

JOINT U.S. – KOREA ACADEMIC STUDIES

Volume 14, 2004

**The United States and South Korea:
Reinvigorating the Partnership**

**Symposium Sponsored by
The Asia/Pacific Research Center,
Stanford University
The Korea Economic Institute, and
The Korea Institute for International Economic Policy
October 22–24, 2003**

CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-----|
| Preface | vii |
| The United States and South Korea: An Alliance under Stress | |
| Reality and Image of the U.S.-Korea Relationship Choi Jang-jip | 1 |
| From Collective Defense to Security Co-Management Park Tong-whan | 13 |
| The United States and North Korea: Containment or Engagement? | |
| The U.S.-D.P.R.K. Nuclear Standoff Samuel S. Kim | 41 |
| Coping with the North Korean Quagmire Moon Chung-in | 65 |
| U.S.-South Korea Economic Relations | |
| The Strategic Importance of U.S.-Korea Economic Relations Marcus Noland | 79 |
| Korea-U.S. Economic Relations Bark Tae-ho | 103 |
| Seoul: Regional Realities and Global Ambitions Eric Heikkila | 139 |
| Silicon Valley and South Korea: Deepening the High Tech Partnership | |
| Prospects for Korean Start-up Companies and Cooperation with Silicon Valley Seong So-mi | 159 |
| Anti-Americanism in Korea: Myth and Reality | |
| The Roots of Anti-Americanism in Korean Society Lee Sook-jong | 183 |
| “Anti-Americanism” in the Republic of Korea Bruce Cumings | 205 |
| Commentary Kim Won-ho | 230 |
| U.S.-Korea Relations: Where Do We Go from Here? | |
| George Shultz | 233 |
| Ahn Choong-yong | 241 |
| Keynote Speech | |
| Ahn Choong-yong | 249 |

THE U.S.-DPRK NUCLEAR STANDOFF: THE CASE FOR COMMON-SECURITY ENGAGEMENT

*Samuel S. Kim**

CONTENTS

- I. Introduction
- II. From Constrained Engagement to Constrained Rollback
- III. Survival Strategy, Whatever It Takes
- IV. In Search of Common-Security Solutions
- V. Conclusion

** Samuel S. Kim is Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Senior Research Associate, and Associate Director of the Center for Korean Research, East Asian Institute, Columbia University.*

I. Introduction

“If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.”

—W. I. Thomas (1928, 572)

We are constantly being told, at least in the United States, that the “second nuclear crisis” on the Korean peninsula suddenly erupted in October 2002 like thunder from blue skies when North Korea—officially the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—admitted the existence of a secret highly enriched uranium (HEU) program.

This newly received wisdom is more misleading than clarifying for several reasons. First, the Bush administration had known about the existence of the program for four months; hence there was no element of surprise. The only surprise was North Korea’s alleged admission that it was pursuing—as opposed to actually possessing—such HEU weapons material.¹ Even here there is conflicting post hoc revisionism by Pyongyang, where the story is that Vice Foreign Minister Kang Suk-ju, who was North Korea’s chief negotiator in Geneva for the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework (AF), told U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly that the DPRK was entitled to pursue such an HEU program. Second, the Bush administration’s actual behavior lacked all the hallmarks of a foreign-policy crisis: surprise, high stakes, short response time, limited options, and a limited number of decision-making participants. Third, this “crisis” has been long in the making, especially since the inauguration of the hard-line Bush administration in January 2001. One may even trace the U.S.-DPRK nuclear standoff back to late 1994, when the newly elected Republican Congress launched a preemptive attack against the AF, signed only two weeks before in Geneva. Fourth, on a line-by-line and sequential basis, Washington is as much responsible as Pyongyang for undoing the AF and creating the current standoff.

In this essay I make a deceptively simple common-security argument for the resolution of the seemingly complex U.S.-DPRK nuclear standoff. At the root of the current confrontation is the failure of both sides to face up to the fundamental challenges of common security, and there is no viable (nonviolent) alternative to direct negotiated solution if the parties follow a common-security approach.

1. According to Mohamed ElBaradei (2003, 48), Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, “Uranium enrichment is sophisticated and expensive, but it is not proscribed under the NPT. . . . Under the current regime, therefore, there is nothing illicit in a non-nuclear-weapon state having enrichment or reprocessing technology, or possessing weapon-grade nuclear material.”

The common-security approach proceeds from several core assumptions and axioms. First, it is a vision of common human destiny.² In an objective sense, the global-local linkage is not a matter of theoretical invention; it is empirical reality. Security in the nuclear-ecological age can only mean common security.³ Any fair security framework must address the legitimate concerns and interests of all its members. Second, common security has taken on special significance and urgency, especially as it has come to impact and condition the security situation of the divided Korean peninsula. Northeast Asia, with the Korean peninsula as its most sensitive flashpoint and strategic pivot, is the one and only region where the world's four major powers—the United States, China, Russia, and Japan—uneasily meet, interact, and see their interests coalesce, compete, and clash in situation-specific ways.⁴ The third premise is that true humanism—and common sense—recognizes that security in human life has never been and never can be absolute. The pursuit of absolute national security through military means or by Bush's evil-state strangulation strategy can only strengthen North Korea's resolve to go nuclear. Fourth, in the context of the current U.S.-DPRK nuclear standoff, the safest and cheapest way of enhancing the security of the stronger United States is to assure the security of the weaker, less privileged North Korea. That is, the United States, as the stronger party, needs to make greater security concessions and assurances to North Korea for the sake of enhancing the common cooperative security of all. Fifth and finally, traditional realist national security approaches cannot escape the reactive (and self-fulfilling) consequences of a state's security behavior for the behavior of its adversary. The issue of North Korea's nuclear program can never be settled without addressing the country's legitimate security needs and fears in strategically credible ways.⁵

In pursuit of this line of reasoning, this essay will track and explain how inconsistent and reactive U.S. policy has interacted with calculatedly survival-oriented international *démarches* of the DPRK to bring about an explosive situation on the Korean peninsula.

2. Perhaps the astronaut, Frank Borman, expressed this vision best when he related how he felt when he saw the Earth from Apollo 8: "It was hard to think that that little thing [the earth] held so many problems, so many frustrations. Raging nationalistic interests, famines, wars, pestilence don't show from that distance. I'm convinced that some wayward stranger in a spacecraft, coming from some other part of the heavens, could look at earth and never know that it was inhabited at all. But the same wayward stranger would certainly know instinctively that if the earth were inhabited, then the destinies of all who lived on it must inevitably be interwoven and joined. We are one hunk of ground, water, air, clouds, floating around in space. From out there it really is 'one world'."

3. For full discussion on the notion of common security, see Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (1982), Weston (1990), and Klare and Thomas (1991).

