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A VIEW ON AMERICA'S ROLE IN ASIA AND THE FUTURE OF THE ROK-U.S. ALLIANCE

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I. Introduction

Preamble (extract) of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty

The Parties to this Treaty,

- *Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area,*
- *Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area,*
- *Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area, . . .*

The security alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States has served well its objectives—peace and security not only on the Korean peninsula but also in the Pacific area—for the past five decades, and it is hoped it will do so into the future. In the meantime, the ROK-U.S. security alliance is currently faced with challenges that are quite different from challenges it has faced in the past.

Since the late 1990s, as a response to the rising public resentment ignited by a series of crimes committed by U.S. soldiers, the ROK and the United States have engaged in a series of talks on technical issues such as revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), burden sharing, revision of the Land Partnership Program, and, most recently, relocation of bases.¹ All such talks have been based on the assumption of the continuation of the existing ROK-U.S. alliance relationship and structure into the future, and the talks have intended to create a favorable environment and conditions for the continued presence of the United States Forces Korea (USFK).

On 15 May 2004, the United States informed the ROK government that it would dispatch the Second Brigade, about 3,600 troops, of the Second Infantry Division to

1. The relocation of U.S. bases has been one of the main topics in the Future of the Alliance (FOTA) policy initiative talks, which have been held 10 times since March 2003. At the 10th FOTA talks, both countries were able to iron out differences regarding size of bases and cost sharing. At that meeting, an umbrella agreement and an implementation agreement were drafted and approved.

Iraq.² Within less than a month, on 6 June, the United States also delivered its plan to withdraw 12,500 troops from Korea by December 2005.³ Reduction in or withdrawal of parts of the USFK is not totally new. Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, there have been four cases of reduction or withdrawal: 1954, 1971, 1978, and 1992 (*Table 1*). However, unlike the previous cases, the current plan is not only a physical reduction; it also changes strategies, missions, force structure, and configuration.⁴

Despite all such changes and trends, until now there has been no clear blueprint for the future of the ROK-U.S. security alliance. Even in the FOTA talks (*Table 2*), which were introduced as a result of the 34th security consultative meeting, the focus has been technical issues.

People are becoming very concerned about the future of the ROK-U.S. security alliance. No clear picture of the desired form of a future ROK-U.S. security alliance has yet been provided.⁵ With the announcement of the reduction of the USFK, it is the time to seriously think of the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance relationship.⁶ Before a model for a future ROK-U.S. alliance is suggested, it is necessary to review the challenges the current alliance faces.

II. Winds of Change

Despite progress made in inter-Korean relations over the past several years, North Korean threats—the primary rationale for the ROK-U.S. security alliance—have not yet decreased or diminished. Instead, the situation on the Korean peninsula seems more serious and unstable than earlier because of North Korean nuclear issues and

2. The Second Infantry Division comprises three brigades: both the First and Second Brigades are stationed permanently in South Korea; the Third Brigade, which has been transformed into a Stryker Brigade Combat Team, in the United States. The Second Brigade was dispatched to Iraq recently.

3. Since 1992, when the United States withdrew 7,000 troops, the United States has maintained about 36,500 troops in South Korea.

4. Agreement to transfer 10 missions to the ROK can be regarded as a prelude to such change. The 10 missions are safeguarding the joint security area; working on counter-fire, rear area de-contamination, counter-special operations force (SOF) operations; and managing the Maehyang-ri firing range, search and rescue, close air support, emergency mine spreading, military police rotation and control, and weather forecasting.

5. On two occasions—the June 1998 summit between President Kim Dae-jung and President Bill Clinton and the May 2003 summit between President Roh Moo-hyun and President George W. Bush—both countries agreed to transform the current ROK-U.S. security alliance into a comprehensive security alliance, but no road map or action plan has yet been put forward.

