustrates the fact that an alteration in past unilateralism is now under way.

### **III. Anti-Americanism in Asia**

Meanwhile, the United States confronts the rise of anti-Americanism throughout Asia as well as elsewhere. To be the only global superpower is to court resentment, especially at a time when nationalism is rising, often substituting for ideology as a unifying force in a period of ideological decline. Such resentment has been fostered also by U.S. unilateralism and a rhetoric accompanying policies that is often seen as both arrogant and intrusive.

In South Korea as elsewhere, anti-Americanism has been displayed in various ways, from criticism of specific U.S. policies to a more general condemnation stemming from nationalist or ideological roots. It has been strongest among the younger generation, those under 40 for whom the Korean War is history. The United States is charged with interfering in North-South relations and preventing reunification as well as precluding the emergence of a truly independent Korea. Incidents such as the deaths of two young girls in a traffic accident involving a U.S. military vehicle have exacerbated negative feelings. Yet despite the increase of anti-Americanism in South Korea, the official relationship remains positive on balance. Both President Kim Dae-jung and his successor, President Roh Moo-hyun, have emphasized the importance of the U.S.-ROK security alliance. President Kim even asserted that the strategic ties should be maintained after reunification and further stated that, when he told Kim Jong-il this at the time of their summit meeting, Kim agreed. President Roh, despite calls for greater independence during the election campaign and the telling support of young Korea, has not only defined the U.S.-ROK strategic alliance as vitally important but has moved his party, the Uri Party, to support the sending of Korean forces to Iraq for noncombat duties.

#### **IV. A New U.S.-ROK Relationship?**

Are the United States and the Republic of Korea en route to being genuine partners rather than continuing with the patron-client relationship of the past? Or are there prospects of the U.S.-Korea relationship becoming less important to both parties, with another major state, namely China, becoming the more critical external influence in strategic as well as economic terms? No simple answer to either of these questions suffices because current developments relating to them are both diverse and subject to abrupt changes.

Let us first explore trends with respect to strategic relations. The United States has signaled that it wants to withdraw one-third of its 37,000 troops in South Korea by the end of 2005. Already it has slated 3,700 for deployment to Iraq. The prime reason for this decision relates to new strategic policies, with the emphasis on modern weaponry, rapid deployment capacity, and bases kept in readiness by allies. Thus, the ROK is not the only ally to be affected. In addition, however, a redeployment of U.S. military forces within the ROK had earlier been signaled, involving the move southward of those forces near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the evacuation of some 7,000 soldiers and families from the Yongsan base in Seoul. The latter move should have taken place long ago, given its political costs. It is interesting that North Korea has condemned the withdrawal of U.S. troops near the DMZ as evidence that the United States is strengthening its capacity for a first strike with minimal casualties.

Nevertheless, opinion in the ROK has been mixed, with critics asserting that the effect of the revised strategic policies is to increase the defense costs and risks for South Korea and, further, that it is being instituted at the wrong time, prior to any agreement with the North on nuclear weaponry. In any case, the ROK has increased its defense budget to \$17.8 billion, an advance of 13.7 percent over the 2003 budget. However, defense expenditures still account for only 2.9 percent of Korea's gross domestic product. Meanwhile, critics of the U.S.-ROK relationship are cheering the new developments, hoping that they signal a reduction in U.S. presence and influence.

Significantly, these moves have not been taken unilaterally. For the past 18 months, officials from the two governments have been negotiating the transformation of the strategic alliance, with various issues posing difficulties in reaching a consensus but with a number of agreements reached. Also, the U.S. Department of Defense has announced plans to spend \$11 billion in Korea over the next four years to strengthen both South Korean and U.S. capabilities.

If plans go according to schedule, U.S. strategic visibility in the ROK will be substantially less and ROK defense responsibilities will be greatly heightened. Yet, the alliance will continue. Unquestionably, moreover, the Korean voice in matters relating to security will have been strengthened, and, in this sense, partnership will be closer to realization. However, as the only global superpower, the United States will undoubtedly reserve the right to differ from allies on occasion and, if it determines necessary, take actions alone or with a "coalition of the willing." The costs of such actions, however, have proved to be extremely high and are thus less likely in the future, barring a truly extraordinary challenge.