4. For a comprehensive analysis of the place of Northeast Asia in post-Cold War world politics, see Kim (2003a).

5. For application of a common-security approach in the Korean case, see Kim (1994, 56–9) and Gurtov (2002, 397–418).

To avert this dangerous collision means establishing a common-security baseline that must first be negotiated by the two parties in conflict—the United States and the DPRK—in the emerging bi-multilateral framework (a multilateral framework providing a venue for bilateral talks on the sidelines). But such a baseline must also be endorsed, simultaneously or subsequently, by China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea, and thus form a Northeast Asian security regime.

II. From Constrained Engagement to Constrained Rollback

The Clinton administration learned the hard way that the United States had no viable alternative but to accept North Korea's package-deal proposal that culminated in the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994. The Clinton administration's initial continuation of its predecessor's containment policy brought the two sides to the brink of war in June 1994. Reflecting on his involvement in the 16 June 1994 emergency national security meeting on the most serious North Korean nuclear-brinkmanship crisis of his tenure as secretary of defense, William Perry (Carter and Perry 1999, 123–4) writes about a third-way option for a negotiated deal in the face of the extremely limited alternatives available to U.S. policymakers: "We were about to give the president a choice between a disastrous option—allowing North Korea to get a nuclear arsenal, which we might have to face someday—and an unpalatable option, blocking this development, but thereby risking a destructive nonnuclear war."⁶ Given all the constraints on the issue-specific power of the United States, the rise of a cost-effective foreign policy, and the collapse of a bipartisan foreign-policy consensus in the 1990s, the AF (the third-way option) could be said to be the worst deal, except that there was no better alternative. What the hard-line, "no appeasement" opponents seldom mention is that, in the absence of the AF, North Korea could today have 50 to 100 bombs,⁷ not just one or two (according to the CIA's estimates).

And yet the AF as the new road map for moving U.S.-DPRK relations toward normalization encountered many obstacles and much sniping from day one. While Pyongyang treated the AF as a legally binding treaty, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO 1996) stated early on that the AF should properly be described as "a nonbinding political agreement" or "nonbinding international agreement" rather than an internationally binding legal document. Such an arbitrary unilateral interpretation of the AF defies one of the most well-established principles of international law. Virtually all international legal scholars, from Hugo Grotius onward, have pointed out that the

6. A footnote for this statement (Carter and Perry 1999, 123) explains that Ashton Carter was not present for the meeting referred to here, so Perry "tells this story himself." See also Perry (2002, 121).

7. The figure of 50 to 100 nuclear weapons is an extrapolation by Perry (2003, A23).

names or titles of international agreements have little or no legal significance; that is, legal force of an international agreement is not dependent on any particular name or title.

The U.S. position also leads to the implicit double-standard assertion that, while the United States is not legally obliged to implement its part of the bargain—normalization of political and economic relations; reduction of barriers of trade and investment within three months; delivery of a light-water reactor by a target date of 2003; provision of formal no-nuclear-threat, no first-use assurances—the cessation of U.S. heavy fuel shipments in November 2002 was justified on the basis of the interpretation of Pyongyang's HEU program as a violation of the AF. In response to the decision of the Washington-generated Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to stop shipments of heavy fuel to North Korea in the wake of James Kelly's visit to Pyongyang, the DPRK declared that it was Washington, not Pyongyang, that delivered the final blow to the AF. Indeed, supplying heavy fuel oil was said to have been the only one of the four articles of the AF that the United States has ever respected (Dao 2002).

There is no denying that the AF implementation process proceeded in fits and starts during the Clinton administration. With the instant political and diplomatic fallout of the Republican victory in the November 1994 congressional elections, the Clinton administration was either unable or unwilling to take on Congress on the unpopular North Korean issue. Unwilling to use its limited political capital, the administration backpedaled on implementing the "nonbinding" U.S. obligations, much to Pyongyang's chagrin and frustration as expressed in its on-again, off-again threats to trash or withdraw from the AF (Sigal 2001).

A more important, albeit unspoken, reason for U.S. backpedaling or inaction was the prevalent belief that North Korea would collapse within either six months (for the optimistic pundits) or three years (for the more cautious pundits). In 1994 and 1995, for example, even South Korea's President, Kim Young-sam, depicted North Korea as a "broken airplane" headed for a crash landing, a landing that would be followed by a quick Korean reunification. The specter of collapse even prompted behind-the-scenes efforts by the U.S. Department of Defense to coordinate contingency planning with South Korean and Japanese allies. At a summit meeting held on Cheju island in April 1996, leaders of South Korea and the United States agreed to promote a two-plus-two formula—the four-party peace talks—even as they privately predicted that the collapse in the North could come as soon as two or three years (Green 1997; AP 1997). Why not wait until the rotten apple falls by the weight of its internal contradictions rather than expend precious political capital for the odious North Korean regime?

During the eight-year Clinton administration, the North Korea policy of the United States shifted and mutated through three stages.⁸ The first stage was a continuation of the containment policy of the previous administration, essentially in place from 1991 through 1994. In light of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, North Korea was not an issue on the radar screens of most policymakers or pundits. When Bill Clinton took office, concerns about nuclear proliferation dealt with the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union: Washington wanted to account for the Soviet nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. This was a much more real and present danger than any vague notion of North Korean nuclear weapons. Therefore minimal steps were to be taken to contain North Korean aspirations for nuclear weapons, and any sort of *quid pro quo* was to be avoided.

The containment policy seemed to be working, and so the Clinton administration adopted it as its own. But trouble struck only a few months into Clinton's first term, in March 1993, when the DPRK gave its legally permissible 90-day notice that it would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it had signed in December 1985. This withdrawal was a response to the request of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for special inspections within the DPRK, the first time that the IAEA had made such a request of a country for unlimited access at any time or place. After a year of back and forth actions and reactions, including the suspension of withdrawal from the NPT, alleged tampering with IAEA seals, a newly announced intention to leave the IAEA, and attempts to impose UN Security Council sanctions, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter went to Pyongyang where he received "Kim Il Sung's personal pledge to freeze North Korea's nuclear program" and catalyzed the revival of U.S.-DPRK talks at a time when the United States was veering dangerously toward military action against North Korea (Sigal 1998, 132).⁹ Mildly embarrassed by Carter's freelance diplomacy, the Clinton administration realized that the United States had no alternative but to retreat from more hawkish options that were being discussed in June 1994 and accept North Korea's package proposal that culminated, after four months of negotiation, in the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. Thus the AF inaugurated the second stage of U.S.-DPRK relations under Clinton: the engagement stage. Engagement, however, was unfortunately limited from the very start by U.S. domestic pressures and politics.