6. In June 2004, at the ninth session of the FOTA talks, the ROK and the United States agreed to establish a subcommittee to review the future of the alliance.

the internal problems of North Korea.⁷ Against such a backdrop, demands for change and adjustment in the traditional ROK-U.S. alliance have become stronger from both sides of the Pacific in recent years.⁸

Table 1: Size of USFK, 1953–2000

Year	Size of forces	Remarks	Year	Size of forces	Remarks
1953	325,000	Armistice agreement	1977	42,000	Announcement of USFK withdrawal plan
1954	223,000	Withdrawal of two divisions	1978	42,000	
1955	85,500		1979	39,000	Withdrawal of 3,600 troops
1956	75,000		1980	39,000	Withdrawal plan halted
1957	70,000		1981	38,000	
1958	52,000		1982	39,000	Nullification of withdrawal plan
1959	50,000		1983	39,000	
1960	56,000		1984	41,000	
1961	58,000		1985	42,000	
1962	57,000		1986	43,000	
1963	57,000		1987	45,000	
1964	63,000		1988	46,000	
1965	62,000	ROK participation in Vietnam War	1989	44,000	
1966	52,000		1990	43,000	Nunn-Warner amendment
1967	56,000		1991	43,000	
1968	67,000		1992	36,450	Withdrawal of 7,000 troops
1969	61,000	Announcement of Nixon doctrine	1993	36,450	
1970	54,000		1994	36,450	
1971	43,000	Withdrawal of Seventh Division	1995	36,450	
1972	41,000		1996	36,450	
1973	42,000		1997	35,910	
1974	38,000		1998	36,388	
1975	42,000		1999	36,388	
1976	39,000		2000	37,021	

7. North Korea has three major economic problems that threaten the integrity of its regime: shortage of food, shortage of energy, and shortage of hard currency. In addition, international isolation is another source of concern.

8. A series of events has contributed to the rise of anti-U.S. sentiment in South Korea: the Rogun-ri issue, the Maehyang-ri firing-range issue, dumping of toxic material, oil leaks, and the deaths of two schoolgirls in June 2002.

Table 2: FOTA Talks, April 2003–July 2004

Talk	Date	Major issues and agreements
1	April 8–9, 2003	Agreed on need to adapt alliance to new global security environment
		Agreed on need for both countries to invest in enduring alliance
		Agreed to consult on modernization of ROK and U.S. military
		Agreed to relocate Yongsan garrison as soon as possible
2	June 4–5, 2003	United States detailed explanation of its plan to invest in more than 150 enhancements to combined defense
		Agreed to proceed with transfer of certain missions between U.S. and ROK forces
		ROK agreed to procure appropriate land in 2004
		Agreed on overall realignment of USFK in two phases
3	July 23, 2003	Agreed that combined military capabilities enhancements and additional force improvements for both ROK and U.S. forces will continue
		Agreed to consult on missions transfer, establishing a more predominant ROK role in defending peninsula
		Agreed to work jointly for relocation by target year of 2006
		Agreed to start jointly drafting relocation master plan in 2003
4	Sept. 3–4, 2003	Agreed to map out master plan “umbrella agreement,” to be ratified by National Assembly
		Reached general consensus that approximately 1,000 U.S. troops will remain at Yongsan
		Agreed that after two years the United States will transfer to South Korea the mission countering the North’s long-range artillery
		Agreed to form joint team to test South Korea’s capacity to take over the duty in August 2005
5	Oct. 5–8, 2003	Failed to agree on details of relocation of U.S. troops
		Agreed on an “umbrella agreement” to replace the present accords signed in 1990
		Expressed “wide” differences on contents of subordinate agreements
6	Jan. 16, 2004	Agreed to pull out virtually all U.S. forces from Seoul by end of 2007, including United Nations Command and Combined Forces Command
		Agreed that 260 hectares of land, currently occupied by U.S. military, will be returned to the Seoul city government
		Agreed that United States will maintain Dragon Hill Lodge to house liaison office and other personnel on business trips
7	Feb. 14, 2004	Expressed differences on the base transfer
		Agreed to expand ROK forces’ role in defense of the peninsula
		Agreed to finalize assessment on the security environment by end of 2004
		Failed to agree on details of base transfer
8	May 6–7, 2004	Agreed to revise the Land Partnership Program
		Accepted South Korea’s proposal to relocate U.S. embassy to Yongsan
9	June 7–8, 2004	Came close to agreement on most matters related to the Yongsan base relocation issue
		Failed to reach agreement on land allocation for the new garrison: United States wants 1,190 hectares; South Korea would provide 1,090 hectares
10	July 22, 2004	Neared agreement on proposed plan of relocating the U.S. military base out of Seoul by 2007
		Reached tentative agreement on details of an umbrella agreement and implementation agreement for Yongsan relocation
		Agreed that Korea would bear expense of transferring the U.S. base’s C ⁴ I system

The most conspicuous phenomenon in recent years in South Korea is the rise and spread of anti-U.S. sentiment, culminating during the winter of 2002 in what became known as “candlelight vigilantism,” which was ignited by the death of two schoolgirls. With the inauguration of the Roh Moo-hyun administration in February 2003, demands for a more balanced, or equal, alliance relationship with the United States have become even stronger and have ignited a domestic debate over *jaju* (self-reliance) vs. *dongmaeng* (alliance).