It is possible that the United States and the ROK will be parties to a multilateral strategic body in Northeast Asia, perhaps evolving out of the six-party dialogues. Such a body would likely preserve state sovereignty and pledge equality, thereby placing a premium on unanimity through flexibility and compromise. To date, such organizations have not been very effective in Asia in making or keeping the peace, given the great diversity of states in terms of political system, stage of economic development, and culture. The time may not be ripe for a formal structure in Northeast Asia, but already various combinations of states in the region are discussing aspects of the security issue and taking cooperative actions, from conducting joint military exercises to displaying greater transparency with respect to military programs. Thus, to expand the number of participants in a regularized multilateral dialogue aiming at formal agreements on a wide range of issues is not without possibility—or merit.

## **V. ROK Ambitions**

ROK leaders have recently talked about turning their nation into an economic hub in Northeast Asia, a center for international investment and trade. Unquestionably, this region constitutes a natural economic territory, given the composite interaction between assets and needs. Moreover, the fact that China looms as an economic giant, already the top market for South Korean exports and increasingly active in investment in ROK firms, partly accounts for the fact that, when polled recently, a majority of the Uri Party legislators rated China as more important than the United States to South Korea.

Before assuming that a fundamental transformation of ROK strategic policies is in the offing, however, one should reflect on the history of Korea's efforts to maintain its independence despite being surrounded by giants. Three basic strategic alternatives have long existed. The first was maximum isolation, a policy that North Korea attempted until recently, but it is no longer feasible in this age of globalization. A second strategy has been to seek balanced and positive relations with all neighboring powers, thereby keeping an equilibrium. The problem with this strategy has been that it frequently failed, with one power assuming ever greater influence and control—the most recent example being Japanese imperialism. The third strategy has been to seek the support of a distant, nonthreatening power in maintaining security from any nearby threats. It is this strategy that the ROK has pursued since the Korean War and that recent leaders continue to support, but both President Kim Dae-jung and President Roh Moo-hyun have sought to combine the second and third strategies with some effectiveness.

## **VI. U.S. Relations with Japan**

Let us next examine contemporary trends with respect to the foremost alliance of the United States in Asia—that with Japan. In Japan as elsewhere, nationalism has been increasingly manifest. Japanese leaders have called for Japan to be recognized as a major power and, in that context, to be given a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Equally important, in recent years, Japan has expanded its security perimeters to the South and has sent its Self-Defense Forces first to the Indian Ocean and subsequently to Iraq for noncombat activities. Further, with the support of both major parties, the Japanese parliament recently passed seven security-related bills that expand the nation's capacities with respect to defense activities. It seems very likely, moreover, that within the next few years, a constitutional amendment will be considered that revises Article 9, the so-called pacifist article.

In sum, Japan is moving in the direction of reasserting itself as a “normal state,” one with a much broader range of options with respect to defense. In addition, Japan has been increasingly active on the international front, serving as a foremost economic aid giver, participating in a full range of multilateral operations, and initiating independent policies, some of which differ from U.S. positions. For example, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has made two trips to Pyongyang and now asserts that Japan hopes to establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK within the next year or two if the nuclear issue can be resolved. To be sure, much hinges on Japan’s continued economic advance, which in turn rests on its ability to effectuate further domestic reforms.

None of Japan’s new thinking signals a threat to the U.S.-Japan strategic alliance. Indeed, the United States has long desired Japan to increase its security commitments, and here, as in South Korea, changes in U.S. security strategies will place a greater responsibility on Japan. Despite the rise of anti-U.S. sentiment, with the war against Iraq unpopular in Japan as elsewhere, there is no strong opposition to the alliance. A reduction in troops and bases, moreover, is likely to reduce tension over such issues as the extensive U.S. military presence in Okinawa. However, there can be no doubt that an increasing number of Japanese want their relations with the United States to shift from those of patron-client to relations of partnership. Greater independence of Japanese policy, especially in Asia, is inevitable. Hence, more intensive consultation between the United States and Japan in both a bilateral and multilateral context will be required, and the trend is in that direction. Further, the relatively weak showing of Koizumi’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the July 2004 parliamentary election illustrated the political costs of sending Japanese forces to Iraq. That issue together with the unpopular change in the pension system enabled the Democratic Party of Japan to gain 12 seats in the upper house of the Diet, reducing the LDP seats to 49 out of 121 and making Koizumi and his party dependent on coalition partners.