Having transitioned from passive containment to a form of passive engagement, the United States had little to do with North Korea until 1998, when a new threat perception inaugurated the third stage of U.S.-DPRK relations, one characterized by a more vigorous pursuit of engagement. The key catalyst here was the August 1998 launch

8. For a detailed analysis along this line, see Caprio (2003, 55–84).

9. See Appendix I in Sigal (1998) for a chronology of events from 1991 through 1994.

of the Taepo-dong-1 missile that passed through Japanese air space; but this had been preceded by North Korean threats to abandon the AF structure and to begin reprocessing plutonium (Sigal 2001). In response, Clinton drafted his former secretary of defense, William Perry, to conduct a thorough review and assessment of U.S. policy toward North Korea. The so-called Perry Report (Perry 1999b), issued in October 1999, noted the centrality of the AF and called for a two-track approach of step-by-step comprehensive engagement and normalization with a concurrent posture of deterrence. As if to presage the coming of the evil-state demonization strategy, the Perry Report stresses that a policy of regime change and demise—“a policy of undermining the DPRK, seeking to hasten the demise of the regime of Kim Jong Il”—was one of four policy options considered but rejected.

The congressional Republicans responded to the Perry Report with an immediate attack, encapsulated in the report of the North Korea Advisory Group, chaired by Representative Benjamin Gilman of New York. The latter report (North Korea Advisory Group 1999) described the Clinton administration’s policies as inadequate and claimed that the DPRK was undeniably a larger threat than it had been before the AF was signed. Nonetheless, the issuance of the Perry Report and the implementation of some of its recommendations led to a lessening of the tense atmosphere and to substantive steps in both U.S.-DPRK relations and inter-Korean relations.

Indeed, the second half of 2000 witnessed a flurry of Pyongyang-Washington interactions, including a quasi summit between President Clinton and Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok in Washington and then a remarkable quasi summit between Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Chairman Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang. These meetings yielded significant progress toward improving U.S.-DPRK relations. The U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué¹⁰ of 12 October 2000, for example, stated *inter alia* that the two sides “are prepared to undertake a new direction in their relations” and “as a crucial first step, the two sides stated that neither government would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed the commitment of both governments to make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity.” In addition, there was a major missile accord in the making. By the end of 2000, however, Pyongyang had pulled up short, owing partly to the continuing issue of on-site verification and partly to rapidly changing U.S. political circumstances beyond its control. At the same time, the United States continued to fall short of its obligations under the AF, operating years behind schedule and not indicating any new time line to which it might adhere. This lack of follow-through has continually extended the nuclear standoff, and it is one of the reasons that the revelations of late 2002 should not have come as a surprise to any clear-eyed observer.

10. <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/usnkorea.htm>

With the coming of the hard-line ABC (anything but Clinton) Bush administration, it was Clinton's North Korea policy, not North Korea itself, that had a crash landing. A paradoxical consequence of this shift was a remarkable role reversal in the U.S.-ROK alliance relationship, such that Washington's and Seoul's North Korea policies too often recently have been out of sync with each other. The Bush administration has initiated a paradigm shift in its military and strategic doctrine—from a threat-based model to a capabilities-based model—in order to cope with the asymmetrical advantages of its adversaries, including North Korea (DOD 2001). At the same time, it has made missile defense one of its main avenues of defense research and development and has repeatedly cited North Korea as one of the primary reasons that the United States must pursue the technologically, diplomatically, and legally questionable weapons system.¹¹ Runaway unilateralism has predominated, and multilateralism has been rejected in both theory and practice in U.S. global policy, as evidenced in the rejection of numerous international treaties (including the ABM Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and a draft treaty on international small arms sales). With his creedal axis-of-evil speech, President George W. Bush made clear his administration's Manichean worldview. And with the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration made clear its willingness to act on this worldview.

The Bush administration's revolutionary shift was not unannounced. Condoleezza Rice, now the assistant to the President for national security affairs, published an article in *Foreign Affairs* (Rice 2000, 48) at the start of the 2000 election season that presaged the ideological shift. The article trashed the international community in the name of "promoting the national interest" and attacked the Clinton administration as having "often been so anxious to find multilateral solutions to problems that it has signed agreements that are not in America's interest." Rice also presaged the coming of the axis of evil by singling out three "rogue" regimes (Iraq, North Korea, and Iran) as the major coping challenge of the United States (Rice 2000, 60–1). While the Clinton administration had enacted a semantic shift from "rogue states" to "states of concern" in June 2000, the Bush administration, both during the campaign and after the 2000 election, has preferred the old terminology. The Bush administration has consistently listed North Korea as one of those rogue states, along with Iran and Iraq.

Congressional Republicans continued to further enflame relations with the DPRK, as evidenced by a series of reports in 2000 denouncing Clinton administration policy as "appeasement" and demanding an extensive overhaul (House Policy Committee 2000a, 2000b, 2000c). These were followed by the September 2000 publication of a neoconservative manifesto for the new American century (Project for the New

11. For an examination of how supporters of the National Missile Defense program have used the North Korean missile threat, see Kennedy (2001).

American Century 2000); some of the contributors (for example, Paul Wolfowitz) would later join the Bush administration. These documents represented a clear indication of the type of worldview and global strategy that would come from the ABC administration.

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, with the aftereffect of enabling the Bush administration to pursue whatever policies it wanted, came the axis-of-evil State of the Union speech in January 2002, in which the rogue-state strategy was upgraded to an evil-state strategy. A series of radical shifts in the U.S. military doctrine made it increasingly evident that this was more than mere rhetorical posturing: the Quadrennial Defense Review's call for a paradigm shift from threat-based to capability-based models; the Nuclear Posture Review's lowering of the threshold for the use for tactical nuclear weapons and listing of North Korea as one of seven target states; and the Bush doctrine of preemption, first proclaimed at West Point in June 2002, officially enunciated and codified in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America¹² in September 2002, and finally exercised in Iraq in March 2003 with perverse and self-defeating consequences.

The combination of harsh, demonizing rhetoric and a militantly forward sanctions strategy (e.g., Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's Operations Plan 5030 and the 11-nation Proliferation Security Initiative to establish an air and naval blockade/sanctions regime [Auster and Whitelaw 2003, 21]) worked to fuel a crisis atmosphere in U.S.-DPRK relations. But the actions of the Nuclear Posture Review explicitly contradict Article III (1) of the AF, which reads, "The United States will provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United States." This, coupled with the recent decision by the United States to pursue the development of a new generation of small "usable" nuclear weapons—the so-called Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator—are one more blow to the much-touted NPT regime and go a long way toward explaining Pyongyang's persistent and seemingly nonnegotiable demand in the latest nuclear standoff for a nonaggression treaty or a security-assurances pledge in legally binding form. The DPRK, once burned, is now twice cautious!