Proalliance arguments tend to be based on security and economics. North Korean threats have not yet diminished; and, despite South Korea’s efforts in force improvement during the past three decades, it alone still cannot deter and defend itself from North Korean armed aggression.⁹ Early warning capabilities such as surveillance and reconnaissance; initial response capabilities; command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C⁴I) systems for command and control; and air and naval capabilities are still greatly dependent on the United States. Unless the ROK invests huge financial resources in a force improvement program—an investment that is neither rational nor desirable—it is necessary to maintain a strong and robust combined defense posture under the auspices of the ROK-U.S. security alliance.¹⁰ Furthermore, in recent years, asymmetrical threats by North Korea are estimated to be increasing in every dimension (IISS 2004). South Korea, which does not have any reliable means of defense or protection, cannot but rely on the United States to cope with asymmetrical threats .

What if North Korean threats diminished or disappeared? Disappearance of the North Korean threat does not necessarily mean the end of the ROK-U.S. security alliance. To cope with so-called unspecified future threats, South Korea (or a unified Korea) needs to maintain and strengthen its alliance relations with the United States. The surrounding countries—Japan, China, and Russia—are restructuring and modernizing their armed forces (KRIS 2003) and are pursuing rather active external policies with enhanced manifestations of their respective status and influence, which might collide with Korea’s national security interests. From a simple perspective of physical discrepancies, a unified Korea alone cannot match the surrounding countries. It is thus necessary and wise to maintain the alliance with the United States even after future unification. What matters are the form, scope, and direction of the alliance relationship with the United States.

9. Before the U.S. Congress, General Thomas Schwartz (2001, 4), commander of Combined Forces Command, said, “[North Korea’s] military capabilities are bigger, better, closer, and deadlier since last year’s testimony.”

10. Park (2004) estimates that an investment of approximately \$175 billion for force improvement is necessary for Korea to acquire a self-reliant defense posture. Korea’s defense budget for 2004 was about \$14 billion.

The ROK-U.S. alliance has significant ramifications for economy and trade. In other words, the alliance is important not only from the perspective of military security but also from the perspective of economics. Despite its economic growth and achievements, South Korea is still dependent on the United States, especially in finance. As South Korea's economy has become more open and internationally oriented, it has become more sensitive and vulnerable to global financial markets, where the United States exercises a dominant influence. Especially since the financial crisis of 1997, the influence of foreign direct investment has become critical, and the pace of the inward-outward flow of capital has increased very quickly. Thus, if serious security problems and concerns cause a permanent rupture in the alliance between the ROK and the United States, negative consequences in Korea's domestic financial market and in its dealings in the foreign exchange market should be expected. Thus, from an economics perspective, the maintenance of a robust alliance with the United States appears to be quite crucial (KIEP 2004).

In recent days, anti-U.S. sentiment and demands for an adjustment of alliance relations with the United States have become quite strong. The rationale for adjustment is quite different from those of the 1970s and 1980s. In those periods, anti-U.S. sentiment was based on ideology; that is, it protested U.S. imperialism. The current anti-U.S. sentiment has different roots: Korean national pride (or nationalism); inconvenience and problems caused by the presence of the USFK; a bad impression of U.S. soldiers caused by their misbehavior, misdemeanors, and crimes; an expectation of better and stable inter-Korean relations; differing interpretations and understandings of North Korea; and differing threat perceptions and expectations (Kim and Kim 2004; Moon 1997).

South Korea has achieved remarkable economic development. It is now a member of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and it has become less dependent on the United States in trade.¹¹ Along with economic development, South Korea has made very significant progress in democratization, with strong representation by civil society and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) over the past 10 years. All such phenomena have contributed to the rise of national pride and nationalism. The rise of national pride is accompanied by the demand, or desire, for an adjustment of South Korea's alliance relations with the United States, a relationship that used to be described as patron-client. Since the inauguration of the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the voice for equal, or balanced, relations with the United States has become very strong, and the trend is likely to continue to grow.