If the U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia are to remain stable, greater sensitivity to views at the level of the citizenry as well as of leaders is required. There has never been a more urgent need to improve America’s public diplomacy than at present. This will require a range of new or revised approaches involving both attitudes and policies. For example, the current visa policy, while defended on security grounds, is doing great damage, producing strong resentment among tourists and businesspeople and serving as a barrier to foreign students, thereby depriving the United States of one of its great strengths in past foreign relations.

## **VII. U.S. Relations with Other Allied Countries of Asia**

Meanwhile, what are the trends with the respect to quasi allies, namely those nations—primarily in Southeast Asia—that want a U.S. presence in their region to provide a

certain balance but generally prefer a presence without the emplacement of U.S. troops or bases? The recent position of Indonesia and Malaysia in opposition to U.S. participation in patrols in the Malacca Strait provides evidence of the ambivalence with which a U.S. military presence is viewed in some quarters. On the other hand, nations like Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand have been more committed to working with the United States in the security realm, and even Vietnam—privately concerned about China’s expanding presence—has sought to encourage greater U.S. involvement in cultural and economic fields.

Once again, the formidable challenge is to build a more positive U.S. image at various levels in these societies. Public diplomacy is a critical challenge. Assistance in antiterrorist programs has been accepted, even solicited, in several cases. Yet there is widespread apprehension about U.S. unilateralism and the past emphasis on “coalitions of the willing.” To be sure, the shortcomings of multilateralism in Southeast Asia are manifest. Yet organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) continue to be supported with the hope that their roles can be strengthened, initially in the economic realm, and U.S. participation in such bodies as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is important as a venue for discussion of key issues.

Here as well as elsewhere, multilateral and bilateral relations as well as official and track-two approaches must be combined. No single approach suffices. Moreover, greater attention must be paid to younger generations. In this region, where generational change is taking place at an accelerating pace, it is imperative that we understand the views of those who are now emerging in key positions, both official and unofficial, and communicate with them on a wide range of issues. Further, even security issues cannot be handled effectively by military means alone; a full range of economic, political, and cultural policies, reached through extensive consultation, is essential.

### **VIII. U.S. Relations with Other Countries of Asia**

It remains to analyze U.S. relations with the three major powers within Asia that are not allies, namely China, Russia, and India. U.S.-China relations cannot be categorized under one label. Depending on the issue, they range from cooperation (partnership is probably too strong a term) to competition, with varying degrees of hostility expressed. Some Americans view China as a rising threat just as some Chinese view the United States as a current threat. Yet for eminently logical reasons, the leaders of both nations want to prevent the deterioration of relations, given their domestic priorities and the costs of conflict or a high level of tension.

China and the United States share many common interests, ranging from antiterrorism and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation to those threats that relate to human security, among them the rising scarcity of key resources like water and energy,

pollution, and the aging of their societies. On these issues and others, the United States and China can and should work more closely together, along with other states, seeking common policies and collective action.

Yet certain issues evoke differences not easily resolved, and the rhetoric on both sides is frequently harsh. PRC authorities regularly criticize U.S. foreign policy as hegemonic, unilateralist, and constituting interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. U.S. arrogance is also condemned. The United States complains about Chinese violations of human rights and other transgressions on the democracy it claims to practice. Various economic transgressions are also protested, and the specter of Chinese ultranationalism is raised as a potential cloud on the Asian horizon.

In specific terms, moreover, Taiwan represents a volatile issue for which no solution is in sight. China, insisting that Taiwan is the foremost issue in the Sino-U.S. relationship, sharply criticizes U.S. weapons sales to the Chen Shui-bian government and urges the United States to use its influence to rein in Chen's independence efforts, warning of dire consequences should those efforts go forward. The United States, while opposing any independence declaration and exerting some pressure on Chen, decries any possible use of force by China and leaves open its options for the future.