The rogue-state–evil-state strategy suffers from a variety of failings. In the first place, its expression is more theological than strategic; hence it seems more appropriate to call this a creed rather than a strategy. The notion of certain states being stereotyped as international rogues lacks standing in international law. At a more practical level, the rogue-state strategy or creed commits the fallacy of premature constraint on U.S. negotiating power and flexibility because the implied—or explicitly stated—policy of

12. www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html

regime change makes states less willing to cooperate. The policy only strengthens the resolve of the adversary state (Litwak 2000; Litwak 2001, 375–92). This leads, ultimately, to a self-fulfilling prophecy: those states decried as evil choose negotiating strategies and international behavior that make them seem more and more evil or roguish in the eyes of the Bush administration. And evil, after all, is to be destroyed; it cannot be a negotiating partner. Indeed, any deviation from the hard-line rollback strategy would arouse accusations of appeasement.

During 2002, while the Bush administration was developing its official statement of militant unilateral strategies, it was beginning to implement some of its tenets in practice. In March 2002, the administration declined to certify that the DPRK had not violated the AF under the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of 2002.¹³ This put U.S. funding to KEDO in grave danger for the first time, although it was eventually restored. In June, Secretary of State Colin Powell said that the United States would meet with the DPRK “any time, any place, without precondition.” According to Robert Gallucci in the 14 February 2002 *New York Times*, this was interpreted by the North Koreans as a willingness by the United States “to meet to accept North Korean surrender on the point issue.” Powell also greatly inflated behavioral preconditions, declaring that “Progress. . . will depend on Pyongyang’s behavior on a number of key issues,” which he defined as (a) getting out of the proliferation business and eliminating long-range missiles that threaten others, (b) making a much more serious effort to provide for its suffering children, (c) moving toward a less threatening conventional weapons posture, and (d) coming into full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards (Harnisch 2002, 872–3). Despite the claim of no preconditions, by August several preconditions had already been smuggled back in in the form of inflated agendas with several side issues and continuing insistence on a multilateral format. State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher said that the United States needed to see progress in relations between Japan and North Korea (Harnisch 2002). The Bush administration’s raising of the bar for phantom negotiations with Pyongyang seemed designed for rejection by Kim Jong-il, contributing to a brewing crisis during all of 2002 and indicating again why the revelations of October should not have come as any great surprise.

The Bush administration’s hard-line rogue-state–evil-state strategy has met with diverse criticism. Virtually all former U.S. ambassadors to the South Korea (ROK) and special envoys to the DPRK—Donald Gregg, James Laney, Stephen Bosworth, William Perry, Wendy Sherman, and Charles Kartman—have openly criticized the administration’s approach to North Korea. Charles Pritchard, who resigned as the State Department’s special envoy for North Korean nuclear issues in August 2003, said, “We’ve gone,

13. For the requirements, see *Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act*, P.L. 107-115, 10 January 2002, Section 565.

under [Bush's] watch, from the possibility that North Korea has one or two weapons to a possibility—a distinct possibility—that it now has eight or more. And it's happened while we were deposing Saddam Hussein for fear he might get that same capability by the end of the decade" (Sanger 2003b, A9; Perry 2003).

Indeed, the October 2002 revelations to James Kelly did not mark the beginning of the crisis but merely its most pronounced statement. Bush's non sequitur diplomacy (willing to talk but refusing to negotiate), preemptive doctrine, and evil-state strategy play rather directly into the DPRK's compensatory asymmetric negotiating strategies, so that the two countries spiral in a perpetual *danse macabre* instead of working toward negotiated resolution of the nuclear issue.

III. Survival Strategy, Whatever It Takes

With the demise of the Soviet Union and diminishing aid from China, the United States has become *faute de mieux* the functional equivalent of China and the Soviet Union combined in Pyongyang's strategic thinking and behavior. During the Cold War, Pyongyang demonstrated a remarkable unilateral, zigzag balancing strategy in its relations with Beijing and Moscow, always attempting to extract maximum payoffs in economic, technical, and military aid, taking sides if necessary on particular issues but never completely casting its lot with one against the other. In the post-Cold War era, the United States has "loomed ever larger in North Korean strategy, becoming the focal point of Pyongyang's efforts at regime survival and the key to enhancing international legitimacy, obtaining economic aid, investment, and increased trade, as well as tactical benefits in its relations with South Korea" (Manning 2002, 62). Such a shift in tactics was endorsed by Kim Il-sung himself as early as 1990 or 1991. Yet its successful execution has encountered a host of problems, all stemming from the different priorities and incentive structures that drive each party's respective policies toward the other. With the coming of the Bush administration, the role of the United States in North Korean foreign-policy thinking and behavior seems to have made a significant shift from lifeboat to mortal threat.

Drawing theoretical insights from asymmetric conflict and negotiation theory, we may explain the logic of North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship strategy as structured and conditioned by four key variables: the weak state's proximity to the strategic field of play, the availability to the stronger state of viable alternatives, the level of stakes for both states in conflict and the degree of resolve for each, and the degree of control for all involved parties. As a weaker state in conflict with the world's lone superpower and its allies (South Korea and Japan), North Korea has relied on and exercised issue-specific and situation-specific power, the effectiveness and credibility of which has required resources and skills other than those achieved through aggregate structural

power. Pyongyang's proximity to the strategic field of play; its compensating brinkmanship strategy; and its high stakes, resolve, and control have all reinforced one another to make the stronger actors' aggregate structural power less relevant and potent than they might appear.

Models of asymmetrical international negotiations are dynamic, process-oriented, issue-specific, and contextual analyses of international relations. One of the key ideas is that power relations are different in an issue-specific context than when they are judged at an aggregate or systemic level. William Habeeb suggests three kinds of power: "Aggregate structural power is an actor's total resources and capabilities; issue power describes an actor's resources and capabilities within the context of a specific issue or relationship; and tactical (or behavioral) power is an actor's ability to use its power resources to attain objectives" (Habeeb 1988, 129). North Korea, as a weaker state in conflict with a superpower, has had to rely upon compensating tactical power against aggregate structural power.¹⁴

If a small, weak state occupies territory of strategic importance to a larger and stronger state, or if the field of play is on the weak actor's home turf (as was the case in the U.S.-Panama negotiations and the Great Britain-Iceland cod wars and is now the case in U.S.-DPRK negotiations), the weaker state can display bargaining power disproportionate to its aggregate structural power (Barston 1971, 46; Habeeb 1988, 130-1). Indeed, located at the pivot point of Northeast Asian security and surrounded by all four major powers as well as its southern rival, North Korea's home turf allows it to exercise its compensatory brinkmanship or even its collapse card. That is, Pyongyang is capable, by instigating hostility or instability, of entrapping any or all four great powers in a spiral of conflict escalation these governments would rather avoid. Pyongyang therefore continues to command what Gen. John H. Tilelli Jr.—former commander of U.S. forces in Korea—called "tyranny of proximity" (Loeb and Slevin 2003, A16). If Pyongyang's brinkmanship or Washington's coercive evil-state sanctions/strangulation strategy escalate to war, the cost to all involved parties would be exorbitant. This fact provides a tremendous bargaining chip for the DPRK.