11. In 2003, the United States slipped to second place when China became South Korea's number one trading partner.

Although the United States and the ROK resumed SOFA negotiations beginning in 1999 and came up with rather satisfactory results, a series of incidents contributed to the spread and intensification of anti-U.S. sentiment among Korea's public. First was the investigation of Rogun-ri incident, which took place about 50 years ago during the Korean War. The Maehyang-ri firing-range issue, the dumping of toxic waste, the dispute over the construction site of a new U.S. embassy, the oil-leak incident, and the misbehavior and crimes of U.S. soldiers have followed and have damaged the public image of the United States. Before such incidents, anti-U.S. sentiment was somewhat confined to members of some progressive NGOs. Anti-U.S. sentiment peaked at the time of the death of two schoolgirls. Public awareness and participation, empowered by strong emotional, cultural, and moral resentment vis-à-vis the United States, have become widespread.

Along with the debate over such domestic issues, public reservations about U.S. unilateralism have begun to grow, especially over two issues: the U.S. war on terrorism (Park 2003) and U.S. policy toward North Korea. With the inauguration of the Bush administration in 2001, the rupture in ROK-U.S. relations became visible with respect to policy toward North Korea. Debate was focused on what the desirable and realistic policy direction toward North Korea should be, an issue that comprises several subquestions:

- What is the basic nature of the North Korean regime?
- Is North Korea changing or not?
- What are North Korea's intentions?
- What are the level, scope, and magnitude of North Korean threats?

Since the North Korea–South Korea summit of 2000, inter-Korean relations have made some progress, and, in consequence, the majority of South Koreans feel less threatened today.¹² With the introduction of some market elements and the partial opening of the country to the outside world, North Korea appears to be changing. Many South Koreans believe that, because of its economic crisis, North Korea has no capability to launch a full-scale war against South Korea. In addition, in South Korea there has emerged a tendency to underestimate the seriousness of North Korea's asymmetrical threat and its implications for regional and global security and peace.

12. Since June 2000, South-North ministerial talks have been held 14 times. Other meetings have also been held, including South-North general officers' talks; Red Cross talks; and South-North economic cooperation talks. For details on inter-Korean dialogue, see the Web site of the ROK Ministry of Unification, <http://www.unikorea.go.kr/>.

Unlike his predecessor's policy, President George W. Bush's policy toward North Korea is perceived as quite aggressive, even hostile, and unaccommodating to South Korea's interests. The U.S. description of North Korea as part of an axis of evil, its reluctance to negotiate with North Korea over the nuclear issue, its strong and inflexible positions in negotiation, and its apparent eagerness to use force against North Korea have contributed to the spread of anti-U.S. sentiment. Some argue that the United States is using the North Korean nuclear issue for its military-industrial interest. Such an understanding has become more pervasive with generational change in Korean society.

Another element that has contributed to anti-U.S. sentiment is the negative understanding of U.S. policies of counterterrorism and counterproliferation. U.S. policy, believed to be led by so-called neoconservatives (neo-cons), appears quite militant and unilateral in its approach toward both issues. It appears to many South Koreans that the United States is trying to project and impose its own understanding and approach on others and that it is willing to resort to force to achieve its goals, which can be seen in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although most South Koreans were quite sympathetic to the United States in its war on terror, when they learned of U.S. information and intelligence failures, the failure to verify earlier U.S. claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the continuing disorder in postwar Iraq, their sympathetic attitude changed, and the credibility and morality of U.S. leadership were severely damaged among the Korean people. Furthermore, Koreans began to doubt U.S. claims about the North Korean nuclear program.

Across the Pacific, the United States has been preparing new security strategies and policies as a response to the 11 September 2001 attacks, when, for the first time in modern history, the U.S. mainland was attacked, with more than 3,000 innocent people killed in two incidents. Mass terror, combined with threats of proliferation of WMD, has become a reality—and the gravest threat in the post-Cold War era.¹³ Such new security challenges require a different security paradigm and new approaches. Successive documents—the Quadrennial Defense Review, National Security Strategy, Nuclear Posture Review, and Global Posture Review—have revealed new concepts and approaches adopted by the United States to counter new security challenges such as terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. Some key elements of the U.S. national security strategy and approach are hegemonic stability (Kagan 2003; Kim 2003); emphasis on preventive, proactive use of force; responsibility sharing among allies; and promotion of democracy, including regime change, if necessary. More offensive and preventive approaches have become possible through the revolution in

13. 11 September 2001 can be interpreted as the beginning of new era, the post-post-Cold War era (Cossa 2001).

military affairs (RMA) and defense transformation in the United States. Consequently, to many observers, the United States appears to be quite militant and unilateral in its approach, lacking diplomatic efforts to build international consensus.

