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THE DILEMMA OF SECURITY COOPERATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Ralph C. Hassig and Kongdan Oh *

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I. "No Eternal Allies and No Perpetual Enemies"

Lord Palmerston's famous words remind us that each state must ultimately look out for its own security. This truth complicates the achievement of multilateral cooperation, whether in economic, social, or security matters. Problems of cooperation occur even in well-established security organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The chances for successful security cooperation are better when states with similar characteristics and interests band together; hence, membership is selective in such organizations as NATO and the European Union (EU). When states with diverse characteristics try to cooperate, the prognosis for successful multilateral cooperation is often poor. This is the case in Northeast Asia.

Multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia will be possible only when participants can agree on which threats they seek security from, how to address those threats, and what their ultimate security goals are. Such a consensus is currently lacking. Threats, being psychological constructions, are only loosely related to political, economic, and social conditions. A nonexistent Iraqi nuclear program became so threatening to the United States that it was cited as a justification for going to war. In Asia, the North Koreans (KCNA 2003) dispute the contention that they pose a nuclear threat to anyone; they note that the United States, the world's strongest nuclear power, has hinted that the DPRK could be a target of preemptive attack even though the DPRK has only a small nuclear deterrent. Who, they ask, is threatening whom?

It is not only the DPRK that seeks to downplay the threatening nature of its nuclear program. Judged by their words, China and Russia are more immediately threatened by the possibility of a U.S. attack on North Korea than they are threatened by the DPRK's nuclear weapons. Also, any threat posed by North Korean nuclear weapons—presumably headed for Japan—goes right over the heads of many South Korean citizens. Given North Korea's desire to achieve parity with the United States in terms of security, the goal of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula will be difficult to achieve as long as the United States, China, and Russia remain committed to their nuclear arsenals. When it comes to nuclear weapons, it is not North Korea that is odd man out in the region; instead, South Korea and Japan are in fact the odd men out. True, the DPRK government in the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula committed itself to making the peninsula free of nuclear weapons; more recently, however, North Korea's commitment has been amended with the condition that the United States must first abandon its hostile attitude toward the Kim Jong-il regime.

In the campaign to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear power, words have often been substituted for action. After referring to Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as members of an axis of evil, President Bush in his 2002 State of the Union address

boldly declared, "The United States will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons." On 11 January 2003, the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) broadcast on Radio 1 that President-Elect Roh Moo-hyun confirmed that the ROK shared the international community's opinion that North Korea's nuclear program "can never be tolerated." In February 2003, the communiqué released after a meeting between the foreign ministers of China and Russia (Xinhua 2003) affirmed that "[t]he two sides emphasized they are in accord with the common aspiration of the international community to maintain the nuclear weapons–free status of the Korean peninsula. . . ." The joint press statement (Kyodo 2003) released after the U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting of June 2003 duly noted that, at the Group of 8 summit meeting and in summit meetings between the ROK and the United States, the United States and Japan, and the ROK and Japan, it had been affirmed that "North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons will not be tolerated." Yet the international community continues to tolerate North Korea's expanding nuclear weapons program.

Whether a new order is emerging in Asia we leave to others to debate; we focus instead on how North Korea's nuclear program might influence or be influenced by an Asian security regime. Could a permanent regional security mechanism turn back the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula? Is the need to prevent nuclear proliferation a necessary or sufficient condition for regional security cooperation? These are difficult questions. We begin to address these questions by providing a brief history of North Korea's nuclear program, reviewing the history of international attempts to stop that program, surveying attempts to establish multilateral forums in Northeast Asia, and then offering our assessment of the prospects for a multilateral solution to the North Korean nuclear threat.

II. Long Time in the Making

The roots of North Korea's nuclear program run deep. North Korean nuclear scientists began receiving training and assistance from the Soviet Union as early as 1956, when North Korea was just starting to rebuild its economy. North Korea's first nuclear reactor began operating in 1965. North Korea was not alone in its interest in nuclear energy: many countries, including South Korea in the early 1960s, began to explore the uses of atomic energy. Military uses were already clear. The United States had defeated Japan with nuclear weapons and had threatened China and North Korea with them during the Korean War. The world's greatest powers were nuclear powers. In the 1960s, as Kim Il-sung began to convert North Korea into a military fortress, the value of nuclear weapons must have become apparent.