As for its own alternatives (the second strategic variable), the DPRK has few; and it tries to keep it that way. Without U.S. engagement, there is little hope that Pyongyang will receive the type of international aid it needs and the international recognition it desires. The nuclear card, therefore, has become an all-purpose, fungible, cost-effective instrument of foreign policy, applicable to almost any situation as a military deterrent, an equalizer in competition with South Korea (since nuclear weapons are one of

14. According to a recent study, weak states were victorious in nearly 30 percent of all asymmetric wars in the approximately 200-year period covered in the Correlates of War data set. More tellingly, weak states have won with increasing frequency over time. See Arreguin-Toft (2001, 96).

North Korea's only areas of advantage), a bargaining chip for extracting maximum concessions, and above all a credible insurance policy for regime survival. Because of the way the DPRK played the nuclear card in the early 1990s, the IAEA had no alternative but to turn the crisis over to higher authorities; and the United States had no alternative but to engage in direct high-level negotiations. Likewise, in the latest standoff, Pyongyang has consistently tried to eliminate alternatives to bilateral talks with the United States in order to force the United States to the negotiating table as the only means of solving the nuclear crisis.

The level of stakes and degree of resolve is the third variable, and the high-stakes game that the DPRK is playing is tied into the notion of limited alternatives. The North Korean regime's foreign-policy agenda is very narrowly focused: Pyongyang aims at survival, security, status, and sovereignty. Any affront to these is treated as a very serious (even mortal) threat, so the DPRK has conceived the stakes of the game as extremely high. The fact that the game, no matter how or in what issue area it is being played, is ultimately about the survival-driven security dilemma is evidenced in recent comments by Charles Pritchard on the 2000 U.S. diplomatic trip to North Korea:

I am struck by what Kim Jong-il, North Korea's leader, said to Madeleine Albright, former U.S. secretary of state, in October 2000. He told her that in the 1970s, Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader, was able to conclude that China faced no external security threat and could accordingly refocus its resources on economic development. With the appropriate security assurances, Mr. Kim said, he would be able to convince his military that the United States was no longer a threat and then be in a similar position to refocus his country's resources (Pritchard 2003).

In a 1999 interview, William Perry offered a similar assessment: "We do not think of ourselves as a threat to North Korea. But I fully believe that they consider us a threat to them, and therefore, they see [the Taepo-dong-1] missile as a means of deterrence" (Perry 1999a).

Coherent with the high-stakes nature of the game is the DPRK's high degree of resolve. Indeed, in any nuclear standoff, greater negotiating power and advantages go not to the stronger party with more nuclear warheads but to the weaker party with the stronger resolve to stand firm in the face of the shared risk and security codependency that the conflict will spin out of control.¹⁵ This means that if things go wrong, they will go very wrong for both parties, albeit in asymmetrical ways. General Gary Luck, former commander of U.S. forces in Korea, offered a sober but succinct

15. For my elaboration of this point, see Kim (1997, 163–86).

estimate of the bottom line if things go badly awry on the Korean peninsula: “one million and one trillion.” That is, the costs of going to war over North Korea’s nuclear program would amount to 1 million casualties and \$1 trillion in estimated industrial damage and lost business (Loeb and Slevin 2003, A16). The degree of resolve for Pyongyang is now far greater than it was in 1994 when Secretary of Defense Perry noted the development of the AF as expanding the options beyond the Hobson’s choice of allowing the DPRK to build nuclear weapons or engaging in “a destructive nonnuclear war.”

Degree of control is the fourth variable in determining asymmetric negotiating outcomes, and, according to Habeeb “control is the single most important component of issue power” (Habeeb 1988, 130–1). While in a status quo state Pyongyang would not seem to have much control, but the regime has excelled in manipulating the nuclear issue so as to enhance its control in negotiations. Tactics have included ambiguity, brinkmanship, stalling, backsliding, surprise announcements, and divide-and-conquer ploys among the allies of the United States. Capitalizing on uncertainty and ever shifting goalposts in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo, Pyongyang has played a skillful cat-and-mouse game with international inspections, reactor restarting, nuclear-fuel reprocessing, and so forth. Backsliding on agreements has served as a mechanism for testing U.S. resolve in terms of implementation and the possibility of new concessions. By leaving the state of its nuclear program unclear—experts cannot agree on how many nuclear weapons, if any, Pyongyang has, and how many it might produce in a given time frame—North Korea has gained additional leverage in manipulating the rules of the game.

With these four variables working in its favor, the DPRK was able in 1994 to employ an asymmetric negotiating strategy successfully vis-à-vis the United States. The failure of the United States to implement the AF initiated a return by the DPRK to these tactics of negotiation, first in 1998 by making missile technology and proliferation an issue with the Taepo-dong-1 launch and then in late 2002 and early 2003 by the lighting of “three long nuclear fuses”: the seeking of equipment to process uranium, the production of plutonium at the Yongbyon facility, and the resumption of construction on the reactors frozen by the AF (Sigal 2003). Perceiving a clear and present danger based on the regime-change rhetoric and/or strategy of the new Bush administration and facing the U.S. decision to stop sending monthly heavy fuel supplies, the DPRK did what most countries under similar circumstances would do: it reactivated the nuclear bargaining chip. It is unclear exactly when Pyongyang revived the HEU program. It may have started as a strategic hedge in light of U.S. failure to implement the AF, but the program undoubtedly was accelerated in response to the perceived increase in hostile attitude from the Bush administration.

On 29 August 2003, the Korean Central News Agency (the North Korean news service) stated the chain of thought succinctly:

The Bush administration openly disclosed its attempt to use nuclear weapons after listing the DPRK as part of “an axis of evil” and a target of “preemptive nuclear attack.” This prompted us to judge that the Bush administration is going to stifle our system by force and decide to build a strong deterrent force to cope with it. Hence, we determined to possess that force. Our deterrent force is not aimed to attack somebody without any proper reason. It is a means for self-defense to protect our sovereignty.

Clearly the harsh evil-state rhetoric of the Bush administration had done more than just raise a few eyebrows in Pyongyang; it had inspired a calculated, material, and coercive-diplomacy response. North Korea resorted to the favored strategy of brinkmanship/breakdown/breakthrough (BBB) that it had first employed in the 1994 nuclear crisis (Kim 1995, 13–27).

On the basis of the Bush administration’s behavior so far, the result would seem to be the United States coming to loggerheads with the DPRK rather than conceding any ground. The non sequitur diplomacy of talking but not negotiating directly and the persistence of the evil-state theology mean that the United States will act far more provocatively than it did under the Clinton administration, which is frightening considering that in 1994 surgical air strikes were seriously considered as an option, and outright war was a clear and continuing possibility. The DPRK’s asymmetric negotiating tactics bolster the administration’s Manichean image of North Korea as an evil regime bent on destruction, a perception that hinders the possibility of serious negotiation and an end to enmity that the DPRK persistently demands.