Dealing with the nature and characteristics of the new security challenges, which are hard to pin down with certainty and have no geographic boundaries, requires coordinated and concerted efforts of allies and the international community. Thus, it is natural for the United States to seek cooperation and sharing of responsibility with its allies and like-minded countries in the world. However, the U.S. ways of handling issues and mobilizing and securing support and cooperation have been perceived as inappropriate and arrogant. The United States also seems to have failed to reflect its allies' concerns and perspectives.

In sum, traditional alliance relations are challenged, but the new security environment and security challenges do not necessarily mean the end of the alliance. International cooperation and the role of U.S. allies may have become more important and diversified because of the nature of the new security concerns.

III. A Model of a Future ROK-U.S. Comprehensive Alliance

New Objectives of the Alliance

The primary objective, or rationale, of the ROK-U.S. security alliance has thus far been the deterrence of North Korean armed attack against South Korea, an objective that has contributed to regional peace and security in the Pacific area. But what if the North Korean threat is diminished? What would be the rationale for the ROK-U.S. security alliance? To this question, many have answered that the ROK-U.S. security alliance should be transformed into a regional security alliance to meet new security challenges in the Pacific area; in other words, the essential nature and objectives of the security alliance would be redefined or reconceptualized.

We have witnessed during the past couple of years new security challenges that transcend geographical boundaries: terror and WMD. The so-called nonconventional security issues—human security, environmental security, drug trafficking, organized crime, and piracy, for example—have become more important and require regional as well as international cooperation. Furthermore, the development of communication and computer technologies and networks has caused modern societies to become vulnerable to cyber-terror and information warfare. All these security issues go well beyond geographical boundaries and are related to the realization or fulfillment of human values. Thus, it would be unnecessary and undesirable to clearly define a geographical limit for the ROK-U.S. alliance.

The ROK-U.S. alliance should not be necessarily confined to deterring armed attack. The alliance must be able to deal with not only military threats but also nonmilitary threats and concerns. The future ROK-U.S. alliance should be designed to deal with various sources of potential threats. Its objectives should be:

- Realization of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region;
- Prevention/deterrence of any regional conflict that may challenge national interests of the ROK and the United States;
- Realization of common and cooperative security by eliminating or deterring various sources of potential threats at various levels; and
- Promotion of common values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the market economy.

In a word, the ROK-U.S. alliance should become a stepping-stone for the development of a more comprehensive and effective system for regional as well as global peace and security, as stated in the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States.

New Characteristics of the Alliance

From a military alliance to a comprehensive security alliance. Commonly shared values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and a market economy should encourage the scope of the ROK-U.S. alliance to go beyond the military field because there will be many more common concerns in newly emerging nonconventional security areas. Especially as it develops further, the ROK should become much more concerned and involved with regional and global issues in various fields. And these concerns and issues require coordinated, collective responses and approaches among allies with common responsibilities and visions. Thus the ROK-U.S. alliance should be transformed into and upgraded to a comprehensive security alliance. Both countries should work together to realize common values—human security—such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and a market economy.

From a geography-based alliance to issues-based cooperation. New security challenges of the twenty-first century are not confined within geographical boundaries. Few will be immune to what happens in other parts of the world. Thus, it is unrealistic to clearly define geographic limits of cooperation among allies. Cooperation should instead be based on the nature and scope of emerging issues. Although currently the ROK-U.S. alliance is mainly limited to the Korean peninsula and the Pacific area, in

the future it will not be necessary to define or limit geographic boundaries of the alliance. Whenever and wherever common goals and values exist and whenever and wherever they are challenged, allies must come together beyond geographic limits. The ROK's contribution and assistance to East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the western Sahara are just a few examples. Currently, however, the ROK's capabilities are still limited, and the ROK is primarily tied up with North Korean issues. As the ROK's capabilities are enhanced and the North Korean threats diminish, the ROK can and will go beyond the current geographic parameter. Such an approach will make the future ROK-U.S. alliance more flexible and responsive to emerging security concerns.