The prospects for Sino-U.S. relations are uncertain, but it seems likely that cooperation in many areas will advance, given the economic and strategic interests of both parties. It should be acknowledged that recent PRC foreign policies have been generally successful in creating among China's neighbors an image of a nonthreatening power. Through such terms as "strategic partnership," China is seeking to create a sense of closeness in its relations with Central and Southeast Asia as well as with Russia. The pledge to resolve issues through negotiation and the promise to abide by the five principles of peaceful coexistence have had a positive impact. Moreover, through these means, a *de facto* buffer-state system has been created as a defense against perceived U.S. encirclement.

Nonetheless, worries ranging from China's economic inroads and migration potential to its rising military strength exist throughout Asia. China-Japan relations, moreover, are troubled by the deep imprint of history as well as such ongoing issues as the territorial dispute in the East China Sea (Sea of Japan) and what Beijing perceives to be Japan's drive toward military power.

Under current circumstances, U.S. foreign policy in Asia will be underwritten by two fundamental principles: a concert of powers and a balance of power. Efforts to resolve various issues will be made by bringing together those nations having a common involvement or interest in a given problem or problems and conducting intensive dialogues (in many cases involving China bilaterally or with others). At the same time,

the United States will maintain its strategic alliances, albeit under revised security guidelines, in an effort to strengthen China's resolve to abide by its peaceful commitments.

It is also in the U.S. interest to encourage the two other major societies of Asia or Eurasia to play an active role on the regional and international stage. The Russian Federation is not a threat today nor will it be for the foreseeable future unless its domestic development falls into long-term disarray. Its geopolitical position, moreover, ensures that it will once again be an important player in both the West and in Asia at some point. President Vladimir Putin, with a desire to reestablish Russia's role as a global power, has cultivated the European Union and the United States while he seeks to improve Russia's relations in East and South Asia. Differences between the United States and Russia have existed and continue to exist on certain important matters ranging from Middle East policies to strategic plans and domestic politics. Indeed, in the aftermath of the September 2004 Beslan tragedy, U.S. apprehensions regarding President Putin's political actions have risen. Yet both sides are still careful in their criticisms, and the door to negotiations is open. Clearly, the United States must continue with this policy.

India is in the process of a meaningful change in economic policies that augurs well for its future. Indeed, India's economic growth is likely to match that of the fastest-growing Asian states, including China. Its economic and strategic importance to East Asia is also advancing. Given its commitment to democracy, moreover, it has an ideological compatibility with the United States and other open societies. The United States is currently engaged in the extremely difficult task of maintaining a close relationship with President Pervez Musharraf's Pakistan as a necessary ally with respect to Afghanistan and Iraq while seeking to improve its relations with India. Thus, the United States has a huge stake in seeing the Kashmir issue resolved or contained through negotiations and moderate policies advanced by both parties. Once again, in-depth dialogue between the United States and both Pakistan and India is important, along with a major increase of interaction at the unofficial level between think tanks, business and academic representatives, and youth.

## **IX. U.S. Policy Outlook**

There can be little doubt that the changing conditions in Asia require an altered, more sophisticated U.S. foreign policy. As has already been recognized, unilateralism is generally doomed to failure, with huge costs resulting. However, no single approach to the prevailing issues will suffice. Multilateralism and bilateralism must be simultaneously pursued, with the particular balance between the two depending on circumstances. Continuous, regularized dialogues have never been more essential.

Transparency must also be enhanced, and issues that cannot be easily or quickly resolved must be kept at the lowest possible level of tension by placing them prominently on the negotiation agenda.

In addition, an urgent need exists for new policies that seek to correct the low ebb in U.S. public diplomacy. This includes a much greater emphasis on bringing diverse groups and individuals together for discussions that may lead in some cases to concrete policy recommendations. Further, efforts to expand the opportunities for Asian students, academics, and others to study in the United States or undertake their respective tasks must be greatly advanced. Self-promoted isolation, even if unintentional, is foolish.

In broad terms, the trend is away from the role of the United States as a patron, the dominating force in alliances and regional affairs, and toward the United States sharing in increasing measure both responsibilities and decisions. In this sense, the trend is toward partnership, although the precise relations will vary and, in virtually all cases, complexities will exist. The United States, as the preeminent economic and strategic power, will still bear heavy responsibilities, but it must work with others in a variety of ways if its national interests are to be best served.