IV. In Search of Common-Security Solutions

Implicit in the Bush administration’s approach has been the highly unrealistic expectation that North Korea would engage in unilateral nuclear disarmament for unspecified economic benefits in the future. On the basis of this unspoken assumption, Washington has demanded that the North first abandon its military programs; only afterwards will the United States decide whether or not to be benevolent. This presumptuousness has further toughened Pyongyang’s resolve to develop a credible deterrent. Likewise, the United States has expected the DPRK to unilaterally fulfill its portions of the Agreed Framework, while the United States has dragged its feet in appropriating money for KEDO operations and an annual shipment of 500,000 tons of heavy oil supplies (but

not the cost of building the two light-water reactors)¹⁶ and, perhaps more important, in working toward normalization of relations and an end to enmity.

This blindness on the part of the Bush administration has led to some serious strains and rifts with South Korea. For example, South Korea's foreign minister, Yoon Young-kwan, held a heated meeting with Colin L. Powell in September 2003 in New York, demanding that President Bush respond to North Korea's call for a nonaggression or peace treaty and a plan for gradual improvement in economic relations in return for dismantling any nuclear facilities. In a twist that angered Powell, Yoon is reported to have said that his new President, Roh Moo-hyun, would not consider any troops to aid the U.S. effort in Iraq unless the United States gave ground on North Korea. Powell, according to several officials familiar with the exchange, curtly told him, "That is not how allies deal with each other" (Sanger 2003b, A9).

The Bush administration's latest "multilateral approach" stands on shaky historical and practical grounds. The fact that the otherwise multilateralism-averse Bush administration is belatedly coming up with a multilateral approach is widely perceived as an attempt to form a united regional (multilateral) front against the DPRK. From Pyongyang's perspective, this multilateral approach is seen as a diversionary tactic on the part of the United States. Besides, Pyongyang does not feel threatened by China, Russia, Japan, or even South Korea; hence no security assurances are needed from them.

Moreover, there are few multilateral precedents for engineering a country's unilateral nuclear disarmament. The past role of the United States is prologue to the future, as Washington has successfully prevented the nuclearization of a number of other countries through the right mix of security assurances and economic benefits, something that has become Pyongyang's bottom line. Washington's security assurances and economic inducements have helped convince South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to abandon nuclear armament. Only in Pakistan has the United States failed (Sigal 1998, 4, 254). South Korea gave up its nuclear program in the 1970s in exchange of more and better security assurances from the United States. The former Soviet Union, under the Nunn-Lugar aid program, has dismantled many of its weapons; and Ukraine—which had possession of some 1,900 Soviet nuclear warheads—agreed to get rid of them all in exchange for security assurances, economic support, and energy assistance (Hayes 2003; Sigal 1998, 254, 305n). These successes should serve as inspiration for a policy of positive inducements

16. Although the United States assumes the legal responsibility for constructing the two light-water reactors, the actual financial cost, estimated at \$4.5 billion, is taken up by South Korea (70 percent), Japan (20 percent), and the EU (10 percent).

and should indicate the importance of providing meaningful security guarantees to replace those associated with the possession of nuclear weapons.

International-relations theory also casts doubt on the ability of multilateral international cooperation to solve a conflict such as the U.S.-DPRK nuclear standoff. International cooperation requires first of all recognition of opportunities for the advancement of mutual interests as well as corresponding policy coordination once these opportunities have been identified and recognized. As the number of actors increases, the likelihood of defection increases and the feasibility of sanctioning defectors diminishes. Furthermore, the costs of transactions and information rise in proportion to the multiplicity and complexity of each player's payoff structure and set of mutual interests, militating against any easy identification and realization of common interests in a given situation. As a consequence, strategies of reciprocity or strategies of "seeking common ground while preserving differences" become more difficult to carry out, triggering a collapse of cooperation.¹⁷

According to Charles Pritchard, the Bush administration may be racing too quickly with its eyes on an unattainable multilateral solution. On 9 September 2003, Pritchard, the Bush administration's former top negotiator with North Korea, offered a blunt assessment and sharp critique of the administration's hard-line policy toward North Korea, asserting that Pyongyang will not relinquish its nuclear weapons programs without more active direct U.S. engagement: "The idea that in a short period of time you can resolve this problem" in talks where diplomats from six countries sit down with 24 interpreters and try to make a deal without private consultations is "ludicrous" (Efron 2003; Slevin 2003, A19). In a similar vein, Agence France-Presse reported on 4 December 2003 that James Kelly, the Bush administration's point man for the six-party talks, likened the process of generating a multilateral consensus for the convening of a second round of the six-party talks to "herding cats." The DPRK has declared that further talks will be meaningless unless Washington front-loads an end to its hostility and expresses willingness to negotiate a nonaggression treaty via the "principle of simultaneous actions."

China has taken an uncharacteristically proactive conflict-management role, spurred by its growing security concerns about possible U.S. recklessness in trying to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis through military means.¹⁸ The logic of Beijing's proactive preventive diplomacy is to avert the crystallization of conditions under which Pyongyang could calculate that lashing out—to preempt the U.S. preventive strike, as it were—

17. For an elaboration of the theoretical and policy implications, see the October 1985 special issue of *World Politics*, especially Oye (1985, 1–24).

18. For further analysis of China's proactive mediation role, see Kim (2003b, 39–55).

which would be a last rational course of action even if ultimate victory were impossible. From Beijing's perspective, the perverse and self-defeating consequences of the evil-state strategy are seen as aiding and abetting hard-liners in Pyongyang and fueling the compensatory BBB behavior of the first U.S.-DPRK nuclear standoff in 1994. Chinese leaders were particularly unnerved by the news in April 2003 that U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had circulated a memorandum proposing that the United States ally itself with China to isolate and bring about a collapse of the North Korean regime (Sanger 2003a, 15; Rennie 2003).

China faces great danger from two alternative possibilities: conflict escalation and collapse acceleration. Either the DPRK could feel so cornered that it fights back, triggering a full-blown armed conflagration; or else economic sanctions could work so well as to produce another collapsing socialist regime on China's borders, with huge political, economic, and social consequences for Chinese domestic politics. It has recently come to light that the six-party talks in Beijing were the hard-earned outcome of President Hu Jintao's behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts.

China's preferred solution is now advanced in the form of a comprehensive package deal stressing three key elements: (1) restarting diplomatic dialogue and negotiations in a bi-multilateral framework; (2) avoiding any hostile or provocative rhetoric and actions; and (3) specifying security assurances and economic aid in exchange for dismantling the nuclear program, thus reviving and revising the 1994 Agreed Framework. Yet such a comprehensive but flexible proposal is easier proposed than accepted, let alone implemented, given Washington's rigid script.