From a threat-driven alliance to a profit-generating alliance. The ROK-U.S. alliance has been working effectively to cope with North Korean military threats. The primary rationale of the alliance is to deter North Korean armed attacks vis-à-vis South Korea. By successfully deterring such an attack up to now, the alliance has contributed to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula as well as in all of Northeast Asia.

What if North Korean threats do not exist, or do not constitute a major concern? What if there is no identifiable clear and present threat or danger? Instead of reacting against threats, the future ROK-U.S. alliance must be shifted to become a profit-generating alliance by creating and maintaining a stable regional strategic landscape under which national interests of both countries shall be protected and promoted. Leading rather than following the strategic landscape will be much more profitable. In other words, the ROK-U.S. alliance can function as a profit generator by leading and/or formulating a favorable security environment under which national interests of both countries shall be preserved and further promoted.

From a reactive alliance to a proactive/preventive alliance. A threat-driven alliance tends to be reactive, but a profit-generating alliance is more likely to be proactive in nature—action oriented, in other words. Rather than being subject to the environment, the alliance should lead the environment. To be proactive, the ROK-U.S. alliance should demonstrate foresight. On the basis of the assessment of strategic trends and the future environment, we should be able to identify probable causal relations between symptoms and causes. We also need to have a clear strategic vision and determination. To realize such a comprehensive alliance, a more sophisticated and well-thought-out approach is required.

IV. What Is to Be Done?

Common Strategic Vision

To realize such a comprehensive security alliance, it is first necessary to have a clear strategic vision for the future that is based on commonly shared values and trust in each other. Currently, there is no strategic vision common to the ROK and the United States. They are tied up with current issues, notably North Korea. Each country has its own strategic vision. To be well prepared for the future, however, it is desirable to have a common strategic vision. Therefore, it is worth having a joint declaration of the ROK-U.S. alliance for the future as a kind of platform or guideline in thinking of the future alliance. Firm determination and clarity of vision on the part of both countries will permit them to stand together in realizing common values, which will eliminate or reduce uncertainty and controversy about the alliance.¹⁴ Such determination and clarity of vision will guide any discussion or debate at the working level by providing clear direction and will promote a better understanding of and strong support for the alliance among the people of both countries. These principles will also make clear how we should cooperate and what will enable us to take the lead in shaping the future security environment.

Long-Term Strategic Assessment

If we have a common vision, the next thing we must do is find out where we stand today and what the possible obstacles are. In essence, joint strategic assessment is required. Currently, the ROK and the United States do not have a commonly shared long-term strategic assessment. What we have today between the ROK and the United States is a peninsula intelligence estimate (PIE), a collection of what are primarily military intelligence data; and each country has its own long-term strategic outlook. Comprehensive threat assessment or strategic assessment well beyond the PIE and the military field would be necessary and beneficial in coordinating the two countries' respective long-term strategic plans and policies. For that purpose, it is necessary to strengthen, or upgrade, the strategic dialogue and information/intelligence at both high levels and working levels. Security consultative meetings and military committee meetings should be the venues for in-depth discussion. Other venues should be used for not only current issues but also long-term strategic assessment.

Strategic Planning

If we have a common strategic outlook, the next thing that must be accomplished is appropriate strategic planning that will enable us to cope with possible concerns and

14. North Korean issues can also be integrated into the long-term strategic vision of the ROK and the United States.

anxieties. Currently, the strategic plan—known as OPLAN 5027—is mainly focused on full-scale war. However, future security concerns and challenges, such as human security issues, are more likely to be of low intensity, of short duration, and on the subnational level but with great ramifications for national, regional, and international peace and security. These future challenges will require enhanced cooperation and coordination among allies or like-minded countries.

To be better equipped to deal with such new challenges, therefore, we must expand the scope of strategic planning from full-scale war to operations other than war and low-intensity conflict. This requires the expansion, not the contraction, of the area where military forces are used. We should go beyond the traditional concept of strategic planning to arrive at a better position, where we can handle the issues effectively and provide an efficiently tailored response.

Force Restructuring and Improvement

Soon we will have fewer U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula. The ROK will assume the primary role in defending itself, and the United States will take a supporting role. However, the ROK is still heavily dependent upon the United States for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C⁴ISR)¹⁵ and air and naval components. Therefore, the consultation process for reducing the numbers of U.S. forces in Korea must be carried out very carefully, with full coordination. Inadequate management of troop reduction is likely to leave a large footprint.