But even with Kim Il-sung's "four military lines," North Korea's security situation deteriorated over the years. At home, the military-first economy could not generate

the necessary resources for a modern military machine. Abroad, the excesses of Stalinism were criticized in the Soviet Union, tainting North Korea's own Stalinist style of government. North Korea's two allies, China and the Soviet Union, had a falling-out in the 1960s. U.S.-Chinese détente got under way in the early 1970s, and Deng Xiaoping began to move China away from socialism in the latter years of the decade. By the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms in Russia had put the last nail in the coffin of the Stalinist model; and the Soviet Union, just before collapsing and leaving North Korea in the lurch, established diplomatic relations with South Korea. When China opened diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992, North Korea was left without a meaningful security alliance. South Korea's security, on the other hand, remained assured, thanks to the U.S. nuclear deterrence umbrella and the tactical nuclear weapons kept on U.S. bases in the ROK from the 1970s until 1991. The ROK military continued to improve its capabilities as well.

Somewhere in that time period, perhaps early in the 1980s, North Korea began to seriously develop a nuclear weapons program. Its first domestically built nuclear reactor, capable of producing the raw material for a plutonium bomb, began operating in 1986. By the early 1990s, a facility to reprocess that fuel was able to produce small quantities of plutonium.

Even while North Korea's security alliances were unraveling, the Kim Il-sung regime was coming under increasing pressure to forgo a nuclear deterrent. In 1985, at the insistence of the Soviet Union, North Korea had signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). After postponing for several years, North Korea signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1992. An initial IAEA inspection, guided in part by intelligence information supplied by the United States, discovered discrepancies in North Korea's nuclear inventory report, and the IAEA demanded special inspections. North Korea's 1993 threat to withdraw from the NPT gained it pariah status in the international community, but a nuclear crisis was averted when the United States agreed to enter into negotiations with the DPRK, negotiations that eventually produced the 1994 Agreed Framework that froze North Korea's nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and permitted North Korea to keep—for the time being—whatever plutonium it might have.

In violation of the Agreed Framework, North Korea then proceeded in secret to develop one or more alternative sources of nuclear weapons material. The U.S. discovery (in the late 1990s) of Pyongyang's uranium enrichment program torpedoed the nuclear agreement and led North Korea to withdraw from the NPT in 2003. This time around, the international community seemed more sympathetic to the security concerns of the Kim Jong-il regime—and more skeptical of U.S. security demands. The recent emergence of Pakistan and India as nuclear powers, and the ROK's

reconciliation and aid policy, also strengthened North Korea's hand. With U.S. troops tied down in Iraq, time now seemed to be on North Korea's side; and, in the face of Pyongyang's boasts of developing a nuclear deterrent, the U.S. response was to call for negotiations. Whether that call was genuine or merely a ploy to buy time is difficult to tell. For the time being, North Korea might be able to have it both ways: continue to claim that its goal was the eventual denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and, at the same time, hold on to a nuclear deterrent to defend itself from U.S. hostility. Like India, Pakistan, and Israel, North Korea has managed to cross the nuclear threshold without facing serious consequences. The new Asian order now includes a nuclear North Korea, and anyone trying to denuclearize the North will have to risk destabilizing the region.

What makes it so difficult to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons program is not only that it has been going on for so long—gathering its own momentum and incurring substantial sunk costs—but that it is in so many ways beneficial to the Kim Jong-il regime. What other country as poor and as badly governed as North Korea could hope to be the focus of talks among the great powers, year after year? As a deterrent, nuclear weapons are without peer. They also confer notoriety and signify scientific and technological sophistication. For the North Korean people, and for many in South Korea, the weapons are a source of pride because they enable North Korea to stand against the United States. Moreover, in the eyes of his military and his people, Kim Jong-il's nuclear deterrent confers legitimacy on the "respected and beloved general."