While China has served as a catalyst for insuring that the talks actually happened, it has not publicly put forth a substantive proposal on which an agreement might be based. Neither, for that matter, has the United States, and the latter has declared the 1994 agreement, which might have served as a suitable baseline for negotiations, "effectively dead" (CBS 2002). At this point, the most prominent proposal on the table comes from the DPRK, which offered a "package solution" deal at the six-party talks that would revive the AF (without an explicit reference to it) and include a missile deal in exchange for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States and Japan. The DPRK offer contains the following points: that dismantling the nuclear program is contingent on a lessening of U.S. hostility, that a nonaggression treaty is the benchmark of this lessening of hostility, that such a treaty must be of binding legal force, and that action must be taken simultaneously (KCNA 2003a).

Giving more specifics of the measures to be taken by the United States and North Korea, Kim Yong-il—vice minister of foreign affairs and head of the DPRK delegation to the six-party talks—summarized the package solution to be implemented via simultaneous actions as follows:

For a package solution, the U.S. should conclude a nonaggression treaty with the DPRK, establish diplomatic relations with it and guarantee the economic cooperation between the DPRK and Japan and between the north and the south of Korea. And it should also compensate for the loss of electricity caused by the delayed provision of light water reactors and complete their construction. For this, the DPRK should not make nuclear weapons and allow the nuclear inspection, finally dismantle its nuclear facility, put on ice the missile testfire and stop its export. . . . According to the order of simultaneous actions, the U.S. should resume the supply of heavy fuel oil, sharply increase the humanitarian food aid. . . . According to this order, we will allow the refreeze of our nuclear facility and nuclear substance and monitoring and inspection of them from the time the United States has concluded a nonaggression treaty with the DPRK and compensated for the loss of electricity. We will settle the missile issue when diplomatic relations are opened between the DPRK and the United States and between the DPRK and Japan. And we will dismantle our nuclear facility from the time the LWRs [light-water reactors] are completed (KCNA 2003a).

The statement contains a mixture of economic and political demands, all of which relate back to the 1994 AF. Having presented its package solution in Beijing, North Korea assessed the stands of the other participants in the six-party talks as follows: (1) China, Russia, and South Korea also referred to the package solution and the way of simultaneous actions; (2) Japan tried to use the six-way talks for meeting its political interests, focusing on the abduction issue; (3) the United States took the most unreasonable stand of disarmament first and security and economic aid later; and (4) it has become clearer through the six-way talks that the United States is forcing the DPRK to disarm while it persistently pursues its hostile policy toward the DPRK (KCNA 2003a).

While U.S. officials have claimed that this proposal does not represent anything new from North Korea, the U.S. quagmire in Iraq and growing uncertainties in Afghanistan combined with sustained pressures from Beijing, Seoul, and Moscow have provided more room for some moderate forces and channels in the State Department. Taking advantage of the Pentagon's preoccupation with the Iraq fiasco, Secretary of State Powell has explored the possibility of a multilateral security pact: "It would be something that would be public, something that would be written, something that I hope would be multilateral" (AFP 2003). Powell's staff was drafting sample agreements (based on what he called historical "models" of similar deals) that he hoped would be acceptable to Pyongyang and would ease the impasse over its nuclear weapons programs. The language of the draft agreements would soon be shared with friends and allies, with the expectation that they would agree to join Washington in pledging not to attack the DPRK. Australia and Russia suggested a similar concept earlier in the year, but until now the United States has balked at it. On 25 October 2003, during his trip to East Asia, President Bush indicated for the first time that the United States would offer a

multilateral security guarantee to be signed by Pyongyang's Northeast Asian neighbors as well as by Washington.

In a significant shift, on 24 October 2003, Pyongyang responded via its New York/UN channels with a cautiously positive reaction. A formal public response came the next day: "We are ready to consider Bush's remarks on the 'written assurances of nonaggression' if they are based on the intention to coexist with the DPRK and aimed to play a positive role in realizing the proposal for a package solution on the principle of simultaneous actions" (KCNA 2003b).

This may well be the beginning of what North Korea hopes to obtain in the nuclear game that it is playing and, therefore, a very positive step forward. Will such a multilateral approach prevail against more hawkish members of the Bush administration who wish to continue to pursue the evil-state strangulation strategy aimed at the collapse of North Korea? It is too early to say. As of this writing, a similar bureaucratic fight is being played out in Washington as was played out with regard to Iraq between the State Department and the Department of Defense (Kessler 2003, A25). One must hope that, contrary to the outcome in Iraq, a more engagement-oriented approach originating in the State Department will prevail.

V. Conclusion

Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington (writing in early 1999 for *Foreign Affairs*—perhaps the most influential foreign-policy magazine for policymakers in Washington and elsewhere) offered a trenchant critique of the creeping unilateralism in the United States: "On issue after issue, the United States has found itself increasingly alone, with one or a few partners, opposing most of the rest of the world's states and peoples. . . . On these and other issues, much of the international community is on one side and the United States is on the other" (Huntington 1999, 41). A similar but more serious situation has been developing in Northeast Asia as the United States has sought a solution to the renewed nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. The most recent developments, however, point in what one hopes is a more multilateral common-security direction.

Because much of the U.S. perception of other states' levels of cooperation will be viewed through the Manichean lens of 11 September 2001—states being either for or against the United States—the danger exists for speeding security-dilemma dynamics, perhaps even for transitioning Pyongyang's interests into more irreversible nuclear directions. The absence of any substantial U.S. security assurances—again the central North Korean demands of the 1994 Agreed Framework—would be used by hard-liners in Pyongyang as evidence of the failure of diplomacy in dealing with the world's lone superpower.

The DPRK did not create a crisis when confronted by U.S. envoy James Kelly; rather, a simmering crisis fed by the failure of U.S. policy since the signing of the AF emerged out in the open. Since 1994 the United States has ignored the need for common security and failed to acknowledge the necessity of living up to its part of the 1994 agreement. The hard-line rhetoric of the Bush administration—with its evil-state strategy, preemptive war plans, and increased faith in nuclear weapons, especially small usable ones—has stirred the simmering crisis and forced it out into the open. In both the academic world and the world of policy and punditry there is a tendency to forget that state interests are often susceptible to the self-fulfilling-prophecy effects of the behavior of other states. In no small part because of the severity of U.S. demonization rhetoric, U.S.-DPRK relations remain in precarious balance.

The United States is not entirely to blame, as the DPRK's shrill confrontational rhetoric and nuclear brinkmanship certainly lend themselves to enflamed feelings of betrayal on the opposite side. But the combination of Manichean rhetoric from a unilateralist United States and the provocation of nuclear brinkmanship from the DPRK completely overshadow the notion of a common security toward a long peace in Northeast Asia. Only by taking steps to revive this notion of common security, largely by addressing the issue of North Korea's very survival, can U.S.-DPRK relations come to rest at a more stable, safe, and sane equilibrium.