For the ROK to assume the primary responsibility for deterring North Korean aggression, the ROK must improve its capabilities in C⁴ISR. Immediate requirements for the ROK to neutralize the North Korean threat to the capital area of Seoul are counterbattery systems, air-defense systems, and measures to neutralize North Korean tanks. Much emphasis will be placed on acquiring more air and naval assets. Key areas of concern must be lift capability and patrol capability. To go beyond the Korean peninsula to make a substantive contribution to regional as well as international peace and stability, the ROK navy and air force must acquire longer-range lift and patrol capabilities as well as combat capabilities. Airborne refueling systems and reliable seaborne lift systems with extended range of operation must be seriously considered. In addition, antisubmarine-warfare and mine-sweeping capabilities must be enhanced. Restructuring and possibly downsizing ground troops without damaging combat capability will be necessary. Demographic changes in Korea beginning in 2010 will

15. It is believed that the army of the ROK is approximately 90 percent dependent on the United States for intelligence and information regarding North Korea.

cause available human resources to decrease, making it difficult to maintain the current numbers of troops. Overcoming the predicted shortage of human resources and guaranteeing available forces to carry out the greater security role will require the careful allocation of resources, the use of RMA principles, and the adoption of the principle of reasonable sufficiency.

More specifically, ground forces need to become lighter and more mobile, yet with a strong combat capability—task-based units. Redundancy must be minimized in the combat support and services sector.¹⁶ Interoperability will be a key factor. If we work together regionally and internationally, interoperability will be essential. The ROK used to call for diversification of weapons procurement sources, which would make sense from an economic perspective; however, interoperability must also be respected to ensure the success of operations.

To overcome critics of the so-called U.S. monopoly in weapons procurement, cooperation and collaboration between the two countries in the defense-industry sector must be enhanced. Future warfare and other military operations will require use of information and computer technologies. Because South Korea is one of the world's leaders in information and computer technology, the areas for cooperation and collaboration between the two countries toward the goals of RMA should be apparent.

Training and Exercises

If we pursue a comprehensive security alliance, many operations will require quite different cooperation from what we have today. We currently focus on full-scale-warfare training and exercises such as reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) and Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL), a joint computer-based war game conducted annually. We rarely think of other types of operations, except the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise. In the future, issues and concerns will result in less-than-full-scale warfare that will require the use of military force; if ROK soldiers are not ready to carry out such missions, any plan is doomed to fail. Thus, in addition to current joint training and exercises, the ROK and the United States must develop and participate in diverse training and exercises that meet the emerging security challenges.

V. Guiding Principles

During the past five decades, the ROK-U.S. security alliance has contributed to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, and it will do so in the future. However, the

16. The ROK Ministry of National Defense is pursuing defense reform to reduce such redundancies and to maximize combat capabilities.

emergence of new security challenges makes adjustments necessary. No country can meet such challenges alone. More cooperation, consultation, and flexibility in response are necessary:

- **Trust and confidence.** The current alliance was formed 50 years ago to meet a common threat, but the future alliance must be aimed at cooperation to realize common values and ideas. Each partner should be open with the other and committed to the attainment of common values and ideas. Understanding and trust between the partners must be the foundation of the partnership. Instead of projecting or imposing on the other, each country must make efforts to enhance mutual understanding and increase contributions to the attainment of the common values and ideas of democracy, human rights, freedom, and the market economy.
- **Mutuality.** An alliance is a mutual relationship, not a unidirectional relationship. Alliance partners must be mutually supportive and complement each other. Mutuality can be attained by trying to understand the other's concerns and approaches and by identifying common areas. We must be clear about where we converge and where we diverge. Consultation and agreement, not negotiation, can lead to common ground for a robust and enduring partnership based on deeds, not only words.
- **Interoperability.** Both countries must forge an alliance that maintains interoperability. To thwart assaults on our common values and ideas and to ensure the effectiveness of our response, it is necessary and desirable for the ROK and the United States to maintain a high level of interoperability of assets, especially on intelligence and information.
- **Transparent management.** The process and steps in adjusting the present alliance must be carefully managed. Because of the nature of the issues to be discussed, transparency can be difficult to achieve, but each side should maintain maximum transparency and be open to the concerns of the other. Transparency will contribute to mutual respect.
- **Public diplomacy.** Both the ROK and the United States should try to reach out and inform the public of the importance of the alliance partnership. Respect for different cultures and societal characteristics must be taught through public diplomacy.

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