Nuclear weapons have put North Korea on the map—and on the route that brings caravans of international aid to Pyongyang. This aid helps offset the costs to the economy incurred by international embargoes put in place to punish North Korea for having a nuclear weapons program. In some respects, foreign aid may even be superior to foreign direct investment, which would require that the Kim regime open the country to foreigners and loosen its grip on the people. Even the foreign investment that North Korea does gain, including that from South Korea, looks more like aid than a business investment. It is impossible to get an accurate figure of how much aid has gone to North Korea over the years because much of it comes from China or is in other ways hidden. Yonhap News Agency reported on 10 March 2003 that the ROK unification ministry's figure for South Korean aid during the Kim Dae-jung administration (1998–2003) was $2.56 billion. U.S. aid from 1995 to early 2003, including the cost of Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) oil, stood at more than $1 billion (Manyin and Jun 2003, 1). China certainly provided billions more, and Japan and the EU have donated several hundred million dollars worth. Most of the international contributions have been in food and energy, but some have been in hard cash (such as the approximately $1 billion provided by Hyundai), which presumably went directly into Kim Jong-il's personal bank accounts (Korea Herald 2003).

It may well be that every attempt to negotiate with North Korea to stop its nuclear program serves to reinforce that program. Supporters of the Agreed Framework consider that the foreign aid and diplomatic acceptance provided by the agreement were a reward for freezing the nuclear program. But another view, equally well supported by the evidence, is that the rewards were proffered to diminish or end the threat presented by the nuclear program. If this is the case, only by keeping that threat alive or by creating new threats can the Kim regime hope to continue receiving international aid and acceptance without having to change its political and economic systems.

III. Stubborn Resistance

Repeated attempts to stop North Korea's nuclear program have failed. The Soviet Union's insistence in 1985 that North Korea sign the NPT was thwarted by the DPRK's ability to postpone signing a nuclear safeguards agreement for seven years. When the agreement was finally signed, the safeguards could not be implemented because the DPRK refused to permit the IAEA to complete its nuclear inspections. The Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was a dead letter on the day it was signed. Nor did the Agreed Framework stop the North Koreans from going ahead with an alternative nuclear program.

Over the years, talks to settle the nuclear issue have taken a variety of forms: two-party (U.S.-DPRK in 1993–94), four-party (U.S.-DPRK-ROK-China in six meetings from 1997 to 1999), three-party (U.S.-DPRK-China in 2003), and, most recently, six-party talks (three meetings to the present, with Japan and Russia added). For all the talking, however, the North Koreans are farther along in their nuclear weapons program than they were when the first talks began. Perhaps the talks' lack of success is due in part to the fact that they have often not squarely addressed the issue of primary importance to the Kim regime: its demand for acceptance and support as a sovereign state with the same rights and privileges as any other state, including the United States.

For North Korea, acceptance means getting a peace treaty and guarantee from the United States that the current Kim regime will not be attacked, discriminated against, or even criticized in any way; that North Korea's totalitarian political system will not be interfered with; and that the country's socialist economy will receive the same economic assistance as other struggling economies. Any agreement lacking such a guarantee of acceptance (indicating to the North Koreans a cessation of U.S. hostility) will, like the Agreed Framework, at best temporarily freeze the weapons program in return for periodic payments (the reward-for-freeze model advocated by the DPRK).

Unfortunately, given the closed nature of North Korean society, neither a temporary freeze nor a permanent dismantlement of the nuclear weapons program can be verified.