REFERENCES

- Agence France-Presse (AFP). 2003. U.S. Seeks Partners for Multilateral Security Pact with North Korea, 11 October.
- Associated Press (AP). 1997. North Korea Collapse Predicted. Associated Press, 6 March.
- Auster, Bruce B., and Kevin Whitelaw. 2003. Upping the Ante for Kim Jong Il: Pentagon Plan 5030, a New Blueprint for Facing Down North Korea. *U.S. News and World Report*, 21 July.
- Barston, Ronald P. 1971. The External Relations of Small States. In *Small States in International Relations*, edited by August Schou and Arne Olav Brundtland. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiskell.
- Caprio, Mark E. 2003. U.S.-DPRK Diplomatic Relations under the Clinton Administration: Cycles of Conflict and Resolution. *American Asian Review* 21, no. 1 (Spring).
- Carter, Ashton B., and William J. Perry. 1999. *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

- CBS News (CBS). 2002. Powell: U.S.–N. Korea Nuclear Deal Dead. 20 October. www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/10/21/world/main526243.shtml.
- Dao, James. 2002. Bush Administration Halts Payments to Send Oil to North Korea. *New York Times*, 14 November.
- Department of Defense (DOD). 2001. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. 30 September. www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf (accessed 15 June 2002).
- Efron, Sonni. 2003. Ex-Envoy Faults U.S. on N. Korea. *Los Angeles Times*, 10 September (Internet version).
- ElBaradei, Mohamed. 2003. Towards a Safe World. *Economist*. 18 October.
- Government Accounting Office (GAO). 1996. Nuclear Nonproliferation—Implications of the U.S./North Korean Agreement on Nuclear Issues. GAO Report no GAO/RCED/NSIAD-97-8 to the Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate. October.
- Green, Michael. 1997. North Korean Regime Crisis: U.S. Perspectives and Responses. *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 9 no. 2 (Winter);
- Gurtov, Mel. 2002. Common Security in North Korea: Quest for a New Paradigm in Inter-Korean Relations. *Asian Survey* 42, no. 3 (May/June).
- Habeeb, William Mark. 1988. *Power and Tactics in International Negotiation: How Weak Nations Bargain with Strong Nations*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Harnisch, Sebastian. 2002. U.S.-DPRK Relations under the Bush Administration: From “go slow” to “no go,” *Asian Survey* 42, no. 6.
- Hayes, Peter. 2003. Bush’s Bipolar Disorder and the Looming Failure of Multilateral Talks with North Korea. *Arms Control Today* (October).
- House Policy Committee. 2000a. Clinton-Gore North Korea Aid: Evidence Shows False Premise for Appeasement. U.S. House of Representatives. 11 April.
- House Policy Committee. 2000b. Clinton-Gore North Korea Aid Will Provide Plutonium for Nuclear Bombs. U.S. House of Representatives. 14 April.
- House Policy Committee. 2000c. Clinton-Gore Aid to North Korea Supports Kim Jong-il’s Million Man Army. U.S. House of Representatives. 27 July.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1999. The Lonely Superpower. *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 2 (March/April).
- Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. 1982. *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Kennedy, Spurgeon. 2001. Preserving the North Korean Threat. *Arms Control Today Online* 4. www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_04/focus01.asp.

- Kessler, Glenn. 2003. U.S. Has a Shifting Script on N. Korea: Administration Split as New Talks Near. *Washington Post*, 7 December.
- Kim, Samuel S. 1994. The Two Koreas and World Order. In *Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War*, edited by Kihl Young-whan. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
- . 1995. North Korea in 1994: Brinkmanship, Breakdown and Breakthrough. *Asian Survey* 35, no. 1 (January).
- . 1997. PukMi hyopsang kwa Pukhan ui chunryak (DPRK-U.S. negotiations and North Korea's strategy). In *PukHan ui Hyopsang Chunryak kwa NamPukHan Kwangkye* (North Korea's negotiating strategy and South-North relations), edited by Kwak Tae-hwan. Seoul: Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University.
- , ed. 2003a. *The International Relations of Northeast Asia*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.
- . 2003b. Chinese-North Korean Relations at a Crossroads. *International Journal of Korean Studies* 7, no. 1 (Spring/Summer).
- Klare, Michael T., and Daniel C. Thomas, eds. 1991. *World Security: Trends and Challenges at Century's End*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). 2003a. Keynote Speeches Made at Six-way Talks. 29 August. www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200308/news08/30.htm.
- . 2003b. 25 October. www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200310/news10/27.htm.
- Loeb, Vernon, and Peter Slevin. 2003. Overcoming North Korea's "Tyranny of Proximity." *Washington Post*, 20 January.
- Litwak, Robert. 2000. *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- . 2001. What's in a Name? The Changing Foreign Policy Lexicon. *Journal of International Affairs* 54 no. 2 (Spring).
- Manning, Robert. 2002. United States–North Korean Relations: From Welfare to Workfare? In *North Korea and Northeast Asia*, edited by Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan Lee (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield).
- North Korea Advisory Group. 1999. Report to the Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives. November.
- Oye, Kenneth A. 1985. Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies. *World Politics* 38, no. 1 (October).
- Perry, William. 1999a. Interview, Washington, D.C., 17 September. Provided by NAPSNet at www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/9909/Sep20.html#item4.

- . 1999b. Review of United States Policy toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations. 12 October. www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/991012_northkorea_rpt.html.
- . 2002. The United States and the Future of East Asian Security: Korea-Quo Vadis? In *Building Common Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia*, edited by Woo Keun-min. Seoul: Yonsei University Press.
- . 2003. It's Either Nukes or Negotiation. *Washington Post*, 23 July.
- Pritchard, Charles. 2003. A Guarantee to Bring Kim Into Line. *Financial Times*, 10 October.
- Project for the New American Century. 2000. *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century: A Report of The Project for the New American Century*. September. www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf.
- Rennie, David. 2003. Rumsfeld Calls for Regime Change in North Korea. *Daily Telegraph* (London), 22 April.
- Rice, Condoleeza. 2000. Promoting the National Interest. *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 1 (January/February).
- Sanger, David E. 2003a. Aftereffects: Nuclear Standoff, Administration Divided Over North Korea. *New York Times*, 21 April.
- . 2003b. Intelligence Puzzle: North Korean Bombs. *New York Times*, 14 October.
- Sigal, Leon V. 1998. *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- . 2001. Countdown on Korea. *American Prospect* 12, no. 15 (27 August).
- . 2003. Presentation at Columbia University, New York, 26 February.
- Slevin, Peter. 2003. Former Envoy Presses North Korea Dialogue. *Washington Post*, 9 September.
- Thomas, W. I. 1928. *The Child in America*. New York: Knopf.
- Weston, Burns H., ed. 1990. *Alternative Security*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.