Therein lies the attractiveness of the voluntary Libya model for the Bush administration and the rejection of that model by the North Koreans. The Kim regime is no more likely to reveal all North Korean weapons hiding places than is the United States likely to permit foreign inspectors to visit all U.S. nuclear installations.[1]

IV. Regional Security Cooperation

Regional tensions have persisted since the Cold War, although they are now largely focused on North Korea and Taiwan. Despite those tensions or perhaps because of them, Northeast Asia has not created a multilateral security forum such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or multilateral defense alliances such as NATO or the former Warsaw Pact. Instead, bilateral alliances have provided security. As the Cold War wound down, Northeast Asian security forums were proposed by the USSR's president Gorbachev in 1986 and 1988, by the USSR's foreign minister Shevardnaze in 1990, and by Korea's president Roh Tae-woo at the United Nations in 1990 and 1992. However, Washington preferred to rely on a small collection of bilateral alliances, likened by former U.S. secretary of state James A. Baker (1991/92) to a "fan spread wide, with its base in North America radiating west across the Pacific."

The Baker fan is a modern version of the ancient security architecture of Asia, in which the hub was imperial China. Throughout the Cold War, the Baker fan provided security against a Chinese push east through South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines toward the United States, but it was not much use in fighting communists in Vietnam and did little to prevent communist China from becoming a major power. In regard to the North Korean nuclear situation, the fan was defensive in nature, failing to provide leverage against North Korea, which had China and Russia at its back.

The Bush administration turned to multilateralism only when it could not achieve its goals unilaterally or through existing alliances. The risk in broadening any alliance is that some members might not be sympathetic to U.S. foreign policy and might even work against it. This is what has happened in Korea.

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1. The Bush administration has said (Linzer 2004, A1) it has no intention of accepting international inspections of its nuclear installations in support of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FCMT). For its part, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on 8 March 2004 that North Korea has demanded equal verification rights. The KCNA report stated that if the United States wants what Washington calls "complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling" of North Korea's nuclear program, the United States must in turn agree to "completely withdraw its troops from South Korea in a verifiable way and make a 'complete, verifiable, irreversible security assurance' guaranteeing the adoption of a peace agreement and normalization of relations."

If in fact there is a need for a regional security forum, it could take any number of forms: track one versus track two, general in nature versus security oriented, dialogue oriented versus action oriented, and permanent versus ad hoc. The only broad track one multilateral institutions to gain a lasting foothold have been the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). ASEAN was formed in 1967 and sprouted several offshoots such as ASEAN + 3, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMC), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

ARF has embraced the states of Northeast Asia as dialogue partners, but the organization's accomplishments as an action forum are severely limited. Issues such as sea piracy and ownership of the Spratly Islands have never been resolved. Just as any Northeast Asian security forum would have to struggle to reconcile the values of very different forms of government, the inclusion in ARF of such states as Vietnam and Burma alongside the more developed Southeast Asian democracies has constrained the organization's actions. ARF has taken an interest in the Korean peninsula nuclear situation. The chairman's statement (ARF 2003) issued at the conclusion of ARF's tenth meeting in July 2003 called on North Korea to rejoin the NPT; in 2004, the chairman's statement (ARF 2004, 2) approvingly noted North Korea's formula for solving the nuclear issue with "words for words" and "actions for actions."

APEC, originally launched as a trans-Pacific trade forum in 1993, has taken up broader issues in recent years. At its 2002 meeting in Cabo San Lucas, the organization issued a separate statement about the Korean nuclear situation. Although this remained a major topic at the October 2003 meeting in Bangkok, opposition from China and Russia prevented the issuance of another such statement (NKS 2003).

Compared with the small number of track one forums (ARF, APEC, and TCOG, for example), more than 30 track two forums have convened over the years although most of them have not endured (Kerr 1994). Probably the best known, and most enduring, is the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, which emerged in 1993 from ASEAN efforts. As for those forums and organizations specifically dedicated to resolving the Korean nuclear situation, TCOG and KEDO (both largely U.S.-ROK-Japan affairs) have had the greatest impact. On a more action-oriented level, the Proliferation Security Initiative—more of a strategy than an organization; and China, Russia, and the ROK have not participated—focuses on the transnational movement of terrorist personnel and material, but it is still in its infancy (it was announced May 2003) and its possible reliance in part on high-seas interdiction is of questionable legality. The recent Regional Maritime Security Initiative appears to be an Asian-Pacific offshoot of PSI (PACOM 2004).

At the moment, the forum most actively involved in stopping North Korea's nuclear program is the six-party talks. In these talks, first convened in August 2003, the Bush administration has tried to leverage the momentum of its war on terrorism, having already identified North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism and a builder of nuclear weapons. But the United States has discovered that its goal of enlisting the other participants to join this particular war-on-terrorism campaign is not going well. Putting pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons programs and return to the NPT appears not to be the first priority for any of the other participating states, which are more concerned about keeping the region at peace and not backing North Korea into a corner. South Korea under the Roh Moo-hyun government has been particularly sympathetic toward the Kim regime in North Korea. Even though all participants agree on the ultimate goal—the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula—North Korea's neighbors are willing to be patient in pursuit of that goal. Even Japan, a likely target of North Korean missiles and nuclear weapons, is taking care not to provoke Kim Jong-il. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has said he wants to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea within a year or two, and billions of dollars in economic assistance will accompany those relations, much of it flowing into Kim Jong-il's pockets.

The major accomplishment of three rounds of six-party talks up to August 2004 is that the United States and North Korea have more clearly laid out their positions, which have been mutually rejected. An insurmountable barrier to a negotiated settlement on Washington's terms is the insistence that any future agreement include a strong verification mechanism. North Korea's deal breaker is that it demands full acceptance, on its own terms, of the widely disliked Kim regime.

V. The Shape of the Table

Years of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral efforts to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons have failed. Proponents of these various efforts, such as those who defend the Agreed Framework, put the best face on the matter by claiming, without evidence (which must be counterfactual in nature), that North Korea would otherwise have produced far more nuclear weapons than it currently has.

Assembling and maintaining a multilateral coalition to pursue security goals is difficult in the absence of a shared perception of threat such as existed in Western Europe during the Cold War. The lack of shared perpetual enemies has the potential to sow discord in any such forum. For example, the Bush administration considers North Korea to be one of the world's most threatening states and certainly a main enemy. On the other hand, the Roh administration views North Korea as a reluctant partner in reunification. These two views are incompatible. Simple balance theory suggests that when one's friend befriends one's enemy, the original friendship will be strained.

The bigger the coalition of friends, the more complications. The ways and means of addressing security problems in the six-party talks are so varied that it is difficult to see how any consensus could be reached unless participants decide to make serious compromises, and any compromise on nuclear weapons still leaves a formidable threat.

What role a regional forum could or should play is open to debate. Political realists in Washington view international institutions as implements of national power. Institutionalists believe that institutions change the very nature of international behavior in the direction of more cooperation, more constraint, and less conflict—a transformation accomplished in part through the communication channels provided by the institutions and through the creation of an international "web of interdependence" arising from institutional commitments (Jervis 1999).

Both roles—talk and action—played by institutions can serve the purposes of participants. Talk sometimes leads to action and sometimes substitutes for action, a substitution that is useful when a state needs additional time to prepare for action. Is time on the side of North Korea or does it side with those states that want to see North Korea denuclearized? The buildup of North Korea's nuclear arsenal seems to argue that the longer a settlement is put off, the more difficult it will be to reach. But Asian culture is far more patient than U.S. culture, and both South Korea and China seem satisfied with the current speed of progress.

Multilateral institutions do not respond well to calls for action. Even the strongest of institutions are slow to act: a case in point was the hesitation of European organizations to stop the genocide in Bosnia. In Northeast Asia, the consensus among the six parties, excepting perhaps the United States, is that no military action should be taken to denuclearize North Korea. Beyond that, the consensus breaks down. The United States and Japan seem willing to consider economic sanctions. China has made a few small gestures in that direction, even while continuing to pour aid into North Korea. South Korea opposes sanctions and, like China, provides substantial economic assistance to North Korea. Whether there is some point at which a near consensus might be reached on negative sanctions is hard to tell. Perhaps a North Korean nuclear test would trigger calls to action, but no government has publicly committed itself to this as a red line.

A serious drawback to employing pressure and negative sanctions against North Korea is that most sanctions would hurt the people while leaving the decision makers in Pyongyang untouched. It can even be argued that the more the North Korean people suffer, the stronger the hand of the military-first leadership in Pyongyang. The Bush administration has toyed with the idea of trying to cut off the major sources of Kim Jong-il's finances, but, because Kim has access to virtually all the DPRK's resources, this attempt is probably futile. Only a strike directly at Kim and his associates might

be focused enough to hurt them, and such strikes are difficult to accomplish as well as morally and legally questionable.

Has the time come for multilateral cooperation to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, or has the time passed? In some ways, conditions have improved in the past decade. Now that China is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), four of the six states active in the region have WTO membership and are committed in principle to the market economy. Three of the states are firmly democratic, China is at least more open, and Russia is more democratic than it used to be. All the states except the United States and Russia share a Confucian cultural heritage as well as linguistic similarities in either spoken or written form. Only North Korea has a bankrupt economy, although many individuals in China are poor. All the states have large populations of well-educated workers, even though the education of North Koreans does not prepare them to participate in the international marketplace. And all countries desire peace in order to pursue their domestic agendas.

Yet there remain numerous obstacles to security cooperation. Differences among members of a multinational institution place strains on unity and cooperation. Among the six states, obvious differences still exist in political and economic systems, national wealth, sizes of population and territory, military power, language, and culture.

Two other factors work against cooperation. One is the existence of historically rooted animosities—for example, between China and the two Koreas over Koguryo dynasty claims, between China and the two Koreas on the one side and the former aggressor Japan on the other, and between the United States and North Korea. The North Koreans, as it turns out, do not trust anybody, even the Chinese and Russians. The second negative factor is that North Korea proudly follows its own style of economic and social systems, which is incompatible with the systems of the other countries.

There is also the reality that 100,000 troops from a country on the other side of the Pacific are stationed in the region. Many believe that these troops have provided regional stability and are still needed for that purpose, but their presence—which substitutes bilateral security alliances for regional cooperation—may distort interstate relations.

Who really wants multilateral security cooperation, and for what purpose? The United States favors cooperation when it supports its interests, but, as the world's only superpower, it does not see the need to do much compromising. China considers itself to be the rightful power center of the region and will cooperate only to help regain its lost position. In the six-party talks, the Chinese have raised their political stature by keeping North Korea at the table, although the necessity of having to pay off the North Koreans to come to the talks reduces China's stature as a regional leader.

Even North Korea, the weakest state of the bunch, has only reluctantly accepted the multilateral approach, viewing it primarily as a means of gaining bilateral dialogue with the United States. Japan and Russia participate because they do not want to be left out of the decision-making process, and South Korea needs to be there to prevent the United States from starting a war.

Multilateral security organizations cannot function well unless all members share common political or economic values (the values they need to share depend on the nature of the organization). Consider the selectivity of membership in the more successful multilaterals—the WTO, the EU, and NATO, for example. Common cultural values help as well. A multilateral forum (such as the OSCE) that consists of members that differ on important dimensions may provide a forum for stimulating dialogue and negotiation but not for coordinated action. Even agreeing to the shape of the negotiating table can be problematic.

Conditions for regional security cooperation in Northeast Asia are not auspicious, and in the future a multilateral security organization may not even be needed. China will gradually abandon its communist system and reunite with Taiwan. North Korea's Kim dynasty will expire, opening the way to Korean unification. At that point there will be only three states in Northeast Asia, all similar in political and economic systems although still haunted by bitter memories. After Chinese and Korean unification, the region will have less need for a regional U.S. military presence (although, to serve its own interests, the United States may desire to keep troops in the region). The United States and Russia can deal with China, Japan, and Korea as business partners and cultural neighbors, not as political mentors or security guarantors.

When the region shrinks to three states, bilateral security coordination may be more efficient than multilateral coordination. And what of the bomb? China will still have it. And perhaps a unified Korea will inherit it from North Korea, keeping it only as a deterrent, not as a means to extort aid. In such a scenario, the nuclear situation will resolve itself, not through force or dialogue but through unification.

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